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Internet has opened the door for e-commerce and created a business av-
enue, online retailing. E-commerce presently shapes the manner in which
consumers shop for products. The online retailing markets have grown by
56% during the past five years, while traditional retailing markets are only
grown by 2% during the same time. The noticeable growth of online retail-
ing creates numerous opportunities as well as challenges for the context of
operations management.
Extensive literature in this domain focus on the conventional inventory
management and pricing problems as in traditional retailing. However,
the rapid development of information technology threatens the established
business models and creates opportunities for new business models. Com-
panies may find it increasingly difficult to make strategic decisions, such
as how to deal with the challenge associated with online retailing and how
to adapt to the new retailing environment. This thesis aims to investigate
innovative business models involved in online retailing, to capture trendy
phenomena that are under-studied, and provide managerial insights.
The first chapter focuses on dealing with the logistics challenge caused by
the booming e-commerce activities. An urban consolidation center (UCC)
or a peer-to-peer platform may alleviate the economic, social and envi-
ronmental pressure on well-being. We compare the performance of these
two business models to guide a consolidator to make efficient operational
decisions. The second chapter focuses on the channel management deci-
sions of a retailer who operates an offline (brick-and-mortar) channel and
an online channel. The two channels are either operated separately or inte-
grated. We explore how the retailer can profitably integrate her offline and
online channels, from a perspective of product descriptions and consumer
reviews. The last chapter focuses on a seller’s decisions in the process of
entering the online market through online marketplaces. In addition to
pure-play marketplaces, some marketplaces also sell their own products di-
rectly competing with sellers, which creates a new form of channel conflict.
We analyze the optimal decisions for both the seller and the marketplaces
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The internet has opened the door for electronic commerce (e-commerce) and
created a business avenue, online retailing. E-commerce presently shapes
the manner in which consumers shop for products. The online retailing
markets have grown by 56% during the past five years, while traditional
retailing markets are only grown by 2% during the same time. The no-
ticeable growth of online market creates numerous opportunities as well as
challenges for the context of operations management. With such a large po-
tential, online retailing has attracted tremendous attention from researchers
in the past few years.
Extensive literature in online retailing focus on the conventional inventory
management and pricing problems as in traditional retailing. However,
the rapid development of information technology threatens the established
business models and creates opportunities for new business models. Com-
panies engaged in online retailing may find it increasingly difficult to make
strategic decisions, such as how to deal with the challenge associated with
online retailing and how to adapt to the new retailing environment. This
thesis aims to investigate innovative business models involved in online re-
tailing, to capture trendy phenomena that are under-studied, and provide
managerial insights for practitioners.
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Chapter 2 focuses on dealing with the logistics challenge caused by the
booming e-commerce activities and the growing population. These phe-
nomena create huge demand for urban last-mile delivery, exerting intense
pressure on the cities’ well-being. To build a city with congestion and
pollution under control, a consolidator can operate an urban consolidation
center (UCC) to bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-
mile delivery. Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer
platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity.
Our objective is to compare the performance of these two business models
to guid the consolidator to make efficient operational decisions. Under each
business model, we study the interactions between a consolidator and mul-
tiple carriers using a two-period game-theoretical model. In each period,
the consolidator first chooses a delivery fee to maximize her expected profit.
Each carrier then observes his task volume, and decides whether to deliver
on his own or use the consolidator’s service to minimize his expected cost.
Under the UCC model, the carriers become more dependent on the UCC to
deliver their tasks as their variable delivery cost increases or their logistics
reestablishment cost decreases. Under the platform model, the carriers
generally keep their logistics capability (even if they purchase capacity from
the platform) in equilibrium to ensure their flexibility of selling capacity
on the platform. Between the two business models, it is generally more
profitable for the consolidator to operate the UCC than the platform if the
carriers’ fixed delivery cost is large. Furthermore, the UCC becomes more
dominant as there are more carriers. If the number of carriers is large,
it is also more efficient for the consolidator to operate the UCC than the
platform to reduce the expected social-environmental cost. Otherwise, the
platform is more efficient.
Chapter 3 focuses on the channel management decisions of a retailer who
sells a single product to consumers through an offline (brick-and-mortar)
channel and an online channel. The consumers in each channel are het-
erogeneous such that the product fits the tastes of only a fraction of these
consumers. The retailer provides a product description for each channel to
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help the consumers assess whether the product fits their tastes. The two
channels are either operated separately with different product description
levels or integrated with a common product description level.
To explore how the retailer can profitably integrate her offline and online
channels, we construct a two-period game-theoretical model in which the
retailer optimizes the product description levels to maximize her expected
profit. We find that integrating the offline and online channels yields more
profit for the retailer if and only if the offline channel’s product description
limit and the consumers’ base product valuation are small.
We further consider a review system where the consumers who purchase
the product in period 1 may post their reviews. The fraction of positive
reviews in period 1 will influence the purchase intention of the upcoming
consumers in period 2. In the presence of the consumer reviews, even if the
offline product description limit is large, it can still be more profitable for
the retailer to integrate the offline and online channels. Furthermore, the
consumer reviews may reduce the retailer’s profit if the consumers’ base
product valuation is sufficiently large.
Chapter 4 focuses on a seller’s decisions in the process of entering the on-
line market through online marketplaces. In addition to many pure-play
marketplaces, some marketplaces also sell their own products directly to
consumers. As a result, if the seller sells her products through those mar-
ketplaces, she may find herself in direct competition with the marketplaces.
This creates a new form of channel conflict, which is one of the focus of
this chapter. We are also interested in the competition between different
marketplaces, since consumers may have their own preference over different
marketplaces when they shop for products.
To analyze the optimal decisions of through which marketplace(s) to sell
products for the seller, we construct a game-theoretical model to capture
the main trade-off in this process. We consider a setting in which one
pure-play marketplace only provides marketplace service to sellers, and one
marketplace also sells its own product directly to consumers. We consider
a seller, who would like to sell a single product to consumers and she will
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decide through which marketplace(s) to sell her products, and at what
price(s). By hosting the seller, each marketplace decides a revenue sharing
commission. We analyze the optimal decisions for both the retailer and the
marketplaces, and characterize the system equilibrium.
In general, as the commission charged by one marketplace becomes higher,
the seller tends to sell its product through the other marketplace. If the
price of the competing product in the marketplace becomes higher, the
seller tends to charge a lower price to further attract more consumers.
However, if the price of the competing product becomes lower, the seller
should charge a higher price to focus on a small group of consumers to
maximize its profit. In equilibrium, the seller will only sell through the
pure-play marketplace and set a lower price than the price of the competing
product in the other marketplace.
4
Chapter 2
Urban Consolidation Center or
Peer-to-Peer Platform? The
Solution to Urban Last-Mile
Delivery
2.1 Introduction
Last-mile delivery is the last leg of a supply chain that transfers freight
or products from a distribution center to a receiver. It comprises up to
28% of the total delivery cost of a supply chain (Lopez, 2017, Wang et al.,
2016). Managing last-mile delivery becomes especially challenging if it is
performed in an urban area, where congestion increases fuel consumption,
causes delay of delivery, and lowers delivery efficiency (Ranieri et al., 2018).
In addition, last-mile delivery is the most expensive and critical operation
for companies engaged in e-commerce (Lee and Whang, 2001). Due to the
continuous growth of urban population and e-commerce activities, last-
mile delivery to a city center exerts intense pressure on the city’s economic,
social, and environmental well-being (Quak and Tavasszy, 2011).
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The economic impact of urban last-mile delivery includes the waste of re-
sources due to extra waiting in traffic congestion and low utilization of
uncoordinated vehicles transporting freight to the city center. The large
number of small, individual customer orders in e-commerce further com-
plicates urban last-mile delivery and incurs significant costs. The social-
environmental impact includes the vicious effect of the increasing traf-
fic incidents and pollution due to transport vehicles, which degrades the
quality of life in the city. For example, based on the Beijing Municipal
Environmental Monitoring Center’s statistics, emissions of transport vehi-
cles are the main source of PM2.5 that causes hazardous haze in Beijing
(http://www.bjmemc.com.cn/).
To build a smart city with congestion and pollution under control, an urban
consolidation center (UCC) is a potential solution to mitigate the reper-
cussion of urban last-mile delivery. Also known as a city distribution center
(van Duin et al., 2008) or an urban distribution center (Boudoin et al.,
2014), a UCC consolidates shipments from multiple carriers and then de-
livers them to the city center using the UCC’s own fleet of trucks. A con-
solidator operating a UCC usually requires a facility to sort the shipments
according to their destinations before they are delivered. As a result of the
consolidation with fewer trucks, higher truck utilization can be achieved,
leading to a lower delivery cost. This shipment consolidation not only
economically benefits stakeholders, including the consolidator, the carriers,
and the public authorities (Ambrosini and Routhier, 2004), but also mit-
igates the social-environmental impact because of reduced traffic. Ideally,
the resultant cost savings can be shared among the carriers, motivating
them to use the UCC’s service.
Despite the potential benefits, many UCC projects in practice are not suc-
cessful. The UCCs of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey were
closed after five years of operations (Doig, 2001). Dablanc (2011) reports
that 150 UCC projects were started in Europe during the last 25 years,
but only five projects survive. Even if they survive, they usually have diffi-
culty to break even and require significant subsidies from the government.
For example, it costs a UCC in La Rochelle 3.8e to deliver a parcel to
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a customer who is charged only 1.7–3e. A UCC in Monaco charges her
customers 2.30e/100Kg, and receives 2.59e/100Kg as a subsidy from the
local government (Dablanc, 2005). Many UCC projects failed because the
carriers were reluctant to use their service. This is supported by a survey
in the NYC metro, which reveals that less than 20% of the carriers would
like to participate in a UCC project (Holguin-Veras et al., 2008). Their re-
luctance to participate is mainly due to a common concern that they may
over rely on the UCCs. Many carriers reduce their own logistics capac-
ity after using a consolidation service (Snapp, 2012, Vivaldini et al., 2012,
Choe et al., 2017). For example, the logistics department of GOME, a
Chinese retailer for electrical appliances, reduces its investment in delivery
trucks and drivers after engaging a consolidation service (National Express,
2010). The substantial cost of reestablishing the logistics capability, which
includes the costs to purchase trucks, recruit drivers, obtain licenses, and
gain knowledge about local clients (Browne et al., 2005), makes the carriers
reluctant to rely on a UCC’s service.
More recently, some peer-to-peer platforms have been established for carri-
ers to share their delivery capacity. Notable examples include Saloodo! by
DHL, Freightos and Convoy in Europe, Loadsmart in U.S., and Cainiao and
Truck Alliance in China. On such a platform, a carrier can sell his unused
capacity to another carrier to fulfill the latter’s delivery needs. It is at-
tractive for a consolidator to operate a platform because it requires neither
a sorting facility nor a fleet of delivery trucks. The peer-to-peer platform
business model typically follows a sharing-economy approach: The plat-
form takes a revenue share from each transaction of capacity for providing
market access to the carriers and for processing the transaction (Gesing,
2017). In contrast to the UCCs’ low success rate, the emergence of the
capacity sharing platforms motivates us to investigate whether the latter
can be a better alternative for a smart city to address the challenges of
urban last-mile delivery.
Although bearing the delivery costs, a UCC can achieve a larger econ-
omy of scale as each truck of the UCC may consolidate the tasks of many
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carriers. In contrast, a capacity sharing platform does not incur any deliv-
ery cost, but each individual carrier on the platform has only very limited
delivery capacity compared to the UCC’s fleet. In this chapter, we inves-
tigate the performance of the two business models above (the UCC versus
the capacity sharing platform) in terms of the consolidator’s profit and
the social-environmental impact. Specifically, for each business model we
develop a two-period game-theoretical model to capture the interactions
between a consolidator and multiple carriers. In each period, knowing that
each carrier has a delivery task with a random volume to fulfill, the con-
solidator first determines the delivery fee to maximize her expected profit.
Then, after knowing his task volume, each carrier decides whether to de-
liver on his own or use the consolidator’s service to deliver his task to the
city center such that his expected cost is minimized. We identify subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations for each model. We
have obtained the following insights.
(i) Our results of the UCC model manifest the trade-off faced by the car-
riers in practice: The carriers can potentially save their delivery costs by
using the UCC’s service, while they face the risk of losing their logistics
capability. As their variable delivery cost increases, the carriers become
more dependent on the UCC to save their delivery costs. On the other
hand, as the cost to reestablish their logistics capability increases, the car-
riers become less dependent on the UCC to avoid the risk of losing their
logistics capability.
(ii) Our results of the capacity sharing platform model explain the increas-
ing popularity of the capacity sharing platforms in practice. In equilib-
rium, we find that the carriers generally have their logistics capability on
hand (even if they purchase capacity from the platform). This ensures suffi-
cient capacity available on the platform to facilitate successful transactions.
Since the platform can always earn a positive profit from each transaction,
it can be more financially sustainable in the long run.
(iii) Comparing the UCC and the platform in terms of their expected profit
shows that the UCC is generally more profitable than the platform if the
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carriers’ fixed delivery cost is large. Moreover, it is easier for the UCC
to dominate as the number of carriers becomes larger. We also compare
the UCC and the platform in terms of their social-environmental impact.
The analysis shows that if the number of carriers is large, then the UCC
is more efficient in reducing the expected social-environmental cost than
the platform. Furthermore, the condition for the UCC to outperform the
platform varies with the distribution of the carriers’ task volumes.
After reviewing the related literature in §2.2, we formulate and analyze
the UCC model in §2.3 and the platform model in §2.4. We compare the
two business models in terms of their expected profits and their social-
environmental impact in §2.5. We study two extensions of our models in
§2.6, before we provide concluding remarks in §2.7. All proofs are provided
in Appendix A.
2.2 Literature review
This research is mainly related to two streams of literature. The first stream
consists of papers on UCCs and the second stream is about peer-to-peer
platforms. The majority of studies on UCCs is conceptual and descriptive.
McDermott (1975) shows in a survey conducted in Columbus, Ohio that
operating a UCC could bring substantial benefits to the shippers, carriers,
consumers, society, and government. Based on a program in the European
network, Dablanc (2007) concludes that the provision of urban logistics
services emerges slowly despite their growing demand. Allen et al. (2012)
review the feasibility studies, trials, and fully operational schemes of UCCs
in 17 countries in the last 40 years.
Some analytical papers on UCCs focus on planning and allocation of deliv-
ery jobs among the carriers. For example, Crainic et al. (2009) consider a
two-tier distribution structure and propose an optimization model to deal
with job scheduling, resource management, and route selection. Handoko
et al. (2016) propose an auction mechanism for last-mile delivery to match
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a UCC’s truck capacity to the shipments such that the UCC’s profit is max-
imized. Wang et al. (2015) study a rolling-horizon auction mechanism with
virtual pricing of shipping capacity. Wang et al. (2018) consider cost uncer-
tainty in last-mile delivery through a UCC, and propose approaches to solve
the winner determination problem of an auction. Özener and Ergun (2008)
study a logistics network in which shippers collaborate and bundle their
shipment requests to negotiate better rates with a common carrier. They
determine an optimal route covering all the demands such that the total
cost is minimized. To the best of our knowledge, no papers have formally
analyzed the stakeholders’ incentives for a UCC project. Our research fills
the gaps in the literature by providing a game-theoretical analysis of the
carriers’ incentive to participate in a UCC project.
The ideas of the capacity sharing platform relate our research to the liter-
ature on two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, Weyl, 2010, Hagiu
and Wright, 2015). A typical setting of a two-sided market involves two
types of players. On a platform, independent providers (such as drivers)
offer service to consumers (such as riders). See, for example, Cachon et
al. (2017), Bai et al. (2018), Taylor (2018), Bimpikis et al. (2016), Cohen
and Zhang (2017), and Hu and Zhou (2017). In contrast, a carrier on the
platform in our research is flexible to choose either to sell his remaining
capacity like a service provider or to buy capacity like a consumer.
Several papers in operations management deal with peer-to-peer rental
platforms, which are similar to our capacity sharing platform in spirit.
For example, Fraiberger and Sundararajan (2015) analyze a peer-to-peer
rental market where each consumer is either a supplier or a buyer. Benjaa-
far et al. (2018) analyze a model where players with different usage levels
make decisions on whether to own a product. Non-owners can access the
product through renting from owners on a needed basis. Jiang and Tian
(2016) consider a setting in which consumers who purchased a product can
derive different usage values and generate income by renting out their pur-
chased product through a third-party sharing platform. Tian and Jiang
(2018) further study how this consumer-to-consumer product sharing af-
fects a distribution channel. Abhishek et al. (2016) consider a setting in
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which a consumer decides whether to purchase a durable good and whether
to rent it when the rental market is available. In the stream of literature
above, if an owner decides to rent out his product, he cannot use the prod-
uct during the rental period. In contrast, a carrier on our capacity sharing
platform does not rent out his entire truck. Instead, he uses his remaining
truck capacity to deliver goods for another carrier to earn extra revenue.
Benjaafar et al. (2017) consider a ride sharing platform on which individ-
uals may rent out empty seats from their cars or find a ride. However,
different from ride sharing, the carriers’ random task volumes play a sig-
nificant role in matching supply with demand of capacity on our capacity
sharing platform. Furthermore, the carriers’ task volumes in our research
can change over time, which also affect their incentive to use the platform.
The collaboration among the carriers considered in our research shares some
similarity with the paper by Agarwal and Ergun (2010), which considers
the alliance formation among carriers. They study the design of large-
scale networks and the allocation of limited capacity on a transportation
network among the carriers in the alliance. Our research is also related
to the literature of inventory transshipment, which typically considers a
wholesaler distributes inventory to multiple retailers and the inventory can
be transshipped among the retailers to fulfill demand. Papers most relevant
to our work include Rudi et al. (2001) and Dong and Rudi (2004), where
both the wholesaler’s and the retailers’ profits are considered. However, in
this stream of literature, a player with demand must work with another
player with supply to generate profits. In contrast, the carriers on our
platform have the option to deliver by themselves and sell their remaining
capacity to the platform, allowing them to be a seller or a buyer. Our
platform model is also related to the literature of secondary markets, where
resellers can buy and sell excess inventory (see, for example, Lee and Whang
(2002), Mendelson and Tunca (2007), Milner and Kouvelis (2007), Broner
et al. (2010), and Chen et al. (2013)). This stream of research focuses on
the impact of secondary markets on supply chains’ or firms’ performance.
In contrast, our objective is to compare the UCC with the capacity sharing
platform. We do not see such a comparison in this stream of literature.
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2.3 An urban consolidation center
2.3.1 Model
In this section, we consider a consolidator that operates a UCC to serve
carriers i = 1, 2, . . . , n for their last-mile deliveries to the city center. We
assume the carriers interact with the UCC in a two-period model, where
period t = 1 captures the short-term impact of the UCC in practice, and
period t = 2 captures its long-term impact. In period t = 1, 2, carrier i has
a delivery task with volume vit. We assume vit equals vL with a probability
λ, or equals vH (> vL) with a probability 1 − λ, where λ ∈ [0, 1]. All the
delivery tasks in each period must be fulfilled within the period. We assume
each carrier is initially equipped with logistics capability that has a limited
delivery capacity sufficient for his own task in each period. In contrast, the
UCC owns a fleet of vehicles with a total capacity that is sufficiently large
to accommodate all the carriers’ tasks in each period.
In each period, the UCC first decides the pricing of her delivery service and
each carrier then decides whether to deliver on his own or use the UCC’s
service to deliver his task to the city center. In period 1, if a carrier decides
to use the UCC’s service, then he can also choose to eliminate or keep
his logistics capability for the future. In period 2, if a carrier decides to
deliver on his own, then he needs to reestablish his logistics capability if it
is eliminated in period 1.
Specifically, at the start of period t = 1, 2, the UCC first decides the price
per unit volume p̄t of her delivery service. After observing p̄t, each carrier
i waits until his delivery task volume is realized. We assume each carrier i
only knows his own realized task volume and decides independently on how
to deliver his task to the city center. Let d̄it denote the decision of carrier
i for period t = 1, 2. In period 1, each carrier i has three possible options
defined as follows. (i) d̄i1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own. (ii) d̄i1 = 0:
Carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability. (iii)
d̄i1 = 1: Carrier i uses the UCC’s service and keeps his logistics capability.
We assume that each carrier’s delivery capacity has no value after period
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2. Thus, each carrier i has only two possible options in period 2 defined
as follows. (i) d̄i2 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own. (ii) d̄i2 = 0:
Carrier i uses the UCC’s service. As a result, we have d̄i1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and
d̄i2 ∈ {−1, 0}, for i = 1, . . . , n. Figure 2.1 shows the sequence of decisions
in the two periods.
Figure 2.1: The sequence of decisions in the two periods under the
UCC business model
If carrier i delivers on his own in period t (d̄it = −1), the carrier incurs a
fixed cost c > 0 and a variable cost per unit volume m > 0. The fixed cost
c includes the maintenance cost for the trucks, the license and permit fees
for the trucks, and the salary of drivers. The variable cost includes the fuel
cost and the loading-unloading cost.
If carrier i uses the UCC’s service in period t, he pays p̄tvit to the UCC.
If carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability in
period 1 (d̄i1 = 0), but decides to deliver on his own in period 2 (d̄i2 =
−1), he incurs an additional setup cost f > 0 to reestablish his logistics
capability in period 2. The reestablishment cost f includes the costs to
purchase trucks, to recruit drivers, and to learn about and reconnect with
local clients.
If carrier i uses the UCC’s service and keeps his logistics capability in period
1 (d̄i1 = 1), then it incurs a fixed holding cost h ∈ (0, c) to the carrier. The
holding cost h includes the costs to maintain the unused trucks and to keep
some relevant staff. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote a discount factor across the two
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periods. To rule out uninteresting cases, such as the carriers never keep
their logistics capability, we assume h < δf and f > c(vH − vL)/vL.
Let nt denote the expected number of carriers who use the UCC’s delivery
service in period t. To serve these carriers, the UCC incurs a fixed delivery
cost that depends on nt. Taking economies of scale into consideration, we
assume that the fixed delivery cost equals
√
ntC > 0 (Steinerberger, 2015).
Furthermore, the UCC also incurs a variable cost per unit volume M > 0.
To be consistent with reality, we assume the UCC may receive a subsidy
S ≥ 0 per unit volume of shipments from the local government or authority.
Note that the UCC may not be subsidized (S = 0), which is considered as
a special case of our model. Our main insights will remain the same.
In each period t in Figure 2.1, the UCC first sets the price per unit volume
p̄t for her service to maximize her expected profit. Given the price p̄t and
the realized task volume vit, each carrier i determines his decision d̄it to
minimize his cost. We solve the problem in Figure 2.1 backward by first
determining the optimal decisions of the carriers and the UCC in period 2,
before we find their optimal decisions in period 1 in the following sections.
2.3.2 Analysis
We first find the optimal decision of each carrier i in period 2. Given the
decision d̄i1 in period 1 and the price p̄2 in period 2, carrier i determines
his optimal decision d̄∗i2 to minimize his cost in period 2. After that we
substitute the optimal responses of all the carriers into the UCC’s problem





as the cost of carrier i in period 2, which is a function




by comparing the following two options: (i) d̄i2 = −1: Carrier i delivers




= c + mvi2 −(∣∣d̄i1∣∣− 1) f . (ii) d̄i2 = 0: Carrier i uses the UCC’s service in period 2,




= p̄2vi2. The following lemma shows the
optimal decision of each carrier i in period 2.
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Lemma 2.1. (Optimal decision of carrier i in period 2)
1. If carrier i delivers on his own or uses the UCC’s service and keeps his
logistics capability in period 1 (d̄i1 = −1 or 1), then in period 2, carrier i
uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability (d̄∗i2 = 0) if
p̄2 ≤ m+ c/vi2, or delivers on his own (d̄∗i2 = −1) otherwise.
2. If carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability
in period 1 (d̄i1 = 0), then in period 2, carrier i uses the UCC’s service
(d̄∗i2 = 0) if p̄2 ≤ m + (c + f)/vi2, or delivers on his own (d̄∗i2 = −1)
otherwise.
Part 1 of Lemma 2.1 shows that the carriers in period 1 who deliver on
their own (d̄i1 = −1), or who use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics
capability (d̄i1 = 1) will make the same decision in period 2. This is because
in both cases, the carriers own their logistics capability in period 2, leading
to the same delivery cost. Furthermore, Lemma 2.1 also shows that carrier
i is more likely to use the UCC’s service in period 2 if his task volume in
the period is smaller (because p̄2 ≤ m + c/vi2 and p̄2 ≤ m + (c + f)/vi2
are more likely to hold if vi2 is smaller). In this case, it is not worthwhile
to pay the fixed cost c to deliver on his own. It is also worth noting that
if carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability in
period 1 (d̄i1 = 0), then he is more likely to engage the UCC in period 2
because of the additional reestablishment cost f .
Let V2 denote the expected total task volume of the carriers who use the
UCC’s service in period 2. Given the carriers’ optimal responses in Lemma
2.1, the UCC chooses the price p̄2 to maximize her expected profit in period
2:
π̄2 (p̄2) = (p̄2 + S −M)V2 −
√
n2C. (2.1)
Define ne as the number of carriers who use the UCC’s service and eliminate
their logistics capability in period 1 (that is, the carriers with d̄i1 = 0).
Note that ne is known in period 2. The following lemma shows the UCC’s
optimal pricing decision in period 2.
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Lemma 2.2. (Optimal decision of the UCC in period 2)
1. If ne > 0, the optimal price of the UCC’s service in period 2 is
p̄∗2 =

m+ (c+ f)/vL, if m < min{b1, b2, b3};
m+ (c+ f)/vH , if b1 ≤ m < min{b4, b5};
m+ c/vL, if max{b2, b4} ≤ m < b6;
m+ c/vH , if m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}.
2. If ne = 0, the optimal price of the UCC’s service in period 2 is
p̄∗2 =
{
m+ c/vL, if m < b7;
m+ c/vH , if m ≥ b7.
The terms bj, j = 1, . . . , 7, are defined in the proof of Lemma 2.2 in the
online supplement. Lemma 2.2 shows that if no carriers eliminate their
logistics capability (ne = 0), then the UCC is forced to charge lower prices
to attract the carriers. Note that the proof of Lemma 2.2 shows that
bj, j = 1, . . . , 7, decrease as the subsidy S increases. Thus, Lemma 2.2
implies that if the government provides a higher subsidy to the UCC, the
latter can afford to charge a lower price p̄∗2 for her service.
After obtaining the optimal decisions d∗i2 and p̄
∗
2, we use them to find the
carriers’ and the UCC’s optimal decisions in period 1 as follows. We first
determine the optimal decision of each carrier i in period 1. Given a price
p̄1, carrier i determines his optimal decision d̄
∗
i1 to minimize his expected
total cost. After that we substitute all the carriers’ optimal responses into
the UCC’s problem to find her optimal price p̄∗1.





over the two periods by comparing the three op-




, one needs to
form some belief about the number of carriers who use the UCC’s service
and eliminate their logistics capability in period 1 (that is, the value of ne).
Following Su and Zhang (2008) and Cachon and Swinney (2009), we seek
to identify a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations.
This means that each player (including the carriers and the UCC) chooses
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their optimal action given their belief about how the others will play. Fur-
thermore, these beliefs are correct, which are identical to the corresponding
actions in equilibrium. In our context, all the carriers and the UCC form
the same rational belief ñe about ne when they optimize their decisions in




i1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
)
.























by choosing one of the following options: (i) d̄i1 = −1:
Carrier i delivers on his own, which incurs an expected total discounted cost
Φ̄i (−1; p̄1) = c+mvi1 +δφ̄∗i2(−1). (ii) d̄i1 = 0: Carrier i uses the UCC’s ser-
vice and eliminates his logistics capability, which incurs an expected total
discounted cost Φ̄i (0; p̄1) = p̄1vi1 + δφ̄
∗
i2(0). (iii) d̄i1 = 1: Carrier i uses the
UCC’s service and keeps his logistics capability, which incurs an expected
total discounted cost Φ̄i (1; p̄1) = p̄1vi1 + h+ δφ̄
∗
i2(1). The following lemma
shows the optimal decision of carrier i in period 1.
Lemma 2.3. (Optimal decision of carrier i in period 1)
1. If ñe > 0, the optimal decision of carrier i is determined as follows.







1, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1;
−1, otherwise.







1, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1 and h ≤ δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)− δc;
0, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (1 + δ)c/vi1 − δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)/vi1






≤ m < b̃6, then
d̄∗i1 =

1, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1 and h ≤ δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;
0, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (1 + δ)c/vi1 − δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)/vi1
and h > δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;
−1, otherwise.
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0, if p̄1 ≤ m+ c/vi1;
−1, otherwise.
2. If ñe = 0, the optimal decision of carrier i is determined as follows.
(a) If m < b7, then
d̄∗i1 =

1, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (c− h)/vi1 and h ≤ δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;
0, if p̄1 ≤ m+ (1 + δ)c/vi1 − δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)/vi1
and h > δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc;
−1, otherwise.
(b) If m ≥ b7, then
d̄∗i1 =
{
0, if p̄1 ≤ m+ c/vi1;
−1, otherwise.
The terms b̃j, j = 1, . . . , 6, are defined in the proof of Lemma 2.3 in the
online supplement. Lemma 2.3 shows that if the task volume vi1 of carrier i
becomes smaller in period 1, then the carrier is more likely to use the UCC’s
service to avoid the fixed cost c. In case carrier i chooses to use the UCC’s
service in period 1, he will eliminate his logistics capability (d̄∗i1 = 0) if m is




or m ≥ b7); otherwise, he
will keep his logistics capability (d̄∗i1 = 1) if the holding cost h is sufficiently
small.
Let V1 denote the expected total task volume of the carriers who use the
UCC’s service in period 1. Recall that π̄2(p̄
∗
2) is the UCC’s expected profit
in period 2 given by Equation (2.1). Assuming all the carriers respond
optimally according to Lemma 2.3, the UCC optimizes her price p̄1 to
maximize her expected total discounted profit over the two periods:
Π̄ (p̄1) = (p̄1 + S −M)V1 −
√
n1C + δπ̄2 (p̄
∗
2 (p̄1)) . (2.2)
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2.3.3 Equilibrium decisions
The following theorem determines the rational expectation equilibrium. To
rule out uninteresting cases in which the carriers never keep their logistics
capability, we assume h ≤ min{δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)− δc, δc(λ+ (1−
λ)vH/vL)− δc}.
Theorem 2.4. (Equilibrium decisions of the UCC model) Assume
h ≤ min{δ(c+ f)(λvL/vH + 1− λ)− δc, δc(λ+ (1− λ)vH/vL)− δc}. There
are three candidates of the equilibrium characterized as follows.
1. If m < min{b7,m1}, then we have the following candidate of the equi-
librium.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗1 = m+(c−h)/vL. Under
this price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service and keeps his
logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗2 = m + c/vL. Under
this price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and
delivers on his own otherwise.
2. If min{b7,m1} ≤ m < b7, then we have the following candidate of the
equilibrium.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗1 = m + (c − h)/vH .
Under this price, all the carriers use the UCC’s service and keep
their logistics capability.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗2 = m + c/vL. Under
this price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and
delivers on his own otherwise.
3. If m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}, then we have the following candidate of the
equilibrium.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗1 = m+c/vL. Under this
price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his
logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗2 = m + c/vH . Under
this price, all the carriers use the UCC’s service.
The terms mj, j = 1, . . . , 4, are defined in the proof of Theorem 2.4 in the
online supplement. Note that the three intervals of m in Theorem 2.4 may
overlap. Given a set of parameters (including m), the equilibrium is the
candidate with the highest expected total discounted profit for the UCC.
According to the proof of Theorem 2.4, mj, j = 1, . . . , 4, decrease as the
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subsidy S increases. Thus, if the government provides a higher subsidy S
to the UCC, then the third equilibrium in Theorem 2.4 becomes more likely
to exist (that is, m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4} becomes easier to hold). Since all
the carriers will use the UCC’s service in period 2 in this equilibrium, the
UCC is more likely to sustain in the long run. This result is aligned with
the observation that many UCC projects require government subsidies in
practice.
The equilibrium of the UCC model can be characterized by the reestab-
lishment cost f and the variable delivery cost m. Figure 2.2(a) shows the
UCC’s equilibrium price in period 1. If f is sufficiently small (correspond-
ing to the left end of Figure 2.2(a)), then the UCC’s price p̄∗1 increases as m
increases. This is because if m is getting larger, the carriers are more likely
to use the UCC’s service. Anticipating this, the UCC charges a higher price
in period 1.
(a) The UCC’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) The equilibrium decisions of the carriers using
the UCC’s service
Figure 2.2: The equilibrium decisions in period 1 under the UCC
model
Figure 2.2(b) illustrates the equilibrium decisions of the carriers who use
the UCC’s service in period 1. If f is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently
large (corresponding to the top-left corner of Figure 2.2(b)), then the carri-
ers who use the UCC’s service will eliminate their logistics capability. This
is because the carriers anticipate that they are likely to continue to use the
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UCC’s service in period 2. Even if they need to deliver on their own in
period 2, it is affordable to reestablish their logistics capability. In con-
trast, if f is sufficiently large and m is sufficiently small (corresponding to
the bottom-right corner of Figure 2.2(b)), the carriers who use the UCC’s
service will keep their logistics capability. Furthermore, as m increases all
the carriers will use the UCC’s service and keep their logistics capability.
(a) The UCC’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) Carriers using the UCC’s service in equilib-
rium
Figure 2.3: The equilibrium decisions in period 2 under the UCC
model
Figures 2.3(a) and (b) show the UCC’s equilibrium price and the carriers
who use the UCC’s service, respectively, in period 2. If f is sufficiently
small and m is sufficiently large, all the carriers will use the UCC’s service
(see the top-left corner of Figure 2.3(b)). However, as f increases and m
decreases, the carriers will keep their logistics capability in period 1 (see
the bottom-right corner of Figure 2.2(b)), thus fewer carriers will use the
UCC’s service in period 2 (see the bottom-right corner of Figure 2.3(b)).
In general, as m increases, the carriers are more dependent on the UCC
to deliver their tasks. That is, in period 1 the carriers who use the UCC’s
service will eliminate their logistics capability, and in period 2 more carriers
will use the UCC’s service. However, as f increases, the carriers become
less dependent on the UCC. That is, in period 1 the carriers who use the
UCC’s service will keep their logistics capability, and in period 2 fewer
carriers will use the UCC’s service.
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2.4 A capacity sharing platform
Instead of having a physical UCC, the consolidator can operate a platform
for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. On the platform, a carrier
delivering by himself to the city center can sell his remaining truck capacity
to another carrier, so that the latter can outsource his delivery task by
paying a fee. If the transaction is successful, then the platform retains a
portion of this fee as her revenue.
2.4.1 Model
Similar to §2.3.1, we consider a two-period model. At the start of each
period t, the platform first decides the price per unit volume p̂t of the
delivery service. After observing the price p̂t, each carrier i waits until his
delivery task volume vit is realized. We make the same assumption as in
§2.3.1 that vit = vL with a probability λ, and vit = vH with a probability
1 − λ, where λ ∈ [0, 1]. For convenience, define N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, NL,t =
{i|vit = vL, i ∈ N}, and NH,t = {i|vit = vH , i ∈ N}, for t = 1, 2.
Motivated by the fact that the delivery capacity of each individual carrier
is usually very limited compared to the UCC’s fleet, we assume in contrast
to the UCC model, if vit = vH , then carrier i has to deliver by himself
to the city center in period t (the other carriers cannot help him) and his
remaining capacity is insufficient to help any other carrier to deliver. Thus,
for each carrier i ∈ NH,t, his action is d̂it = −1, for t = 1, 2.
In each period t, only carrier i with vit = vL will participate (purchase or sell
capacity) in the capacity sharing platform. Among these carriers inNL,t, we
assume that each carrier can serve (or can be served by) at most one other
carrier on the platform. In period 1, each carrier i ∈ NL,1 has three possible
options. (i) d̂i1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own and sells his remaining
capacity to the platform. (ii) d̂i1 = 0: Carrier i purchases capacity from
the platform and eliminates his logistics capability. (iii) d̂i1 = 1: Carrier i
purchases capacity from the platform and keeps his logistics capability. In
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consistent with the UCC model, we assume that all the delivery capacity
has no value after period 2. Thus, in period 2 each carrier i ∈ NL,2 has
only two possible options defined as follows. (i) d̂i2 = −1: Carrier i delivers
on his own and sells his remaining capacity to the platform. (ii) d̂i2 = 0:
Carrier i purchases capacity from the platform. As a result, for i ∈ NL,1,
we have d̂i1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and for i ∈ NL,2, we have d̂i2 ∈ {−1, 0}. Figure
2.4 shows the sequence of decisions in the two periods.
Figure 2.4: The sequence of decisions in the two periods under the
platform business model
Given that all the delivery tasks must be fulfilled in each period t, if car-
rier i ∈ NL,t wants to purchase capacity from the platform, we assume
the carrier can always obtain the required capacity vL. The platform can
guarantee this by outsourcing the delivery task of carrier i to an external
party, if necessary. We assume that the platform does not make any profit
in this outsourcing process. On the other hand, if carrier i ∈ NL,t wants
to sell his remaining capacity to the platform, whether his capacity can be
successfully sold depends on the demand and the supply of capacity on the
platform. If the demand is no less than the supply, then all the carriers who
wish to sell their remaining capacity can successfully sell it. However, if
the demand is less than the supply, then only a subset of these carriers can
sell their remaining capacity. In this situation, the platform will randomly
distribute the tasks with an equal probability to the carriers willing to sell
their remaining capacity.
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For notational convenience, define ns,t as the expected number of carriers
who deliver on their own and sell their remaining capacity to the platform
in period t (that is, the carriers who choose d̂it = −1). Define np,t as the
expected number of carriers who purchase capacity from the platform in
period t (that is, the carriers who choose d̂i1 = 0 or 1 in period 1, and the
carriers who choose d̂i2 = 0 in period 2). Therefore, the supply and the
demand of capacity on the platform in period t are propotional to ns,t and
np,t respectively.
If carrier i delivers on his own in period t (d̂it = −1), then the carrier
incurs a fixed cost c > 0 and a variable cost per unit volume m > 0. If
carrier i ∈ NL,t purchases capacity from the platform in period t (d̂it = 0
or 1), then he pays p̂tvL. The platform receives a portion αp̂tvL, where
α ∈ (0, 1) represents the platform’s revenue share. The remaining portion
(1 − α)p̂tvL goes to the other carrier who serves carrier i. To ensure that
selling capacity on the platform is profitable, we assume (1− α)p̂t > m. If
carrier i ∈ NL,1 eliminates his logistics capability in period 1 (d̂i1 = 0), but
decides to deliver on his own in period 2 (d̂i2 = −1), he incurs a setup cost
f > 0 to reestablish his logistics capability. If carrier i ∈ NL,1 purchases
capacity from the platform and keeps his logistics capability in period 1
(d̂i1 = 1), then it incurs a fixed holding cost h ∈ (0, c) to the carrier.
Similar to §2.3.1, we assume h < δf .
For each period t in Figure 2.4, the platform first sets the price per unit
volume p̂t to maximize her expected profit. Given the price p̂t and the
realized task volume vit, each carrier i ∈ NL,t determines his decision d̂it to
minimize his expected cost. We solve the problem in Figure 2.4 backward
by first identifying the optimal decisions of each carrier i ∈ NL,2 and the




Given the decision d̂i1 in period 1 and the price p̂2 in period 2, we first
determine the optimal decision d̂∗i2 of each carrier i ∈ NL,2 to minimize his
expected cost. After that we substitute the carriers’ optimal responses into
the platform’s problem to find her optimal price p̂∗2.





2 by comparing the two options: d̂i2 = −1 or 0. If carrier i delivers by
himself and sells his remaining capacity to the platform (d̂i2 = −1), then
the expected revenue generated from selling his remaining capacity depends
on the supply (proportional to ns,2) and the demand (proportional to np,2)
of capacity on the platform in period 2. Following Su and Zhang (2008)
and Cachon and Swinney (2009), we aim to identify a subgame perfect
Nash Equilibrium with rational expectations. We assume all the carriers
in NL,2 form the same rational beliefs ñs,2 and ñp,2 about ns,2 and np,2,
respectively, when they optimize their decisions in period 2. Furthermore,
ñs,2 = ns,2
(
d̂∗i2, i ∈ NL,2
)
and ñp,2 = np,2
(
d̂∗i2, i ∈ NL,2
)
in equilibrium.
Define θt = min {ñp,t/ñs,t, 1}, for t = 1, 2.





the following options. (i) d̂i2 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own and





= c + mvL −
(∣∣∣d̂i1∣∣∣− 1) f − θ2 [(1− α)p̂2 −m] vL. (ii)





= p̂2vL. Note that for both periods 1 and 2, if the cost of
delivering by himself is identical to the cost of purchasing capacity from
the platform, we assume that carrier i will choose either option with an
equal probability. This random tie-breaking rule is to avoid the extreme
situation where the carriers with identical costs choose the same option on
the platform. In this extreme situation, all the carriers will either deliver
on their own or purchase capacity from the platform, and the platform will
never earn a positive profit. To facilitate an interesting comparison between
the UCC and the platform, we rule out this extreme case.
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After we determine the optimal decision d̂∗i2 of carrier i ∈ NL,2, we can
substitute it into the platform’s problem to find her optimal price in period
2. The platform chooses p̂2 to maximize her expected profit in period 2:
π̂2 (p̂2) = αp̂2vL min {ns,2, np,2} . (2.3)
After obtaining the optimal decisions d̂∗i2 and p̂
∗
2 in period 2, we use them
to find the carriers’ and the platform’s optimal decisions in period 1.





over the two periods by comparing the three options:
d̂i1 = −1, 0, or 1. If d̂i1 = −1, then the expected cost of carrier i in period 1
depends on ns,1 and np,1. To identify a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium
with rational expectations, we assume all the carriers in NL,1 form the same
rational beliefs ñs,1 and ñp,1 about ns,1 and np,1, respectively, when opti-
mizing their decisions in period 1. Furthermore, ñs,1 = ns,1
(
d̂∗i1, i ∈ NL,1
)
and ñp,1 = np,1
(
d̂∗i1, i ∈ NL,1
)
in equilibrium.


















as the optimal expected cost of carrier i in period 2. Given p̂1, carrier




by choosing one of the following options:
(i) d̂i1 = −1: Carrier i delivers on his own and sells his remaining capacity to
the platform, which incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i (−1; p̂1) =
c+mvL − θ1 [(1− α)p̂1 −m] vL + δφ̂∗i2(−1).
(ii) d̂i1 = 0: Carrier i purchases capacity from the platform and elimi-
nates his logistics capability, which incurs an expected total discounted
cost Φ̂i (0; p̂1) = p̂1vL + δφ̂
∗
i2(0).
(iii) d̂i1 = 1: Carrier i purchases capacity from the platform and keeps
his logistics capability, which incurs an expected total discounted cost
Φ̂i (1; p̂1) = p̂1vL + h+ δφ̂
∗
i2(1).
We then substitute all the carriers’ optimal responses d̂∗i1 into the platform’s
problem to find her optimal price p̂∗1 that maximizes her expected total
discounted profit:
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Π̂ (p̂1) = αp̂1vL min {ns,1, np,1}+ δπ̂2 (p̂∗2 (p̂1)) , (2.4)
where π̂2 (p̂
∗
2 (p̂1)) represents the platform’s optimal expected profit in pe-
riod 2 given p̂1 (see Equation (2.3)).
2.4.3 Equilibrium decisions
The following theorem summarizes the platform’s and the carriers’ decisions

























Theorem 2.5. (Equilibrium decisions of the platform model)
1. If f ≥ h
δ(1−λ) , then we have the following results.
Period 1: The platform’s equilibrium price is p̂∗1 = (c + 2mvL − h)/[(2 −
α)vL]. Under this price, each carrier i ∈ NL,1 chooses d̂∗i1 = −1 or
d̂∗i1 = 1 with an equal probability.
Period 2: The platform’s equilibrium price is p̂∗2 = (c+2mvL)/[(2−α)vL].
Under this price, each carrier i ∈ NL,2 chooses d̂∗i2 = −1 or d̂∗i2 = 0
with an equal probability.
2. If f < min
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f , f
′
}
, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The platform’s equilibrium price is p̂∗1 = [c + 2mvL − δ(1 −
λ)f ]/[(2 − α)vL]. Under this price, each carrier i ∈ NL,1 chooses
d̂∗i1 = −1 or d̂∗i1 = 0 with an equal probability.
Period 2: The platform’s equilibrium price is p̂∗2 = (c+2mvL)/[(2−α)vL].
Under this price, carrier i ∈ NL,2 chooses d̂∗i2 = −1 or d̂∗i2 = 0 with
an equal probability, if d̂∗i1 = −1; or chooses d̂∗i2 = 0, if d̂∗i1 = 0.
Theorem 2.5 is illustrated by Figures 2.5 and 2.6. Figure 2.5(a) shows
the platform’s equilibrium price in period 1. Figure 2.5(b) shows that
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each carrier i ∈ NL,1 sells or purchases capacity on the platform in period
1 with an equal probability. If the reestablishment cost f is sufficiently
large (f ≥ h/[δ(1− λ)]), then the carriers who purchase capacity from the
platform should keep their logistics capability. Otherwise, these carriers
should eliminate their logistics capability.
(a) The platform’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) The equilibrium decision of each carrier
Figure 2.5: The equilibrium decisions of the platform and each carrier
i in period 1
Figures 2.6(a) and (b) show the equilibrium decisions of the platform and
each carrier i ∈ NL,2, respectively, in period 2. Figure 2.6(b) shows that
if f ≥ h/[δ(1 − λ)], then each carrier i sells or purchases capacity on the
platform in period 2 with an equal probability. Otherwise, the carrier’s
decision depends on his decision in period 1. If he delivers on his own in
period 1 (that is, d̂∗i1 = −1), then he sells or purchases capacity on the
platform in period 2 with an equal probability. On the other hand, the
carriers who purchase capacity and eliminate their logistics capability in
period 1 (that is, d̂∗i1 = 0) will continue to purchase capacity from the
platform in period 2. In this situation, although the reestablishment cost
f is affordable, but with a large variable delivery cost m, it is expensive to
make their own delivery.
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(a) The platform’s equilibrium pricing strategy (b) The equilibrium decision of each carrier
Figure 2.6: The equilibrium decisions of the platform and each carrier
i in period 2
2.5 Comparing the UCC and the capacity
sharing platform
We compare the UCC and the capacity sharing platform in terms of the
expected profit and the expected social-environmental cost. We focus
on three regions where the equilibria exist in both models: (i) When f
is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently large: f < min
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f1, f2
}
and m > max{b7,m4,m5,m6}. (ii) When f is sufficiently large and m
is intermediate: f > max
{
h
δ(1−λ) , f1, f2, f3, f4
}
and min{b7,m1} ≤ m <




δ(1−λ) , f1, f2, f3, f4
}
and m < min{b7,m1}. The terms m5,m6, and
fj, j = 1, . . . , 4 are defined in the proof of Theorem 2.6 in the online sup-
plement.
2.5.1 Expected profit
Between the UCC and the platform, which business model is more prof-
itable for the consolidator? We determine the consolidator’s preference by
comparing the equilibrium profits Π̄ (p̄∗1) of the UCC in §2.3 and Π̂ (p̂∗1) of
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the capacity sharing platform in §2.4. The following theorem identifies the
conditions under which the UCC (or the platform) is more profitable for
the consolidator.
Theorem 2.6. (Comparing the UCC’s and the platform’s profits)
In each region, the UCC is more profitable than the platform (Π̄ (p̄∗1) >
Π̂ (p̂∗1)) if and only if
Region (i): c > c1;
Region (ii): one of the following conditions holds: (a) c > c2 and δ > δ1,
(b) c < c2 and δ < δ1;
Region (iii): one of the following conditions holds: (a) c > c3, (b) h < h1.
In Region (i), the UCC is more profitable than the platform if the carriers’
fixed delivery cost c > c1. This is because when c is large, the carriers
are more likely to outsource their delivery tasks to avoid the fixed cost.
This will benefit the consolidator if she operates a UCC because there will
be many carriers using her service. On the other hand, if the consolidator
operates a platform, there will not be many successful transactions because
the supply of capacity is low. This reduces her profit. Furthermore, the
proof of Theorem 2.6 shows that c1 decreases with n and S. As n in-
creases, the carriers enjoy more savings by using the UCC because of the
economies of scale in shipment consolidation, making the UCC more likely
to outperform the platform. The UCC also becomes more dominant as
the government subsidy S increases. If c < c1, then the carriers are more
likely to deliver on their own. Thus, more capacity will be available on the
platform, making the platform more profitable than the UCC.
In Region (ii), the UCC is more profitable than the platform if both the
fixed delivery cost c and the discount factor δ are large (c > c2 and δ > δ1).
A large c pushes more carriers to outsource their delivery tasks. Further-
more, a large reestablishment cost f persuades the carriers who eliminate
their logistics capability to continue outsourcing the delivery in the long
run. A large δ magnifies this effect. Under the platform model, these car-
riers are less likely to supply capacity in period 2. This creates excessive
30
demand for capacity on the platform, leading to a severe imbalance of sup-
ply and demand, which yields a lower profit for the platform. On the other
hand, if δ is small (c > c2 and δ < δ1), the carriers are less sensitive to
their costs in period 2 and become more likely to do their own delivery.
This mitigates the supply-demand imbalance on the platform, making the
platform more profitable than the UCC.
In contrast, if both c and δ are small (c < c2 and δ < δ1), the affordable
delivery costs (small c and intermediate m) attract more carriers to deliver
on their own. This is especially so for a small δ, which encourages the
carriers, who eliminate their logistics capability in period 1, to deliver on
their own in period 2. This creates excessive supply of capacity on the
platform, which reduces the number of successful transactions, making the
platform less profitable than the UCC. However, if δ is large (c < c2 and δ >
δ1), the large f makes the carriers, who eliminate their logistics capability
in period 1, to outsource their delivery tasks in period 2. This increases
the demand for capacity on the platform, which mitigates the imbalance
of supply and demand, leading to a higher profit for the platform than the
UCC.
Lastly, in Region (iii), the UCC is more profitable than the platform if
c > c3 because of the same reason mentioned in Region (i). The second
condition (h < h1) for the UCC to outperform the platform needs more
explanations. We first consider the opposite case with h > h1. If the
holding cost h is large, the carriers are less likely to hold their logistics
capability in period 1. Meanwhile, the large f deters the carriers from
eliminating their logistics capability. Therefore, more carriers will deliver
on their own to avoid these large costs, reducing the UCC’s profit. However,
if h is small, then the carriers can always use the UCC’s service and hold
their logistics capability in period 1, avoiding a costly reestablishment in
the next period. This makes the UCC more profitable than the platform.
Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 2.6 shows that c3 decreases and h1
increases with n, making it easier for the UCC to dominate as n increases.
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2.5.2 Expected social-environmental cost
Between the UCC and the platform, which business model leads to a lower
expected social-environmental cost? As a result of the consolidation, both
the UCC and the platform yield higher truck utilization with fewer trucks
used. This not only economically benefits the consolidator and the carriers,
but also mitigates the social-environmental impact (in terms of reduced
congestion and pollution) because of reduced traffic to the city center. In
this section, we compare the UCC and the platform with respect to their
impact to the society and the environment.
To quantify the impact, define ψ as the social-environmental cost associated
with a carrier’s delivery to the city center. This includes, for example, the
cost to the society due to congestion and the cost to the environment due
to pollution. Define ∆̄ψ and ∆̂ψ as the expected total social-environmental
cost reduction achieved by the UCC and the platform respectively. Under
the UCC model, although additional trucks are required, each UCC’s truck
can potentially consolidate multiple tasks. In contrast, under the platform
model, although no additional trucks are required, each carrier can at most
serve one other carrier’s task. It is unclear that which business model is
more effective in reducing the social-environmental cost.
We first analyze the expected total social-environmental cost reduction
achieved by the UCC. Recall that nt represents the expected number of
carriers served by the UCC in period t = 1, 2. Using the same setup cost’s
formula due to the consolidation by the UCC in §2.3.1, the expected total
social-environmental cost in each period t is reduced from nψ to
√
ntψ+(n−





In contrast, the task of a carrier who purchases capacity from the platform is
fulfilled by another carrier, leading to a social-environmental cost reduction
ψ. In case the platform does not have sufficient supply of capacity, we
assume that the unmatched delivery tasks are outsourced to a third party
without incurring any additional social-environmental cost. Recall that
np,t represents the expected number of carriers who purchase capacity from
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the platform in period t. The expected total social-environmental cost
reduction in each period t is np,tψ. Thus, we have ∆̂ψ = np,1ψ + np,2ψ.
The following theorem compares ∆̄ψ and ∆̂ψ. We focus on the same three
regions in Theorem 2.6 where the equilibria exist in both models.
Theorem 2.7. (Comparing the UCC’s and the platform’s social-
environmental cost reductions) In each region, the UCC is more effi-
cient than the platform in reducing the expected total social-environmental
cost (∆̄ψ > ∆̂ψ) if and only if















Region (iii): n > 4/λ.
Theorem 2.7 shows that if the number of carriers n is large, then the UCC
is more efficient in reducing the social-environmental cost than the plat-
form. This is because if n is large, the UCC’s trucks (each can serve multi-
ple tasks) can achieve a larger economy of scale in shipment consolidation.
This significantly reduces the traffic congestion and pollution caused by the
last-mile delivery. On the other hand, if n is small, the UCC may not be ef-
ficient in reducing the social-environmental cost. In contrast, the platform,
which matches a carrier’s task with another carrier without employing any
additional trucks, becomes more efficient.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 2.7: Thresholds of n in Regions (i), (ii), and (iii)
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Figure 2.7 shows how the threshold of n in each region varies with λ. In













also increase, making the platform more likely to outperform the UCC
in reducing the social-environmental cost. As the probability of low task
volume (λ) increases, more carriers will engage the platform. Many of these
carriers want to purchase capacity from the platform because of the large
and intermediate variable delivery cost m in Regions (i) and (ii). This
significantly reduces the social-environmental cost, making the platform
more efficient than the UCC.
In Region (iii), as λ increases, the threshold 4/λ decreases, making the UCC
more likely to outperform the platform in reducing the social-environmental
cost. This is because as λ increases, more carriers will engage the platform.
However, the large f and small m in Region (iii) make the carriers more
likely to deliver on their own. This is especially so under the platform
model because the carriers can earn extra revenue by selling their remaining
capacity. In contrast, the UCC can achieve a larger scale of shipment
consolidation, which reduces the social-environmental cost more efficiently
than the platform.
Table 2.1 shows the preferred business model with respect to the profit
and the social-environmental impact. To maximize the expected profit, the
consolidator should choose the UCC if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost c is
large in general. Otherwise, the capacity sharing platform is preferred. To
minimize the expected social-environmental cost, the UCC is preferred if
the number of carriers n is large. Otherwise, the consolidator should choose
the platform.
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Table 2.1: The preferred business model
small c small c large c large c
small n large n small n large n
To maximize
expected profit platform platform UCC UCC
To minimize expected
social-environmental cost platform UCC platform UCC
2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 A hybrid model
We consider a hybrid business model that combines the ideas of both the
UCC and the capacity sharing platform. In this hybrid model, the consol-
idator simultaneously operates a UCC, which fulfills the carriers’ delivery
tasks, and a platform, which matches supply and demand for capacity
among the carriers. This hybrid model is inspired by Amazon that sells
products to consumers by itself, and also allows peer-to-peer selling on its
platform.
For analytical tractability, we consider a one-period model in which the
consolidator operates both the UCC and the platform. Through the UCC,
the consolidator charges the carriers for her delivery service. Through the
platform, the consolidator receives a revenue share α ∈ (0, 1) from each
successful transaction of capacity. The consolidator first chooses the prices
p̄ and p̂ per unit volume of delivery service for the UCC and the platform,
respectively, to maximize her expected profit.
After observing the prices p̄ and p̂, each carrier i waits until his delivery task
volume vi is realized. Depending on vi, each carrier i has different options to
fulfill his task. If vi = vL (which occurs with a probability λ), then carrier i
has three possible options: (i) He delivers on his own and sells his remaining
capacity to the platform. (ii) He uses the UCC’s service. (iii) He purchases
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capacity from the platform. If vi = vH (which occurs with a probability
1− λ), then carrier i has two possible options: (i) He delivers on his own.
(ii) He uses the UCC’s service. Each carrier independently decides how to
fulfill his task to minimize his expected cost. To ensure that selling capacity
on the platform is profitable and the options do not always dominate each
other, we assume m < (1− α)p̂ < (1/vL − 1/vH) c. The following theorem
summarizes the consolidator’s and the carriers’ equilibrium decisions.
Theorem 2.8. (Equilibrium decisions of the hybrid model)
1. If m < min{m7,m8}, then it is optimal for the consolidator to charge any
p̄∗ > (c+2mvL)/((2−α)vL) and p̂∗ = (c+2mvL)/((2−α)vL). Under these
prices, each carrier i with vi = vH delivers on his own, and each carrier i
with vi = vL delivers on his own (and sells his remaining capacity to the
platform) or purchases capacity from the platform with an equal probability.
2. If m7 ≤ m < m9, then it is optimal for the consolidator to charge
p̄∗ = m + c/vL and any p̂
∗ ≥ m + c/vL. Under these prices, each carrier i
with vi = vH delivers on his own, and each carrier i with vi = vL uses the
UCC’s service.
3. If m ≥ max{m8,m9}, then it is optimal for the consolidator to charge
p̄∗ = m+ c/vH and any p̂
∗ ≥ m+ c/vL. Under these prices, all the carriers
use the UCC’s service.
The terms mj, j = 7, . . . , 9, are defined in the proof of Theorem 2.8 in the
online supplement.
The conditions of the above equilibrium result determine the source from
which the consolidator generates her profit. If the carriers’ variable delivery
cost m is small (m < min{m7,m8}), then the consolidator will generate
profit from the platform. This is because the affordable delivery cost m
makes it difficult to attract the carriers to use the UCC’s service. However,
as m becomes moderate or large (m7 ≤ m < m9 or m ≥ max{m8,m9}),
more carriers would like to outsource their delivery tasks. Specifically, if
m7 ≤ m < m9, then only the carriers with a high task volume will deliver
on their own. If m ≥ max{m8,m9}, then no carriers will make their own
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delivery. Both cases eliminate the supply of capacity on the platform.
Thus, the consolidator will optimize her prices to induce the carriers to
engage the UCC (rather than the platform), such that her expected profit
is maximized. In both cases, the consolidator generates profit from the
UCC.
Note that some equilibrium in Theorem 2.8 leads to a lower social-environmental
cost than the others. For example, it is straightforward to show that if
n > 1/(1 − λ/2)2, then the third equilibrium (when m ≥ max{m8,m9})
results in the lowest expected total social-environmental cost. In this equi-
librium, all the carriers use the UCC’s service. The government can pro-
mote the third equilibrium by increasing the variable delivery cost m, such
as imposing variable tax to the carriers who deliver on their own. Further-
more, the proof of Theorem 2.8 shows that m7,m8, and m9 decrease with
the government subsidy S for the UCC’s service. Thus, to make the third
equilibrium more achievable, the government can provide a higher subsidy
to the consolidator for the UCC’s service. Conversely, if n ≤ 1/(1− λ/2)2,
then the first equilibrium (when m < min{m7,m8}) yields the lowest social-
environmental cost. In this equilibrium, all the carriers with a low task
volume sell or purchase capacity on the platform. In this situation, the
government can act in a reverse manner to make the first equilibrium more
attainable.
2.6.2 Demand correlation
In the UCC and the platform models, some carriers are reluctant to elim-
inate their logistics capability in period 1 because of the reestablishment
cost f . This decision depends on the carrier’s delivery task volume in the
next period. In practice, each carrier’s demands across the periods are
sometimes correlated such that the carriers can roughly predict their task
volumes in the near future. This helps them plan ahead with their logistics
requirement.
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In this section, we analyze the UCC model with correlated demands for
each carrier between the two periods. Specifically, we assume the demands
for each carrier in the two periods are positively correlated. That is, if the
carrier’s task volume is low (high) in period 1, then his task volume is also
low (high) in period 2. The rest of the model is identical to that of §2.3.1.
The following theorem summarizes the equilibrium results.
Theorem 2.9. (Equilibrium decisions of the UCC model with cor-
related demands)
Assume h ≤ min{δ(c+f)vL/vH−δc, δc(vH/vL−1)}. There are three cases:
1. If max{m11,m12} ≤ m < min{m4,m10}, then we have the following
results.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗1 = m+c/vL. Under this
price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his
logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗2 = m + c/vL. Under
this price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and
delivers on his own otherwise.
2. If max{m10,m11,m12} ≤ m < m4, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗1 = m+(c−h)/vH . Under
this price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates
his logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and uses the UCC’s service
and keeps his logistics capability otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗2 = m + c/vL. Under
this price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service if vi1 = vL, and
delivers on his own otherwise.
3. If m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}, then we have the following results.
Period 1: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗1 = m+c/vL. Under this
price, each carrier i uses the UCC’s service and eliminates his
logistics capability if vi1 = vL, and delivers on his own otherwise.
Period 2: The UCC’s equilibrium price is p̄∗2 = m + c/vH . Under
this price, all the carriers use the UCC’s service.
The terms mj, j = 10, . . . , 12, are defined in the proof of Theorem 2.9.
Note that the carriers eliminate their logistics capability in period 1 if they
will continue to use the UCC’s service in period 2. On the other hand,
the carriers keep their logistics capability in period 1 if they will deliver
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on their own in period 2. This is because in period 1 the carriers already
know their task volumes in the future, so they can plan ahead with their
logistics capability.
We also analyze the platform model with positively correlated demands
across the two periods for each carrier. We find that there is no Nash
Equilibrium with rational expectations in that model. This is because if
the expected number of carriers who eliminate their logistics capability in
period 1 is small, then the carriers anticipate that the platform will charge a
low price in period 2. This in turn encourages the carriers to eliminate their
logistics capability in period 1, leading to deviations. Similar deviations
exist if the expected number of carriers eliminating their logistics capability
in period 1 is large. Therefore, there is no equilibrium.
We have also obtained the equilibrium results for the UCC and the platform
models for a case where each carrier’s task volumes across the two periods
are negatively correlated. Compared to Theorem 2.9, the negative demand
correlation induces more carriers to use the UCC’s service. We omit the
details here.
2.7 Summary
We study two different business models to make urban last-mile delivery in
a smart city more economically sustainable and operationally efficient. Un-
der the first business model, a consolidator operates a UCC, which requires
a sorting facility and a fleet of trucks to deliver the tasks of carriers. The
consolidator bears the delivery costs, but charges the carriers a service fee
for the last-mile delivery. Under the second business model, the consolida-
tor operates a platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. The
consolidator does not need a facility and trucks. There is no delivery cost
incurred to the consolidator, who receives a revenue share from each trans-
action of capacity on the platform. The UCC can achieve a larger economy
of scale as each truck of the UCC may consolidate the tasks from many
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carriers. In contrast, each carrier on the platform has only very limited
delivery capacity compared to the UCC’s fleet.
For each business model, we develop a two-period game-theoretical model
capturing the interactions between the consolidator and the multiple car-
riers. In each period, the consolidator first determines the delivery fee per
unit volume to maximize her expected profit. Then, after knowing his task
volume, each carrier minimizes his expected cost by choosing to (i) deliver
on his own, (ii) use the consolidator’s service and eliminate his own logistics
capability, or (iii) use the consolidator’s service but keep his own logistics
capability.
In practice, the carriers under the UCC business model face the following
trade-off: They can potentially save their delivery costs by using the UCC’s
service, but they are subject to the risk of losing their logistics capability.
Our game-theoretical model delicately demonstrates this trade-off through
its equilibrium results (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). As the carriers’ variable
delivery cost m increases, they become more dependent on the UCC to save
their delivery costs: In period 1 the carriers who use the UCC’s service will
eliminate their logistics capability, and in period 2 more carriers will use the
UCC’s service. On the other hand, as the carriers’ logistics reestablishment
cost f increases, they become less dependent on the UCC to avoid the risk
of losing their logistics capability: In period 1 the carriers who use the
UCC’s service will keep their logistics capability, and in period 2 fewer
carriers will use the UCC’s service. We also find that if the UCC receives
a sufficient government subsidy, then all the carriers will use the UCC’s
service in period 2, making the UCC more sustainable in the long run.
This echoes the phenomenon in practice that many UCC projects rely on
government subsidies.
Under our capacity sharing platform model, the carriers generally have
their logistics capability on hand in equilibrium (even if they purchase ca-
pacity from the platform). This ensures sufficient capacity available on the
platform to facilitate successful transactions. Since the platform can always
earn a positive profit (revenue share) from each transaction, our equilibrium
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results partially explain the increasing popularity of the capacity sharing
platforms in practice. Only if f is sufficiently small and m is sufficiently
large, the carriers who purchase capacity from the platform in period 1 will
eliminate their logistics capability, and will purchase capacity again from
the platform in period 2.
We compare the UCC and the capacity sharing platform in terms of their
expected profits. In general, the UCC is more profitable than the platform
if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost c is large. If c is large, the carriers are
more likely to outsource their delivery service, leading to a low supply
of capacity on the platform. Thus, there will not be sufficiently many
successful transactions on the platform, causing it to be less profitable than
the UCC. Moreover, it is easier for the UCC to dominate as the number
of carriers n becomes larger because of her economy of scale in shipment
consolidation. However, there is an exception if f is sufficiently large and
m is intermediate (Region (ii) of §2.5.1). In this situation, the platform
outperforms the UCC if the discount factor δ is small. Since the carriers
are less sensitive to their costs in period 2, they become more likely to do
their own delivery (and sell their remaining capacity to the platform). This
mitigates the imbalance of supply and demand on the platform.
We also compare the UCC and the platform in terms of their social-
environmental impact. Although additional trucks are required by the UCC
model, each truck of the UCC can potentially consolidate multiple carriers’
tasks. In contrast, no additional trucks are required by the platform model,
but each carrier on the platform can only serve at most one other carrier
because of his limited capacity. We find that if n is large, then the UCC is
more efficient in reducing the expected social-environmental cost than the
platform. This is because the UCC’s trucks (each can serve multiple tasks)
can achieve a larger economy of scale in shipment consolidation when n is
large. This significantly reduces the traffic congestion and pollution of the
last-mile delivery. Note that this is nontrivial because the threshold of n
for the UCC to outperform the platform varies with the probability of a low
task volume λ in different manners under different situations (see Figure
2.7).
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We study two extensions of our models. The first extension considers a
hybrid model in which the consolidator concurrently operates a UCC and a
platform. We also analyze an extension with correlated demands between
two periods for each carrier. Other future research directions include endo-
genizing the government subsidy S and considering the construction costs




Their Offline and Online




During the past decades, many retailers have supplemented their brick-and-
mortar (offline) stores with an online channel (Gao and Su, 2017). Conven-
tionally, these retailers operate their offline and online channels separately
(for example, in terms of human resource, inventory, product information,
etc.). To provide consumers a seamless shopping experience across the of-
fline and online channels, some retailers start to adopt an omni-channel
strategy that employs new technology to integrate the two channels (Cisco
Study, 2013).
For some product categories such as apparel, consumers’ purchase deci-
sions are affected by their trials of the products in brick-and-mortar stores.
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However, for many other product categories such as electronics, cosmet-
ics, drugs, food, and books, consumers may not be able to exhaustively
try the products before purchases. Thus, for these product categories, the
consumers’ purchase decisions are largely determined by product descrip-
tions. For example, it is difficult to judge a digital camera’s versatility in
handling different lighting conditions without extensive use of the product.
Such information is usually provided in product descriptions.
According to the literature (see, for example, Gu and Xie (2013) and Sun
and Tyagi (2017)), a consumer’s purchase decision depends on how well a
product’s attributes fit the consumer’s personal taste. For many product
categories, it is difficult for consumers to assess a product’s attributes even if
the product can be inspected physically. In contrast, a more comprehensive
product description can reduce the uncertainty of product fit, which affects
the consumers’ purchase decisions. We focus on such product categories in
this work.
While the online channel can offer virtually unlimited space to describe
a product (Berman and Thelen, 2004), a detailed product description is
usually lacking in the offline channel. According to a survey by Digimarc
Corporation (2015), 85% of U.S. adult shoppers indicated that their in-
store purchase decisions were influenced by the descriptive information on
product packages. However, 78% of them mentioned that they did not find
sufficient information that they required. This reflects the limitation of the
product descriptions in the offline channel. If the offline and online chan-
nels are operated separately, then it is hard to resolve the offline consumers’
product-fit uncertainty because of the product description limitation (May-
zlin and Shin, 2011). Many consumers expect offline stores to provide the
same product descriptions as their online counterparts, and 71% of them
prefer in-store access to digital contents (Cisco Study, 2013).
Nowadays, with the advance in information technology, some retailers are
able to disseminate a product description to both the offline and online
consumers seamlessly, overcoming the product description limitation in the
offline channel. For example, the Chinese e-commerce giant, Alibaba has
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proposed a “smart store” concept recently. In a smart store, offline con-
sumers can access additional product descriptions about sizes, colors, and
functions from an online channel through a “cloud shelf”, which is a dig-
ital interactive wall screen (Chen, 2017, Dudarenok, 2018). Maserati has
transformed two of its dealers in China into smart stores, where customers
can scan different parts of a car to learn about its features (Chou, 2018).
Similarly, the beauty and body-care retailer, Sephora encourages in-store
customers to scan products using Sephora’s mobile app to access addi-
tional product descriptions (Lawson, 2016). The Indian e-commerce plat-
form, Paytm Mall collaborates with a fashion brand, Redtape to enable
QR codes for their entire offline catalogue. When offline consumers scan a
QR code, they receive a product description from an online platform (Nair,
2018, Rai, 2018).
By integrating the offline and online channels with such technologies, an
omni-channel retailer is able to provide a more detailed product description
to her offline consumers, reducing their product-fit uncertainty. However,
the retailer delivers the same product description through both the offline
and online channels, albeit the consumers’ decisions may be different across
the two channels. For example, if a consumer decides not to purchase a
product from the retailer, then he can visit another retailer. Switching to
another retailer usually incurs a larger hassle cost to the offline consumers
(Balasubramanian, 1998, Forman et al., 2009, Mehra et al., 2017). This is
because the cost of searching and transportation for an offline consumer to
visit another brick-and-mortar store is higher than the cost of switching to
another website for an online consumer. In this case, integrating the offline
and online channels causes inflexibility that prevents the retailer to take
advantage of the difference between her offline and online consumers’ deci-
sions. Thus, it is not clear whether adopting new technologies to integrate
the offline and online channels can always benefit the retailer.
The Internet and information technology also provide an opportunity for
consumers who purchase a product to share their reviews online. Consumer
reviews can be influential on the upcoming consumers’ purchase decisions
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(Chen and Xie, 2008). Among all the ratings and reviews that may influ-
ence the consumers’ purchase decisions, the reviews that are endogenously
generated by the consumers on retailers’ websites are most influential (Cisco
Study, 2013). It is known that positive reviews can increase the consumers’
intention to purchase a product (Bickart and Schindler, 2001, Shaffer and
Zettelmeyer, 2002, Huang and Chen, 2006, Park et al., 2007). However,
whether a consumer will post a positive review depends on his experience
of the product (Li and Hitt, 2008, Moe and Trusov, 2011). Generally,
the review will be positive if the product fits the consumer’s taste. The
consumer can find out whether the product fits his taste from the product
description. Thus, the product description will affect the consumer reviews,
which in turn will affect the retailer’s sales.
Given that most consumer review systems are available only online, a re-
tailer who operates the offline and online channels separately is typically
unable to deliver consumer reviews to the offline consumers. However, the
technology integrating the two channels allows both the offline and online
consumers to access the same consumer reviews (in addition to a consistent
product description). For example, in the Alibaba smart stores, consumers
can read reviews through the cloud shelf (Chen, 2017, Dudarenok, 2018).
In Sephora offline stores, consumers can also read reviews by scanning a
product using a Sephora’s mobile app. Since the presence of consumer re-
views will complicate a retailer’s product-description decision, it in turn
makes the retailer’s decision on whether or not to integrate the offline and
online channels challenging.
The above observations motivate the following research questions: (i) Under
what conditions should a retailer integrate her offline and online channels?
(ii) What is the impact of consumer reviews on this decision process? Will
the consumer reviews make integrating the two channels more favorable?
(iii) Lastly, will the consumer reviews improve or hurt the retailer’s ex-
pected profit? To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous research
that optimizes the product descriptions with endogenously generated con-
sumer reviews in a multi-channel retail setting.
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To address the above questions, we consider a retailer selling a single prod-
uct to consumers through an offline channel and an online channel. The
consumers in each channel are heterogeneous such that the product fits the
tastes of only a fraction of these consumers. We also consider the difference
of the outside options between the offline consumers and the online con-
sumers. We construct a two-period game-theoretical model to study the
retailer’s decision-making process. If the retailer operates the two channels
separately, she optimizes a product description level for each individual
channel. In contrast, if the retailer integrates the two channels, she op-
timizes a common product description level for both channels. In each
period, the retailer first determines the product description level(s). Upon
observing the product description, each consumer updates his belief about
the product fit and makes a purchase decision to maximize his expected
utility. After the consumers make their purchase decisions, the profit of the
retailer is realized.
We further consider that if a consumer review system is available, the
consumers who purchase the product in period 1 may post their reviews on
the system, which will affect the period 2 consumers’ purchase intention.
Although the consumer reviews in practice may provide some information
mitigating the product fit uncertainty (Kwark et al., 2014), we focus on
the reviews which only affects consumers’ valuation about the product,
to make our model tractable. It’s common in practice that consumers
only provide a review stating that they ”liked” the product or that they
”disliked” it (Ifrach et al., 2015). This type of reviews and star ratings
do not contain any fit information, which cannot help consumers further
resolve their fit uncertainty. In our model, the consumers only rely on the
product descriptions provided by the retailer to update their belief about
the product fit. In contrast, the fraction of positive consumer reviews
generated in period 1 only affects period 2 consumers’ product valuation.
If the offline and online channels are operated separately, only the online
consumers can post and read the reviews, whereas the consumers in both
channels can post and read the reviews if the two channels are integrated.
We have obtained the following insights:
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(i) Without consumer reviews, we find that it is more profitable for the
retailer to integrate the offline and online channels than to operate them
separately if the limit of the offline product description is low and the con-
sumers’ base product valuation is small. This is because if the two channels
are operated separately, the offline consumers are unlikely to purchase the
product given the high product-fit uncertainty caused by the limited prod-
uct description. In contrast, integrating the offline and online product
descriptions makes more offline consumers willing to purchase the product
with a more detailed product description, and making the retailer more
profitable. However, if the base product valuation is sufficiently large, it
is more profitable for the retailer to operate the two channels separately.
In this situation, it is easier to attract the offline consumers who have a
low utility from the outside option. Differentiating the product description
levels between the two channels yields a higher profit for the retailer.
(ii) In the presence of consumer reviews, even if the offline product descrip-
tion limit is high, it can still be more profitable for the retailer to integrate
the offline and online channels. This is because it allows the offline con-
sumers to post and read the reviews. This retailer provides a sufficiently
rich product description in the first period to generate a large fraction of
positive reviews, which in turn raise the offline consumers’ product valu-
ation in the second period. This increases the retailer’s expected profit.
However, since the retailer sets the same product description level for both
channels, the higher product description level in the first period can deter
some offline consumers whom the product does not fit from purchasing the
product. If the profit gain from the upcoming consumers in the second pe-
riod can compensate this profit loss in the first period, it is more profitable
to integrate the offline and online channels.
(iii) Consumer reviews may reduce the retailer’s profit if the consumers’
base product valuation is sufficiently large. This is because when there are
no reviews, the retailer can already attract the consumers with large base
product valuation easily even with a low product description level. With
the addition of the consumer reviews, however, the retailer has to set a high
product description level in the first period to prevent the negative impact
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of the reviews on the upcoming consumers. The increase in the product
description level drives down the retailer’s profit in the first period as it
prevents some consumers whom the product does not fit from purchasing
the product, which is detrimental to the retailer.
This chapter is organized as follows. After reviewing the relevant litera-
ture in §3.2, we analyze the models without and with consumer reviews in
§3.3 and §3.4 respectively. We consider an extended model in §3.5. §3.6
concludes this chapter. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Literature review
We consider a retailer that operates an offline channel and an online channel
separately with different product description levels or integrates the two
channels with a common product description level. In contrast, a stream
of literature on traditional channel management studies different channels
operated by different companies. See, for example, Chiang et al. (2003),
Cattani et al. (2006), Chen et al. (2008), and Netessine and Rudi (2006).
Our work is also related to Bernstein et al. (2008), who consider bricks-
and-mortar retailers opening their online channels in an oligopoly setting.
There is growing literature on omni-channel retail management. Most op-
erations management papers in this area focus on fulfillment. Gallino and
Moreno (2014) empirically test the impact of the practice of buy-online,
pick-up-in-store (BOPS) on a retailer’s sales in both online and offline chan-
nels. Gao and Su (2017) study the implications of BOPS on channel co-
ordination based on an analytical model. Gallino et al. (2017) investigate
another omni-channel fulfillment strategy – ship to store. They empiri-
cally demonstrate that within a group of stock-keeping units, the strategy
increases the sales of bottom-selling items. Lim et al. (2016) describe last-
mile supply network configurations in omni-channel retailing. Harsha et
al. (2019) propose two pricing policies for an omni-channel retailer in the
presence of cross-channel fulfillment.
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A few papers study how to effectively provide information to consumers
in an omni-channel environment. Bell et al. (2017) investigate the impact
of physical showrooms on consumers’ channel choice. Gao and Su (2017)
study the individual as well as the joint impacts of physical showrooms,
virtual showrooms, and inventory-availability information on consumer be-
havior and retail operational efficiency. Gao et al. (2018) investigate how
an online channel influences a retailer’s decisions regarding physical stores,
where customers can inspect products. In contrast, our work considers
product descriptions and consumer reviews. The former helps consumers
assess whether a product fits their tastes, whereas the latter can influence
the future consumers’ purchase decisions. We study how a retailer strategi-
cally provide the product descriptions in different channels with and with-
out consumer reviews. We identify conditions in which the retailer is better
off by integrating the offline and online channels.
Our research is also related to the literature on how a firm can induce pur-
chases from consumers facing product value and fit uncertainty. Gu and Xie
(2013) examine firms’ equilibrium fit-revelation decisions in a competitive
market. Ofek et al. (2011) focus on the impact of adding an online channel
on a retailer’s pricing and fit-revelation decisions. Kwark et al. (2014) and
Sun and Tyagi (2017) examine the disclosure of product-fit information in
the context of a distribution channel. Liu et al. (2019) investigates the op-
timal information provision strategy to resolve uncertainty in the presence
of consumer search costs. Different from these papers, our study focuses
on the retailer’s decisions on the product descriptions under two different
channel-management strategies: operating the offline and online channels
separately or integrating them.
This research also adds to the literature that studies consumer reviews.
Chen and Xie (2008) study how to adjust a retailer’s marketing communi-
cation strategy in response to consumer reviews. They identify when the
retailer benefits from facilitating the consumer reviews. Yu et al. (2016) ex-
amine the impact of consumer reviews on a firm’s dynamic pricing strategy
in the presence of strategic consumers. Liu et al. (2017) study how online
reviews and past-sales-volume information jointly affect consumer purchase
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decisions and firms’ pricing strategies. In contrast, we investigate how con-
sumer reviews affect a retailer’s decisions on the product descriptions and
her incentive to integrate the offline and online channels.
3.3 Model without consumer reviews
3.3.1 Model description
We consider a retailer that sells a single product through an offline (brick-
and-mortar) channel and an online channel to consumers in two periods
t = 1, 2. Let i = b, o denote the offline and online channels respectively.
For each channel, we assume there are n distinct consumers in each period.
For simplicity, we assume the retail price of the product is fixed at p for
both channels and for both periods.
The product is characterized by several attributes related to its design
and functionality. For example, the attributes that characterize a digital
camera are its size, weight, sensor, image processor, AF points, ISO range,
etc. The consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes (preferences) for each
product attribute. We assume that each consumer knows his own taste for
each attribute, but the actual details of the attribute of the product are
unknown to him. Therefore, before purchasing the product, the consumer
is unsure about whether each product attribute matches his expectation.
We say the product fits a consumer if all its attributes fit the consumer’s
taste. Otherwise, the product does not fit the consumer. Let m = 0 denote
a scenario where the product fits the consumer and assume this occurs
with a probability P{m = 0} = θ ∈ (0, 1) in each period. Let m = 1
denote a scenario where the product does not fit a consumer and assume
this occurs with a probability P{m = 1} = 1 − θ in each period. Given
the definition of m, each consumer’s valuation of the product is V − cm,
where V represents base product valuation and c > 0 captures a valuation
reduction due to product misfit. Note that for the sake of tractability, we
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neglect the difference between a misfit caused by a single attribute and a
misfit caused by multiple attributes.
In each period t = 1, 2, the retailer decides on the product description level
di,t ∈ [0, 1] for channel i = b, o. The product description level di,t repre-
sents the amount of information of the product’s attributes disclosed to the
consumers. This information helps the consumers resolve the uncertainty
of m. A larger di,t corresponds to a more informative product description
for channel i in period t. Similar to a common approach in the literature
(see, for example, Lewis and Sappington (1994), Chen and Xie (2008), and
Kwark et al. (2014)), we assume that after knowing di,t, a private signal s
is generated for each consumer. Specifically, after the consumer reads the
product description in channel i, if this description suggests that the prod-
uct fits the consumer, then s = 0. Otherwise, we have s = 1. If the product
actually does not fit the consumer (m = 1), the signal s is more likely to
reveal the misfit (s is more likely to appear as 1) as more information about
the product’s attributes is provided. Thus, we have P{s = 1|m = 1} = di,t
and P{s = 0|m = 1} = 1−di,t, for i = b, o and t = 1, 2. On the other hand,
if the product actually fits the consumer (m = 0), then all its attributes fit
the consumer’s taste. In this case, the signal s will not reveal any misfit (s
will appear as 0) regardless of the product description level di,t. That is,
P{s = 0|m = 0} = 1.
Let U denote each consumer’s utility of purchasing the product from the
retailer. Given the signal s and using the above probabilities, we can derive
each consumer’s conditional expected utility of purchasing the product as
E[U |s] = V − cE[m|s] − p, where E[m|s] represents the expected degree
of misfit given s. According to Bayes’ Theorem (Stuart and Ord, 1994),
we have E[m|s = 0] = (1−θ)(1−di,t)
1−(1−θ)di,t and E[m|s = 1] = 1. Based on the
above results, we can derive each consumer’s conditional expected utility
in channel i for each period t as
E[U |s = 0] = V − cE[m|s = 0]− p = V − c(1−θ)(1−di,t)
1−(1−θ)di,t − p,
E[U |s = 1] = V − cE[m|s = 1]− p = V − c− p.
(3.1)
Each consumer in channel i decides whether to purchase the product from
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the retailer by comparing his conditional expected utility in Equations (3.1)
with an outside option. Note that we assume that if a consumer decides
not to purchase the product from the retailer through channel i, then his
outside option is to visit and purchase it from another retailer. Let ui denote
the consumer’s utility from the outside option of channel i. We assume
uo > ub because switching to an outside option usually incurs a larger
hassle cost to the offline consumers (Balasubramanian, 1998, Forman et al.,
2009, Mehra et al., 2017) as mentioned in §3.1. Furthermore, to exclude
uninteresting cases in which the consumers make purchases for any product
description level or always purchase from only one channel, we assume
p+uo ≤ V < p+ub+(1−θ)c and (1−θ)c/2 < uo−ub < min{θc, (1−θ)c}.
Let φi,t(d) denote the probability of each consumer in channel i to purchase
the product in period t given a product description level d. The retailer’s
expected profit from channel i in period t is denoted as πi,t(di,t) = p ×
n× φi,t(di,t), for i = b, o and t = 1, 2. We assume that providing a product
description incurs a fixed cost that is independent of the product description
level di,t, and we normalize it to zero in our analysis. This is reasonable
in practice because the extra cost of adding a few more lines of text about









i,t, then the retailer always chooses d
′
i,t.
The retailer can operate the offline and online channels separately, or inte-
grate the two channels. Depending on the retailer’s channel-management
strategy, the retailer makes different decisions to maximize her total ex-
pected profit. Specifically, a retailer who operates two channels separately
chooses db,t to maximize πb,t and chooses do,t to maximize πo,t, resulting
in a total expected profit πdual,t = πb,t + πo,t. To capture the offline chan-
nel’s limitation in the product description, we assume that db,t ≤ d̄, where
d̄ ∈ (0, 1). In contrast, with the technology mentioned in §3.1, a retailer
who integrates the offline and online channels does not face such a limita-
tion in her offline channel. Instead, the retailer chooses an identical product
description level domni,t for the two channels to maximize her total expected
profit πomni,t = p× (n× φb,t(domni,t) + n× φo,t(domni,t)).
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In each period t, the retailer first decides the product description level
for each channel to maximize her total expected profit. After reading the
product description, a private signal s is generated for each consumer in
channel i according to the probability P{s|m}. The consumer then decides
whether to purchase the product by comparing his conditional expected
utility E[U |s] with the outside option of channel i. Figure 3.1 shows the
sequence of the decisions in the two periods.
Figure 3.1: The sequence of decisions in the two periods without con-
sumer reviews
We first determine the optimal decisions of the retailer when she operates
the offline and online channels separately in §3.3.2, before we find the op-
timal decisions of the retailer when she integrates the offline and online
channels in §3.3.3. Note that in the absence of consumer reviews, the opti-
mal decisions are the same across the two periods and we use a superscript
(∗) to denote all the optimal decisions and the equilibrium outcomes. We
identify conditions under which integrating the offline and online channels
benefits the retailer. Although the decisions are the same across the pe-
riods, it is worth considering the two-period model here so that we can
compare it with a model with consumer reviews, in which the decisions are
different across the periods.
3.3.2 Operating offline and online channels separately
We first analyze the retailer’s optimal decisions for the offline channel and
then for the online channel. In the offline channel, the retailer chooses
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db,t ≤ d̄ to maximize her expected profit πb,t in each period t. Lemma
3.1 shows the optimal decisions of the retailer for the offline channel. Let
d̂ = (1−θ)c−(uo−ub)
(1−θ)[c−(uo−ub)]
and V̂ = p+ ub +
(1−θ)(1−d̄)c
1−(1−θ)d̄ .
Lemma 3.1. The retailer sets a product description level d∗b,t = 0 for the
offline channel with an expected profit π∗b,t = 0 if d̄ ≤ d̂ and V < V̂ , and









otherwise, for t = 1, 2.
For the online channel, the retailer can choose any do,t ∈ [0, 1] to maximize
her expected profit πo,t in each period t. Lemma 3.2 shows the retailer’s
optimal decisions.









for t = 1, 2.
Lemma 3.1 shows that if the product description limit for the offline chan-
nel is low and the consumers’ base product valuation is small, then the
retailer provides a minimum product description for the offline channel.
Since the base product valuation is small, the consumers will not purchase
the product if their fit uncertainty is high. The retailer cannot resolve
the consumers’ fit uncertainty even with the highest level of product de-
scription. Therefore, the retailer would rather not sell through the offline
channel. In contrast, Lemma 3.2 shows that the retailer can always induce
her online channel’s consumers to purchase the product, and make a profit
by optimizing the product description level.
3.3.3 Integrating offline and online channels
The retailer sets a common product description level domni,t for the offline
and online channels to maximize her total expected profit πomni,t in each
period t. Lemma 3.3 shows the optimal decisions of the retailer.
55




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) for both the offline and online channels with a total expected
profit π∗omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c , for t = 1, 2.
By comparing Lemmas 3.3 and 3.1, we observe that for the offline channel,
the retailer provides a more detailed product description when the offline
and online channels are integrated than that when the two channels are
operated separately (that is, d∗omni,t > d
∗
b,t). This can be achieved by en-
abling the offline consumers to access the online product description with
the technology mentioned in §3.1.
3.3.4 Comparing the two strategies
By comparing the retailer’s total expected profits under the two strategies
in §3.3.2 and §3.3.3, we identify conditions under which integrating the
offline and online channels yields a higher expected profit for the retailer.
Theorem 3.4. The retailer is more profitable by integrating the offline and
online channels if and only if d̄ ≤ d̂ and V < V̂ .
Figure 3.2 illustrates whether integrating the offline and online channels is
beneficial for the retailer under different values of d̄ and V . It is intuitive
that integrating the two channels is more profitable if d̄ is small. This is
because the integration removes the product description limit from the of-
fline channel, and induces the consumers who are deterred by an insufficient
product description to make purchases.
Figure 3.2 shows that, contrary to a common belief that integrating the
offline and online channels is more beneficial, operating the two channels
separately turns out to be more profitable if V is sufficiently large. This is
because when the base product valuation is large, it is easier to attract the
offline consumers whose utility from the outside option is low.
To take advantage of this, the retailer should differentiate the product de-
scription levels for the two channels to maximize her profit. Specifically, the
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Figure 3.2: Region in which integrating the offline and online channels
benefits the retailer
retailer should set a lower product description level for the offline channel
(than the online channel) because the outside option there is less attractive.
In contrast, the retailer does not have this flexibility if the two channels are
integrated. Furthermore, a higher product description level for the offline
channel (recall that d∗omni,t > d
∗
b,t) will increase the number of offline con-
sumers who think the product does not fit them and will not purchase the
product. When V is large, this effect dominates the benefit of integrating
the two channels, hurting the retailer’s profitability.
3.4 Model with consumer reviews
3.4.1 Model description
In this section, we assume that the consumers who purchase the product
in period 1 can post their reviews about the product through a review sys-
tem. The consumers in period 2 can read these reviews before they decide
whether to purchase the product. To align with the practice that consumer
reviews are typically posted online, we assume that if the retailer operates
the offline and online channels separately, only the online consumers can
post and read the reviews, whereas both the offline and online consumers
can post and read the reviews if the retailer integrates the two channels.
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We study the equilibrium outcomes and the implications of adding such a
consumer review system.
Given the retailer’s decision on the product descriptions and the generated
private signals, the conditional expected utility and the purchase decision of
each consumer in period 1 are the same as in the model without consumer
reviews in §3.3. After a consumer purchases the product in period 1, he
learns that whether the product fits him or not (that is, m is realized).
The consumer will post a review with a probability η ∈ [0, 1]. Based on
a common assumption in the literature of product reviews (Li and Hitt,
2008, Moe and Trusov, 2011), the consumer’s review can be either positive
or negative, depending on whether the product fits him. Specifically, if his
realized utility from purchasing the product is no less than that from the
outside option (that is, if U = V − cm − p ≥ ui), then the consumer will
write a positive review. Otherwise, he will write a negative review. Note
that this approach is commonly used in modeling consumer reviews (Ifrach
et al., 2015). Furthermore, this approach ensures that a consumer, in our
model, will write a positive review if and only if the product truly fits his
taste, or write a negative review otherwise.
As mentioned in §3.1, we only focus on the consumer reviews that do not
contain product fit information, to make our model tractable. For the con-
sumers in period 2, they still rely on the product descriptions provided
by the retailer to update their belief about the product fit E[m|s]. The
consumer reviews generated in period 1 only affect their perceived value
of the product. Extensive literature shows that only when the quantity of
positive reviews is sufficiently large to overcome the negative attitudes from
negative reviews, will those positive reviews improve consumers’ purchase
intentions (Huang and Chen, 2006, Bickart and Schindler, 2001, Shaffer and
Zettelmeyer, 2002, Park et al., 2007). Thus, we assume that the fraction
of positive reviews will affect period 2 consumers’ product valuation ulti-
mately. Specifically, let λ denote the fraction of positive reviews among all
the consumer reviews generated in period 1. Let λ denote a threshold value,
above which the consumer reviews will make a positive impact on period 2
consumer’s product valuation. The period 2 consumers’ ultimate valuation
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about the product is updated as V −cE[m|s]+ψ(λ), where ψ(λ) ≡ a(λ−λ)
captures the impact of the consumer reviews.
Therefore, in period 2, the conditional expected utility of each consumer in
channel i from purchasing the product can be derived as follows:
E[U |s = 0] = V − cE[m|s = 0] + ψ(λ)− p = V − c(1−θ)(1−di,2)
1−(1−θ)di,2 + ψ(λ)− p,
E[U |s = 1] = V − cE[m|s = 1] + ψ(λ)− p = V − c+ ψ(λ)− p.
(3.2)
The outside option of each channel i stays unchanged. Each consumer
in channel i decides whether to purchase the product by comparing his
conditional expected utility in Equations (3.2) with the outside option of
the channel.
Note that in Equations (3.2), the fraction of positive reviews (λ) only affects
the consumers’ valuation of the product but cannot help them to determine
whether the product fits them. This is suitable when the consumer reviews
are expressed as thumbs up or down, or star ratings, which do not carry the
information to resolve the uncertainty of product fit (Hu et al., 2006). A
model that incorporates a more comprehensive review system providing the
information about product fit is, unfortunately, intractable in our setting.
Furthermore, we assume that θ + (1−θ)c
a
< λ < 1 − (1−θ)c
a
and a > 2c/θ2
to exclude trivial cases in which the consumer reviews have no impact or a
single-sided (only positive or negative) impact on the equilibrium outcomes.
Similar to the model without consumer reviews, in each period t, if the
offline and online channels are operated separately, the retailer determines
the product description level di,t for each channel i, but if the two channels
are integrated, the retailer determines a common product description level
domni,t for both channels. The sequence of the decisions is similar to that
of the model without consumer reviews in Figure 3.1, except that in period
1, the retailer chooses the product description level for each channel to
maximize her total expected profit over the two periods. Figure 3.3 shows
the sequence of the decisions in the two periods. We solve the optimal
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decisions of the retailer and the consumers through backward induction to
obtain the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Figure 3.3: The sequence of decisions in the two periods with consumer
reviews
We determine the optimal decisions and the equilibrium outcomes if the
offline and online channels are operated separately in §3.4.2 and if the two
channels are integrated in §3.4.3. We use a superscript (†) to denote all the
optimal decisions and the equilibrium outcomes in the presence of consumer
reviews. We identify conditions under which the consumer review system
and the integration of the offline and online channels benefit the retailer.
3.4.2 Operating offline and online channels separately
If the retailer operates the offline and online channels separately, only the
online consumers can post and read the reviews. Thus, the offline con-
sumers have the same conditional expected utilities and optimal decisions
as in the model without consumer reviews in §3.3.2. Thus, the retailer’s
optimal decision d†b,t for the offline channel is identical to d
∗
b,t in Lemma 3.1.
For the online channel, we determine the retailer’s optimal decisions back-
ward by first finding d†o,2 in period 2, before we find d
†
o,1 in period 1. The
retailer takes the consumer reviews in period 1 into account, and chooses a
product description level do,2 for the online channel in period 2 to maximize
her expected profit πo,2(do,2) = p×n×φo,2(do,2). Recall that ψ(λ) = a(λ−λ)
represents the impact of consumer reviews.
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Lemma 3.5. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a prod-
uct description level d†o,2 with an expected profit π
†
o,2 in period 2 for the
online channel as follows.
1. d†o,2 = 0 and π
†
o,2 = 0 if
(a) ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub − (1− θ)c, or










(a) uo − ub − (1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V ≥ p+ uo − ψ(λ), or
(b) 0 ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub, or
(c) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ).
3. d†o,2 = 0 and π
†
o,2 = pn if
(a) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V ≥ p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ), or
(b) ψ(λ) ≥ (1− θ)c.
Figure 3.4 shows the retailer’s optimal decision d†o,2 for the online channel in
period 2 under different values of ψ(λ) and V . For Case 1 where ψ(λ) < 0
and V is small, the reviews have a negative impact on the consumers’
product valuation in period 2, it is optimal for the retailer to set a minimum
product description level (d†o,2 = 0). In this case, the consumers in period
2 will not purchase the product even if the retailer provides the maximum
product description. Thus, the retailer sets d†o,2 = 0.
Figure 3.4: The retailer’s optimal decision d†o,2 for the online channel
in period 2
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For Case 2 where the reviews have a negative impact on the consumers’
product valuation in period 2 but V is large, or the reviews have a mod-
erate positive impact, the retailer can induce the consumers to purchase
the product by choosing a positive product description level. For Case 3
where the reviews have a strong positive impact on the consumers’ product
valuation, the retailer can induce all the consumers in period 2 to purchase
the product even if she provides a minimum product description.
By comparing Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.2 (without consumer reviews), we
have the following findings. (i) While the retailer always makes a profit in
the absence of reviews, she may not make any profit from the online channel
in the presence of reviews. For example, in Case 1 of Lemma 3.5 where the
reviews have a negative impact on the consumers’ product valuation and V
is small, the retailer earns no profit and she is hurt by the consumer review
system. (ii) While the retailer always sets a positive product description
level in the absence of reviews, she may choose to provide no product
description for the online channel in the presence of reviews. For example,
in Case 3 of Lemma 3.5 where the reviews have a strong positive impact
on the consumers’ product valuation, the retailer can make a higher profit.
In this case, the consumer review system benefits the retailer.
In period 1, the retailer chooses a product description level do,1 for the
online channel to maximize her total expected profit Πo = πo,1 + πo,2 over
the two periods. Let λ̄ = θ+ (uo−ub)(a−c)
ac
and V̄1 = p+uo+(1−θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c .
Lemma 3.6. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a prod-
uct description level d†o,1 with a total expected profit Π
†
o over the two periods









p−V+aλ+uo+(1−θ)c + pn if









p−V+uo+c + pn otherwise.
The proof of Lemma 3.6 shows that the retailer sets a high product descrip-
tion level in period 1 to reduce the number of negative reviews from the
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consumers whom the product does not fit. This is because, after reading a
more detailed product description, the consumers whom the product does
not fit (with m = 1) are more likely to find out the misfit (s = 1) and
they will neither purchase the product nor write a review. Therefore, the
retailer is able to generate a large fraction of positive reviews λ such that
ψ(λ) has a positive impact on the consumers’ product valuation in period
2.
Comparing Lemma 3.6 with Lemma 3.2, if the consumers are very sensitive
to the negative reviews and have large base product valuation (that is,
λ ≥ λ̄ and V ≥ V̄1), then we have d†o,1 > d∗o,1. This means the retailer
needs to provide a more detailed product description in the presence of
reviews. This is because, without a sufficiently large λ, the reviews will hurt
the consumers’ product valuation in period 2 (ψ(λ) is negative), making
it difficult to sell the product even if V is large. Therefore, to make λ
sufficiently large, the retailer needs a higher product description level d†o,1
to reduce the number of consumers, whom the product does not fit, to
purchase the product and write negative reviews.
To find out the impact of the consumer reviews on retailer, we compare the
retailer’s total expected profits Π∗o and Π
†
o and the corresponding optimal
decisions d∗o,1 and d
†
o,1 without and with the consumer reviews respectively.






Theorem 3.7. The consumer review system has the following impact on
the retailer.
1. If λ < λ̄, or λ ≥ λ̄ and V < V̄1, then the consumer review system
benefits the retailer (Π†o > Π
∗
o) and it does not affect the product
description level in period 1 (d†o,1 = d
∗
o,1).
2. If λ ≥ λ̄ and V̄1 ≤ V < V̄2, then the consumer review system benefits
the retailer (Π†o > Π
∗
o) and it increases the product description level




3. If λ ≥ λ̄ and V ≥ V̄2, then the consumer review system hurts the
retailer (Π†o < Π
∗
o) and it increases the product description level in
period 1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1).
Adding the consumer review system benefits the retailer (that is, Π†o > Π
∗
o)
except when both λ and V are large. There are three cases in Theorem
3.7. First, if the consumers are not very sensitive to negative reviews (that
is, λ < λ̄), then the reviews are likely to have a positive impact on the
consumers’ product valuation in period 2. In this case, adding the consumer
review system increases the retailer’s profit in period 2 without affecting
the product description level (d†o,1 = d
∗
o,1) and the expected profit in period
1. As a result, the retailer’s total expected profit over the two periods
increases after adding the consumer review system (that is, Π†o > Π
∗
o).
If λ is large but V is sufficiently small (λ ≥ λ̄ and V < V̄1), then, even
without reviews, the retailer already needs to set a high product description
level to help the consumers resolve product-fit uncertainty and to induce
them to purchase the product (because the conditional expected utility in
Equation (3.1) increases with do,1). Adding the consumer review system
does not affect the product description level in period 1 (that is, d†o,1 = d
∗
o,1).
This is because the high product description level can already deter the
consumers, whom the product does not fit, to purchase the product in
period 1. This leads to a large fraction of positive reviews λ and generates
a larger expected profit for the retailer in period 2. Thus, we have Π†o > Π
∗
o.
Second, if λ is large and V is moderate (Case 2 of Theorem 3.7) then
adding the consumer review system increases the retailer’s total expected
profit (that is, Π†o > Π
∗
o) and increases the product description level in
period 1 (that is, d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1). This is because a moderate V means that
there is a considerable number of consumers purchasing the product even
without the consumer reviews. Thus, adding the consumer review system
will benefit the retailer (Π†o > Π
∗
o) only when λ is sufficiently large. To
achieve that, the retailer needs to increase the product description level in
period 1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1) to reduce the number of consumers whom the product
does not fit to make purchases and write negative reviews.
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Lastly, adding the consumer review system hurts the retailer’s expected
profit (that is, Π†o < Π
∗
o) and increases the product description level in
period 1 (that is, d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1), if λ and V are both large (Case 3 of Theorem
3.7). In this case, V is sufficiently large that even without the consumer
reviews, the retailer can easily attract many consumers to purchase in both
periods with a low product description level. However, in the presence of
reviews, the retailer has to set a higher product description level in period
1 (d†o,1 > d
∗
o,1) to ensure a larger λ such that the reviews will not negatively
affect her profit in period 2. This increase in the product description level
drives down the retailer’s profit in period 1 because some consumers will
find out the product misfit and will not purchase the product. The profit
gain in period 2 due to the positive reviews is insufficient to compensate
the profit loss in period 1. Thus, the retailer is worse off by having the
consumer review system (Π†o < Π
∗
o).
Overall, Theorem 3.7 reveals that whether the consumer review system is
beneficial to the retailer depends on two important factors: the consumers’
sensitivity to negative reviews (λ) and the consumers’ base product valu-
ation (V ). Figure 3.5 illustrates the region in which adding the consumer
review system benefits the retailer.
Figure 3.5: Adding the consumer review system may benefit the re-
tailer
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3.4.3 Integrating offline and online channels
If the offline and online channels are integrated, the retailer sets the same
product description level domni,t for the two channels and enables the con-
sumers in both channels to post and read the reviews. To facilitate the
offline consumers to provide their feedback, the retailer can enable them
to create online accounts so that they can post their reviews (Chen, 2017,
Yang, 2018). To allow the consumers to read the reviews conveniently in
the offline stores, the retailer can install the “cloud shelf.”
Taking into account of the consumer reviews, the retailer optimizes her
decision domni,1 in period 1 to maximize her total expected profit Πomni =
πomni,1 + πomni,2 over the two periods, and chooses domni,2 to maximize
her expected profit πomni,2 in period 2. We determine the retailer’s optimal




Lemma 3.8. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a prod-
uct description level d†omni,2 with an expected profit π
†
omni,2 in period 2 as
follows.
1. d†omni,2 = 0 and π
†
omni,2 = 0 if
(a) ψ(λ) ≤ −(1− θ)c, or










(a) −(1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < −(uo − ub) and V ≥ p+ ub − ψ(λ), or
(b) −(uo − ub) ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub − (1− θ)c, or










(a) uo − ub − (1− θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V ≥ p+ uo − ψ(λ), or
(b) 0 ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub, or
(c) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ).
4. d†omni,2 = 0 and π
†
omni,2 = 2pn if
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(a) uo − ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V ≥ p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ), or
(b) ψ(λ) ≥ (1− θ)c.
According to Lemma 3.8, the retailer sets a minimum product description
level d†omni,2 = 0 in period 2, if the reviews have a strong negative (Case
1) or strong positive (Case 4) impact on the product valuation. In Case
1, the reviews will significantly reduce the consumers’ product valuation
in period 2 so that no consumers will purchase the product even if the
retailer provides a maximum product description. Conversely, in Case 4,
the reviews can significantly increase the product valuation in period 2
such that all the consumers will purchase the product even if the retailer
provides a minimum product description.
The consumer reviews have a moderate impact in Cases 2 and 3. The
retailer sets different product description levels depending on ψ(λ) and
V . Figure 3.6 shows the retailer’s optimal decision d†omni,2 in period 2 for
different values of ψ(λ) and V .
Figure 3.6: The retailer’s optimal decision d†omni,2 in period 2
Comparing Figure 3.4 (the retailer’s optimal decision d†o,2 if the offline and
online channels are operated separately) with Figure 3.6, we observe that
if ψ(λ) < 0, d†o,2 = 0 in Figure 3.4 but d
†
omni,2 > 0 in Case 2 of Figure 3.6 .
Due to the negative impact of the reviews (ψ(λ) < 0), if the two channels
are operated separately, the retailer cannot induce the online consumers to
purchase the product even if she provides a maximum product description.
Thus, she chooses a minimum product description for the online channel. In
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contrast, if the offline and online channels are integrated, the retailer sets a
positive product description level even if the reviews have a negative impact
(ψ(λ) < 0). Although she cannot generate sales from the online channel,
the retailer still can generate sales from the offline consumers whose outside
option is less attractive.
Comparing Lemma 3.8 to Lemma 3.3 (the retailer’s optimal decision with-
out consumer reviews), we observe that d†omni,2 < d
∗
omni,2 in many cases.
This suggests that the consumer reviews may serve as an alternative de-
vice to induce purchases, while reducing the retailer’s dependence on the
product description.
The following lemma determines the retailer’s optimal decision in period 1.
Recall that λ̄ = θ + (uo−ub)(a−c)
ac
and V̄1 = p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c .
Lemma 3.9. In the presence of consumer reviews, the retailer sets a prod-
uct description level d†omni,1 with a total expected profit Π
†






















Similar to Lemma 3.6, the proof of Lemma 3.9 shows that, in response to
the addition of the consumer review system, the retailer will choose a high
product description level in period 1 to generate a large fraction of positive
reviews λ. Similar to Theorem 3.7 where the offline and online channels
are operated separately, Corollary 3.10 shows the condition under which
adding the consumer review system benefits the retailer if the offline and
online channels are integrated.
Corollary 3.10. The consumer review system benefits the retailer (Π†omni >
Π∗omni) except for both λ and V are large.
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3.4.4 Comparing the two strategies
In the presence of consumer reviews, if the two channels are operated sepa-







o from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.6. Comparing Π
†
dual with
Π†omni in Lemma 3.9, Theorem 3.11 identifies the conditions under which
integrating the offline and online channels yields a higher profit for the
retailer. Let λ̂ = θ + (uo−ub)(a−c)
ac
+ θ(1−θ)(a−c)cd̄






. Recall that d̂ = (1−θ)c−(uo−ub)
(1−θ)[c−(uo−ub)]
and
V̂ = p+ ub +
(1−θ)(1−d̄)c
1−(1−θ)d̄ .
Theorem 3.11. In the presence of consumer reviews, we have the following
results.
1. If uo − ub > (1−θ)c1+θ , it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate
the offline and online channels if and only if d̄ ≤ d̂ and V < V̂ .
2. If uo − ub ≤ (1−θ)c1+θ and λ > λ̂, it is more profitable for the retailer
to integrate the offline and online channels if and only if d̄ ≤ d̂ and
V < V̂ , or d̄ > d̂ and V < Ṽ .
3. If uo − ub ≤ (1−θ)c1+θ and λ ≤ λ̂, it is more profitable for the retailer
to integrate the offline and online channels if and only if d̄ ≤ d̂ and
V < max{V̂ , Ṽ }, or d̄ > d̂ and V < Ṽ .
Theorem 3.11 shows that integrating the offline and online channels yields a
higher total expected profit for the retailer if and only if uo−ub is large and
both d̄ and V are small (Case 1), or both uo − ub and V are small (Cases
2 and 3). Figures 3.7(a), (b), and (c) illustrate under what conditions
integrating the offline and online channels is beneficial for the retailer in
the presence of consumer reviews for Cases 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Similar
to Figure 3.2 for the model without consumer reviews, Figure 3.7(a) shows
that if d̄ and V are small, it is more profitable to integrate the offline
and online channels. This is because if the two channels are operated
separately, the retailer can hardly attract the offline consumers with small
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base product valuation V to purchase the product given a very limited
product description. In contrast, integrating the offline and online channels
removes this limit.
Figure 3.7: Region in which integrating the offline and online channels
benefits the retailer
In the presence of consumer reviews, even if d̄ is large (d̄ > d̂), it is still
more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline and online channels
as long as uo−ub is small (see Figures 3.7(b) and 3.7(c)). Note that this is
different from Figure 3.2, where it is more profitable to integrate the two
channels only if d̄ is small (d̄ ≤ d̂).
If d̄ > d̂, integrating the offline and online channels is a double-edged
sword that can benefit or hurt the retailer with consumer reviews. On the
one hand, this strategy allows the offline consumers to post and read the
reviews. Since the retailer sets a high product description level in period 1
to generate a large fraction of positive reviews λ (see Lemma 3.9), which
increases the offline consumers’ product valuation in period 2 and thus the
retailer’s expected profit. In contrast, integrating the offline and online
channels cannot create this effect in the absence of the consumer reviews.
On the other hand, if the offline and online channels are integrated, the
retailer cannot differentiate the product descriptions of the two channels.
Since the outside option of the offline consumers is less attractive than that
of the online consumers (ub < uo), the retailer could set a lower product
description level for the offline channel. However, if the offline and online
channels are integrated, the product description level of the offline channel
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is increased (d†omni,1 > d
†
b,1), which will deter some offline consumers whom
the product does not fit from purchasing the product in period 1.
Therefore, when d̄ is large (d̄ > d̂), whether integrating the offline and
online channels is more profitable for the retailer depends on the trade-off
between the retailer’s profit gain in period 2 from the positive impact of
consumer reviews and the profit loss in period 1 due to the inflexibility of
setting a common product description level for both channels. If uo− ub is
small (the difference between the outside options of the offline and online
channels is small), the retailer incurs a limited profit loss in period 1 due to
the inflexibility. Consequently, it is more profitable to integrate the offline
and online channels (see Figures 3.7(b) and 3.7(c)). However, if uo − ub is
large (uo−ub > (1−θ)c1+θ ), the profit gain in period 2 from the positive impact
of consumer reviews is insufficient to compensate the profit loss in period
1 due to the inflexibility. Thus, the retailer can be worse off by integrating
the offline and online channels (see Figure 3.7(a)).
Further comparing Figures 3.7(b) and 3.7(c), we observe that when d̄ and
uo− ub are small, integrating the offline and online channels is more domi-
nating if λ is small (see Figure 3.7(c)). This is intuitive because with a small
λ, it is more likely for the reviews to have a positive impact (ψ(λ) = a(λ−λ)
is more likely to be large), magnifying the benefit of integrating the offline
and online channels.
In summary, without consumer reviews, it is beneficial for the retailer to
integrate the offline and online channels only if d̄ and V are small (see
Figure 3.2). In the presence of consumer reviews, even if d̄ is large (d̄ > d̂),
it is still beneficial to integrate the offline and online channels when the
difference between the outside options of the two channels (uo − ub) is
small (see Figures3.7(b) and 3.7(c)).
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3.5 Extended model with consumers search-
ing for the product description
If the retailer operates the offline and online channels separately, we assume
that the offline consumers cannot access the online product description. In
practice, some offline consumers may search for the online product descrip-
tion even if the retailer does not facilitate that (for example, they may
search using their mobile devices). In this section, we consider a model
without consumer reviews and assume that the offline consumers search for
the online product description with a probability η ∈ [0, 1]. The rest of the
model is identical to that of §3.3.
In this extended model, the retailer chooses do,t to maximize her expected
profit from both the online consumers and the offline consumers who search
for the online product description: πo,t(do,t) = p × n × φo,t(do,t) + p × n ×
η × φb,t(do,t). On the other hand, the retailer chooses db,t to maximize her
expected profit from the offline consumers who do not search for the online
product description: πb,t(db,t) = p × n × (1 − η) × φb,t(db,t). The following
corollary summarizes the optimal decisions of the retailer.
Corollary 3.12. Suppose the offline consumers search for the online prod-
uct description with a probability η. The retailer sets an offline product de-
scription level d∗b,t = 0 with an expected profit π
∗
b,t = 0 if d̄ ≤ d̂ and V < V̂ ,





with an expected profit π∗b,t =
θ(1−η)npc
p−V+ub+c
otherwise, for t = 1, 2. The retailer





expected profit π∗o,t =
θ(1+η)npc
p−V+uo+c , for t = 1, 2.
By comparing Corollary 3.12 with Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, we observe that
the retailer makes identical optimal decisions as in §3.3, but the total ex-
pected profits are different. Note that the retailer’s optimal decisions and
expected profits are given by Lemma 3.3 if the offline and online chan-
nels are integrated. By comparing the retailer’s total expected profit when
the two channels are operated separately with that when the two channels
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are integrated, Corollary 3.13 shows the conditions under which it is more
profitable for the retailer to integrate the two channels.
Corollary 3.13. Suppose the offline consumers search for the online prod-
uct description with a probability η. The retailer is more profitable by inte-
grating the offline and online channels if and only if d̄ ≤ d̂ and V < V̂ .
Corollary 3.13 shows that Theorem 3.4 continues to hold for this extended
model.
3.6 Summary
We consider a retailer that sells a single product through an offline (brick-
and-mortar) channel and an online channel to consumers in two periods.
The product has several different attributes and the consumers are hetero-
geneous in their tastes (preferences) for these attributes. Each consumer
knows his own taste for each attribute, but the actual details of the prod-
uct for that attribute are unknown to him. Therefore, before purchasing
the product, the consumer is unsure about whether the product fits his
taste. The consumer, however, can learn about the product by reading
the product description provided by the retailer. We study the retailer’s
decisions on the provision of the product descriptions in this multi-channel
environment, and investigate the impact of different channel-management
strategies on the retailer’s expected profit.
We develop a game-theoretical model to study the decision-making process
of a retailer who either operates an offline channel and an online chan-
nel separately or in an integrated manner. Specifically, the retailer may
differentiate the product description level of the offline channel from that
of the online channel if she operates the two channels separately. In con-
trast, if the retailer integrates the two channels, she sets the same product
description level for both channels. In each period of our model, the re-
tailer first decides the product description level(s) to maximize her expected
profit. After reading the product description, a private signal is generated
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for each consumer in each channel about whether the product fits the con-
sumer. The consumer then evaluates his expected utility of purchasing the
product conditioned on the private signal, and decides whether to make the
purchase by comparing this utility with that of an outside option. After the
consumers make their purchase decisions, the retailer’s profit is realized.
We find that it is more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline
and online channels if the limit on the offline product description d̄ is low
and the consumers’ base product valuation V is small (see Theorem 3.4
and Figure 3.2). This is because if the retailer operates the offline and on-
line channels separately, the offline consumers are unlikely to purchase the
product given the high product-fit uncertainty caused by the limited prod-
uct description. In contrast, by integrating the offline and online channels,
the retailer can provide an identical product description for both channels
using new technology such as “cloud shelf.” A more detailed product de-
scription makes more offline consumers willing to purchase the product,
making the retailer more profitable. This partially explains why facilitat-
ing online product descriptions in brick-and-mortar stores becomes popular
in practice.
However, the retailer needs to be cautious about integrating the offline and
online channels. Even if the offline product description limit is low, inte-
grating the two channels does not always benefit the retailer. Specifically,
if the base product valuation V is sufficiently large, it is more profitable to
operate the two channels separately (see Figure 3.2). This is because when
the base product valuation is large, it is easier to attract the offline con-
sumers who have a low utility from the outside option. Differentiating the
product description levels between the two channels yields a higher total
expected profit for the retailer. However, the retailer loses this flexibility if
she integrates the offline and online channels. Thus, it is important for the
retailer to take both the offline product description limit and the base prod-
uct valuation into account when deciding whether to integrate the offline
and online channels.
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We further study a model in which the consumers who purchase the product
in the first period can post their reviews about the product online through a
review system. The consumers in the second period can read these reviews
before they decide whether to purchase the product. If the retailer operates
the offline and online channels separately, only the online consumers can
post and read the reviews, while both the offline and online consumers
can post and read the reviews if the retailer integrates the two channels.
We analyze the equilibrium outcomes and investigate the implications of
adding such a review system.
In the presence of consumer reviews, even if the offline product description
limit d̄ is high, it may still be beneficial for the retailer to integrate the
offline and online channels as long as the outside-option utility difference
between the two channels uo−ub is small (see Figures 3.7(b) and 3.7(c)). In
this situation, integrating the offline and online channels is a double-edged
sword that can benefit or hurt the retailer. On the one hand, it allows the
offline consumers to post and read the reviews. Since the retailer provides
a sufficiently rich product description in the first period to generate a large
fraction of positive reviews (see Lemma 3.9), these reviews can increase
the offline consumers’ product valuation in the second period, and thus
increase the retailer’s expected profit. On the other hand, the retailer sets
the same product description level for both channels. The higher product
description level in the first period (d†omni,1 > d
†
b,1) can deter some offline
consumers whom the product does not fit from purchasing the product.
Therefore, if d̄ is large, whether integrating the two channels is more prof-
itable for the retailer depends on the trade-off between the profit gain in
period 2 from the consumer reviews’ positive impact and the profit loss
in period 1 due to the inflexibility of setting the same product description
level for both channels. If uo − ub is small, the retailer incurs a limited
profit loss in period 1 due to the product description inflexibility. Conse-
quently, it is more profitable to integrate the offline and online channels
(see Figures 3.7(b) and 3.7(c)). However, if uo− ub is large, the profit gain
in period 2 from the positive impact of the consumer reviews is insufficient
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to compensate the profit loss due to the inflexibility. Thus, the retailer can
be worse off by integrating the two channels (see Figure 3.7(a)).
We also find that the consumer reviews may hurt the retailer’s profit if the
consumers’ base product valuation V is sufficiently large (see Theorem 3.7
and Corollary 3.10). This is because when there are no reviews, the retailer
can already attract the consumers with large base product valuation easily
even with a low product description level. In the presence of consumer
reviews, however, the retailer has to set a high product description level in
period 1 to prevent the negative impact of the reviews on the upcoming
consumers. The increase in the product description level drives down the
retailer’s profit in period 1 as it prevents some consumers whom the product
does not fit from purchasing the product. This is detrimental to the retailer.
Finally, it is worth noting that understanding how consumer reviews affect
future purchases is not straightforward in practice. For example, some
retailers allow consumers to rate a product in multiple dimensions. These
multi-dimensional ratings may reflect how the product fits the consumers’
tastes, and may help future consumers figure out whether the product
fits them. Investigating the effects of such reviews can be an interesting
direction for future work.
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Chapter 4





The increasing prevalence of online marketplaces, where sellers use the
online platform to sell their products to customers, has sparked researchers’
interest in studying the economics of online marketplaces (Mantin et al. ,
2014). The best known examples of online marketplace include Amazon
and eBay in U.S., Lazada and Qoo10 in Singapore. While Qoo10 and eBay
operate as a pure-play marketplace, Amazon and Lazada also have the
business of selling their own products. As a result, a seller selling products
through a marketplace like Lazada may find itself in direct competition
with the marketplace (Ryan et al. , 2012). Specifically, for some similar or
substitutable products, the seller and Lazada are competing for the same
customers. A customer has the option of buying it directly from Lazada,
or through the seller. This potential conflict, and its impact on both the
marketplace and the seller is one of the focus of this chapter.
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We are also interested in the competition between different marketplaces,
since consumers may have their own preference over different marketplaces
when they shop for products. To decide through which marketplace to sell
its product, a seller should take into account all of the above impacts. We
consider a setting in which a pure-play marketplace is operating like Qoo10
and a marketplace is operating like Lazada who also sells its own product
directly to consumers. We consider a seller who decides through which
marketplace(s) to sell its product, and at what price(s). By hosting the
seller, the marketplaces charge a revenue sharing commission. We are also
interested in the marketplaces’ decision regarding its product price which
competes with the seller. We will determine the equilibrium outcomes for
the seller and both marketplaces under this setting. Given this motivation
and problem setting, our research questions include:
(i) Under what conditions should the seller sell its product through the
pure-play marketplace, and under what conditions should the seller
sell through the marketplace who sells a competing product? What
will be the corresponding optimal pricing decisions?
(ii) What will be the optimal product price charged by the marketplace
who also sells its own product?
(iii) What will be the equilibrium outcomes?
To address the above questions, we develop a game-theoretical model that
captures the key trade-offs arising in this decision process. In our model, a
retailer consider selling a single product to consumers through a pure-play
marketplace m, or through a marketplace c who also sells its own product
competing with the seller, or though both marketplaces. The consumers
are heterogenous in their preferences over the marketplaces c and m, as
well as in their preferences over the products sold by the marketplace c
and sold by the seller. The marketplace c will first determine its product
price, and then the seller will decide through which marketplace(s) to sell
its product, and the corresponding product price(s). After the consumers
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make their purchase decisions which are to maximize their utility, the profit
of the seller and the marketplaces are realized.
We have obtained the following insights:
(i) In general, as the commission charged by one marketplace becomes
higher, the seller tends to sell its product through the other market-
place. If the price of the competing product in marketplace c becomes
higher, the seller tends to charge a lower price to further attract more
consumers. However, if the price of the competing product in mar-
ketplace c becomes lower, the seller should charge a higher price to
focus on a small group of consumers to maximize its profit.
(ii) In equilibrium, if the commission of the marketplace c is lower than
that of the marketplace m, the marketplace c will decide its product
price such that the seller only sells through it. On the other hand,
if the commission of the marketplace c is higher than that of the
marketplace m, the marketplace c will decide its product price such
that the seller sells through both marketplaces.
This chapter is organized as follows. After reviewing the relevant literature
in §4.2, we describe the model in §4.3, before analyzing it in §4.4. We also
analyze an extended model in §4.5. §4.6 concludes this chapter. All proofs
are provided in the Appendix C.
4.2 Literature review
We consider a seller that decides through which online marketplaces to sell
product. Some existing papers have developed on the analysis of online
marketplaces. see Greiger (2003) and Wang et al. (2008) for reviews of
this strand of literature. We focus on those papers that are most relevant to
our research problems. Bernstein et al. (2008) study a traditional retailer
who considers selling its product online. They consider two options for the
retailer: developing its own website or aligning with pure etailers. Wang
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et al. (2004) analyze channel performance under a consignment contract,
inspired by Amazon’s marketplace. Ru and Wang (2010) consider a similar
model to study the inventory control problem. While these papers are
motivated by similar practical examples as our research, they differ in that
they do not consider the competition, either between the similar products
sold by retailer and the marketplace, or between different marketplaces.
Since our research considers that a seller may sell product through a mar-
ketplace which also sells its own competing product, a related question
is whether a marketplace would want to offer its own product competing
with the seller, or whether the marketplace would allow the seller with a
competing product to sell through it at the first place. Hagiu and Spul-
ber (2013) study a platform’s incentive to introduce first-party content
alongside third-party content in two-sided markets. Zhu and Liu (2018)
empirically show that Amazon is more likely to compete with its third-
party sellers in product categories that are more successful. Ryan et al.
(2012) consider that a retailer selling its product through its own website,
may also choose to sell through a marketplace, and the marketplace firm
who has its own product may or may not offer the marketplace service to
the seller. Hagiu et al. (2020) study conditions under which a firm can
profitably turn itself into a marketplace by hosting a competing retailer. In
contrast to these papers, our research does the reverse: it studies whether
a seller should sell through a marketplace to compete with product of that
marketplace.
4.3 Model description
We consider the following problem setting. A seller sells a single product
to n consumers through online marketplace. There is a pure-play market-
place m, and a marketplace c who also sells its own product in addition to
providing the marketplace service. The seller has the option to sell through
either marketplace or both. To sell through each marketplace i, i = m, c,
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the seller pays a proportion commission αi for each unit sold to marketplace
i. We assume αi is exogenous in our model.
The marketplace c and the marketplace m are horizontally differentiated,
which are located at the ends of a unit Hotelling line [0, 1]. The consumers
are heterogenous in their preferences for the two marketplaces. The con-
sumer preferences are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line with
an individual’s preference denoted by x ∈ [0, 1]. For instance, the two on-
line marketplaces may vary in their user interface and order system, for
which consumers have different preferences.
The consumers are also heterogenous in their preferences over the product
sold by the seller and the product sold by the marketplace c. For example,
some consumers may perceive higher value from the product directly sold
by the marketplace, because they believe the marketplace is more reliable
than the individual seller. We capture this heterogeneity by assuming there
are two types of consumers in the market. A fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of consumers
perceive a base utility V from the seller’s product, and perceive a higher
base utility VH from the product sold by the marketplace c. The remaining
fraction 1 − θ of consumers perceive same base utility V from the two
products. We call the former consumers high-type consumers, the latter
consumers low-type consumers.
The marketplace c first decides a price pc of its own product, and the seller
decides through which marketplace(s) to sell her product and decides price
ps,i for her product sold through marketplace i. If the seller sell her product
through both marketplaces, we assume that the seller charges a common
price ps = ps,m = ps,c. In §4.5, we relax this assumption and consider a
setting in which the seller can price discriminately on the two marketplaces.
All the consumers have unit demands, and their utility of purchasing a
product is given by the sum of a base utility, a disutility measuring the
distance between an individual’s ideal location and the location of the
product, less the price. A constant marginal disutility t is incurred for a
unit distance between a consumer’s ideal preference and the position of the
product. We assume that t < V − pi, i.e., the incurred disutility is low
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enough that the market is fully covered. We also discuss what happens in
the partially covered market at the end of §4.4. Let us,m and us,c denote the
consumer’s utility of purchasing the seller’s product through marketplace
m, and marketplace c respectively. Let uc denote the consumer’s utility
of purchasing the product of the marketplace c. A high-type consumer’s
utility is as follows.
uc = VH − tx− pc
us,c = V − tx− ps,c
us,m = V − t(1− x)− ps,m
(4.1)
A low-type consumer’s utility is as follows.
uc = V − tx− pc
us,c = V − tx− ps,c
us,m = V − t(1− x)− ps,m
(4.2)
The sequence of events and decisions in our model is specified as follows,
which is also depicted in Figure 4.1. At first, the marketplace c decides the
price pc to maximize its expected profit. Then, the seller decides through
which marketplace(s) i to sell her product, after which she decides price(s)
ps,i for her product, to maximize her expected profit. Finally, each con-
sumer makes purchase decision to maximize his utility.
4.4 Model analysis
In this section, we analyze the model backward, first determining the op-
timal decisions of the seller for product price and marketplace choice in
§4.4.1, and then determining the optimal decisions of the marketplace c for
its product price, as well as the equilibrium outcomes in §4.4.2.
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Figure 4.1: The sequence of decisions
4.4.1 Optimal decisions of the seller
We first find the optimal pricing decision of the seller in the cases selling
through marketplace c, selling through marketplace m, and selling through
both marketplaces, in §4.4.1.1, §4.4.1.2, §4.4.1.3 respectively.
4.4.1.1 Seller sells through marketplace c
Define Ds,c as the seller’s demand from selling through marketplace c. The
seller’s profit of selling through marketplace c will be πs,c = Ds,c × ps,c ×
(1 − αc). To maximize her profit, the seller will set her product price p∗s,c
according to the following Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. If the seller only sells her product through marketplace c, then
the optimal pricing decisions of the seller are as follows.
1. If pc >
VH−V
θ
, the seller sets a price p∗s,c = pc + V − VH .




4.4.1.2 Seller sells through marketplace m
Define Ds,m as the seller’s demand from selling through marketplace m.
The seller’s profit of selling through marketplace m will be πs,m = Ds,m ×
ps,m×(1−αm). To maximize her profit, the seller will set her product price
p∗s,m according to the following Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.2. If the seller only sells her product through marketplace m,
then the optimal pricing decisions of the seller are as follows.
1. If pc > (1 +
2
θ
)t, the seller sets a price p∗s,m = pc − t+ V − VH .
2. If pc ≤ (1 + 2θ )t, the seller sets a price p
∗
s,m = pc − t.
4.4.1.3 Seller sells through both marketplaces
We assume that if the seller sells through both marketplaces c and m,
then the seller set a same price ps = ps,c = ps,m for the product on both
marketplaces. The seller’s profit of selling through both marketplaces will
be πs = Ds,c×ps× (1−αc) +Ds,m×ps× (1−αm). To maximize her profit,
the seller will set her product price p∗s according to the following Lemma
4.3.
Lemma 4.3. If the seller sells her product through both marketplaces c and




, the seller sets a price p∗s = pc + V − VH .




From lemmas 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, we can observe that, in general, no matter
which marketplace the seller decides to sell through, her pricing decision
depends on the price pc charged by marketplace c. If pc is high, the seller
will set a lower price, and if pc is low, the seller will set a higher price. The
reason is as follows. Since some consumers have higher valuation for the
product of marketplace c, only if pc is sufficiently high, the seller has an
incentive to lower her price to aggressively compete for those consumers.
Otherwise, the seller would rather charge a higher price to focus on other
consumers.
4.4.1.4 Optimal marketplace choice
By comparing the expected profits in lemmas 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, the seller
decides through which marketplace(s) to sell her product to maximize her
profit. The following theorem shows the seller’s optimal decisions on mar-
ketplace choice.
Theorem 4.4. The seller’s optimal decisions on marketplace choice are as
follows.




(a) αc > αm +
2(1−αm)t
pc+V−VH
, the seller only sells through marketplace m,
and sets a price p∗s,m = pc − t+ V − VH .
(b) αm < αc ≤ αm + 2(1−αm)tpc+V−VH , the seller sells through both market-
places m and c, and sets a price p∗s = pc + V − VH .
(c) αc ≤ αm, the seller only sells through marketplace c, and sets a




< pc ≤ (1 + 2θ )t, and
(a) αc > αm +
(1−αm)[θ(VH−V )(pc−t)−2t(VH−V−t)]
(pc+V−VH)t
, the seller only sells
through marketplace m, and sets a price p∗s,m = pc − t.
(b) αm < αc ≤ αm + (1−αm)[θ(VH−V )(pc−t)−2t(VH−V−t)](pc+V−VH)t , the seller sells
through both marketplaces m and c, and sets a price p∗s = pc +
V − VH .
(c) αc ≤ αm, the seller only sells through marketplace c, and sets a
price p∗s,c = pc + V − VH .
3. If pc ≤ VH−Vθ , and
(a) αc > αm +
(1−αm)[θpc(VH−V−2t)+t(2t−θ(VH−V ))]
(1−θ)tpc , the seller only sells
through marketplace m, and sets a price p∗s,m = pc − t.
(b) αm < αc ≤ αm+ (1−αm)[θpc(VH−V−2t)+t(2t−θ(VH−V ))](1−θ)tpc , the seller sells
through both marketplaces m and c, and sets a price p∗s = pc.
(c) αc ≤ αm, the seller only sells through marketplace c, and sets a
price p∗s,c = pc.
In general, we observe that on matter pc is high, medium, or low, the seller
has similar marketplace choice depending on αc and αm. If αc is much
larger than αm, then the seller only sells through marketplace m, but if αc
is slightly larger than αm, then the seller sells through both marketplaces.
On the other hand, if αc is smaller than αm, then the seller only sells through
marketplace c. It’s intuitive that when one marketplace commission is quite
lower than another’s, the seller only sells through this marketplace.
The interesting part is when one commission is slightly lower or higher than
another one. We see that when αc is slightly higher than αm, the seller will
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sell through both marketplaces, but when αc is slightly lower than αm, the
seller will only sell through marketplace c. This is because if the seller also
sells on marketplace m in this case, the marketplace c will always lower
its own product price to compete for consumers, the seller will lose some
consumers and her profit from marketplace m cannot compensate this loss.
Thus, the seller would rather only sell through marketplace c.
4.4.2 Equilibrium outcomes
Define Dc as the demand from the product of marketplace c. The mar-
ketplace c decides a price pc of its product to maximize its profit πc =
Ds,c×ps,c×αc+Dc×pc. After obtaining the optimal decisions of the seller
and the marketplaces c, we can determine their equilibrium decisions. The
following theorem characterizes the equilibrium outcomes.
Theorem 4.5. There are two equilibrium outcomes exist as follows.
1. If αc ≤ αm, the marketplace c can set any price p∗c > p̄. The seller
only sells through marketplace c, and sets a price p∗s,c = p
∗
c + V − VH .
2. If αc > αm, the marketplace c sets price p
∗
c = VH −V +
2(1−αm)t
αc−αm . The
seller sells through both marketplaces, and sets a price p∗s =
2(1−αm)t
αc−αm .
In equilibrium, if the commission αc of the marketplace c is lower than
the commission αm of the marketplace m, the seller will always choose
to only sell her product through marketplace c. If the seller also sells
through marketplace m, then the marketplace c always has the incentive
to reduce its product price to compete for the consumers from the seller
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and the marketplace m. This is because the marketplace c cannot generate
sufficient profit from the commission, due to a low αc. Since the seller
cannot earn too much by selling through marketplace m due to a high
αm, so the seller would rather not sell on the marketplace m to avoid this
situation.
On the other hand, if the commission αm of the marketplace m is lower
than the commission αc of the marketplace c, the seller would like to sell
through the marketplace m, but she will still sell through the marketplace
c. This ensures the marketplace c to generate a sufficiently large profit
from the commission because of a high αc, so that the marketplace c will
not compete with the seller using its own product. However, if the seller
does not sell through the marketplace c, then the marketplace c will always
reduce its product price to compete with the seller to generate a profit,
which is detrimental to the seller. Therefore, the seller will sell through
both marketplaces to avoid this situation.
Furthermore, we also analyze the model in a partially covered market. We
find that the equilibrium result is a special case of Theorem 4.5. Specifi-
cally, the seller will always choose to sell through both marketplaces. This
is because she will become a local monopoly on marketplace m, and she
can optimize her price to compete with marketplace c on it as well. The
following corollary shows the equilibrium result.
Corollary 4.6. In a partially covered market, the seller, in equilibrium,
sells through both marketplaces with a price p∗s = V/2. The marketplace c
sets a price p∗s,c = VH/2.
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4.5 Extension: Discriminate for two mar-
ketplaces
So far we have assumed that the seller will charge a common price if she
chooses to sell through both marketplaces, while ignoring the possibility of
pricing discriminately for the two marketplaces. Since the consumers in our
model have heterogeneous preference for the two marketplaces m and c, the
seller is likely to take advantage of the pricing flexibility to optimize her
prices for the two marketplaces individually. This may allow the seller to
compete with the marketplace c more effectively. In this section, we relax
the single-price assumption and consider the setting in which the seller is
able to price discriminately if she chooses to sell through both marketplaces.
The rest of the model is identical to that of §4.3. The following theorem
characterizes the equilibrium decisions of the seller in this setting.
Theorem 4.7. (Equilibrium decisions under the discriminate price
model)
1. If 1−αc
1−αm > max{ᾱ1, ᾱ2}, the seller will only sell through the market-
place c, and set a price p∗s,c = 3t− θ(VH − V ).
2. If ᾱ3 <
1−αc
1−αm ≤ ᾱ2, the seller will sell through both marketplaces, and
set prices p∗s,c = 3t− θ(VH − V ) and p∗s,m = 4t− (1 + θ)(VH − V ).
3. If 1−αc
1−αm ≤ ᾱ1, the seller will only sell through the marketplace m, and
set a price p∗s,m = 2t− θ(VH − V ).
Similar to Theorem 4.5, the first two cases of Theorem 4.7 show that if
the commission αm of the marketplace m is larger or slightly smaller than
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the commission αc of the marketplace c, the seller will only sell through
marketplace c and sell through both marketplaces, respectively. However,
if αm is sufficiently smaller than αc, the seller would give up selling on
marketplace c and choose to sell through marketplace m only. This is
because, in contrast to the main model, the marketplace c cannot always
leverage its own price to force the seller to sell through it. Since the seller
has the flexibility to price discriminately for the two marketplaces, she can
always charge a lower price to compete fiercely with marketplace c on it.
Both of the seller and the marketplace c will be worse off in this situation.
Thus, in equilibrium, the seller will only sell through marketplace m.
4.6 Summary
We consider a seller that sells a single product through online marketplace
to consumers. We consider one marketplace m operate as a pure-play
marketplace like eBay and Qoo10, and another marketplace c who also sells
its own competing product to consumers like Amazon and Lazada. The
consumers are heterogenous in their preferences for these two marketplaces
as well as for the products sold by the seller and the marketplace. We study
the seller’s decisions on the choice of the marketplace and the price of the
product, and the pricing decision of marketplace c. We develop a game-
theoretical model which captures the competition between the seller and
the marketplace as well as the competition between the two marketplaces.
Specifically, at the first stage, the marketplace c will determine its product
price, and then the seller will decide through which marketplace(s) to sell its
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product, before determining the product price(s). Finally, the consumers
make their purchase decisions to maximize their utility, and the profit of the
seller and the marketplaces are realized. We analyze this decision process
to determine the equilibrium outcomes.
We find that, in general, as the commission charged by one marketplace
becomes higher, the seller tends to sell its product through the other mar-
ketplace. If the price of the competing product in marketplace c becomes
higher, the seller tends to charge a lower price to further attract more con-
sumers. However, if the price of the competing product in marketplace c
becomes lower, the seller should charge a higher price to focus on a small
group of consumers to maximize its profit. In equilibrium, if the commis-
sion of the marketplace c is lower than that of the marketplace m, the
marketplace c will decide its product price such that the seller only sells
through it. On the other hand, if the commission of the marketplace c is
higher than that of the marketplace m, the marketplace c will decide its
product price such that the seller sells through both marketplaces.
Furthermore, we study an extended model in which the seller is able to
price discriminately for the two marketplaces. With the pricing flexibility,
the seller may only sell through marketplace m as well in equilibrium. This
chapter provides a formal analysis of how a seller can strategically choose
the online marketplaces to sell through. Naturally, there are some other
factors relevant to the decision that we did not capture in this chapter.
There are some interesting extensions that future research can explore.
A key feature of the online marketplace is the commission rate, which is
assumed to be exogenous in our model. In practice, some marketplaces
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may compete with each other in the commission rate to attract the seller.
Thus, one future research direction is endogenizing the commission rates of
the two marketplaces. Furthermore, some marketplaces or online platforms
in practice offer exclusive sale contract with the sellers, through which the
sellers can benefit from a lower commission rate. Another future research
direction is to take into account this exclusive sale contract, in line with




The growth of online retailing market creates numerous opportunities and
challenges for the context of operations management. Extensive literature
in online retailing focus on the conventional inventory management and
pricing problems as in traditional retailing. However, the rapid develop-
ment of information technology threatens the established business models
and creates opportunities for new business models. Companies engaged in
online retailing may find it increasingly difficult to make strategic decisions
in the new retailing environment. This thesis investigates innovative busi-
ness models which are under-studied in this domain to provide managerial
insights for practitioners.
In Chapter 2, we study how to deal with the pressure on well-beings caused
by the last-mile delivery of online retailing. To alleviate the congestion and
pollution, a consolidator can operate an urban consolidation center (UCC)
to bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-mile delivery.
Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer platform for the
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carriers to share their delivery capacity. For each business model, we con-
struct a two-period game-theoretical model to study the interactions be-
tween a consolidator and multiple carriers. In each period, the consolidator
first chooses a delivery fee to maximize her expected profit. Each carrier
then observes his task volume, and decides whether to deliver on his own
or use the consolidator’s service to minimize his expected cost.
We compare the performance of these two models to guid the consolidator
to make efficient operational decisions. Under the UCC model, the carriers
become more dependent on the UCC to deliver their tasks as their vari-
able delivery cost increases or their logistics reestablishment cost decreases.
Under the platform model, the carriers generally keep their logistics capa-
bility (even if they purchase capacity from the platform) in equilibrium to
ensure their flexibility of selling capacity on the platform. Between the
two business models, it is generally more profitable for the consolidator to
operate the UCC than the platform if the carriers’ fixed delivery cost is
large. Furthermore, the UCC becomes more dominant as there are more
carriers. If the number of carriers is large, it is also more efficient for the
consolidator to operate the UCC than the platform to reduce the expected
social-environmental cost. Otherwise, the platform is more efficient.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the channel management decisions of a re-
tailer who sells a single product to consumers through an offline (brick-
and-mortar) channel and an online channel. The consumers in each channel
are heterogenous in their tastes for the product. Each consumer is unsure
about whether the product fits his taste before purchasing the product.
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The consumer, however, can learn about the product by reading the prod-
uct description provided by the retailer. We study the retailer’s decisions
on the provision of the product descriptions in this multi-channel environ-
ment, and investigate the impact of these decisions on the retailer’s channel
management strategy.
The retailer may operate the offline and online channels separately with
different product description levels or collectively with a common prod-
uct description level. For each strategy, we develop a two-period game-
theoretical model in which the retailer optimizes the product description
levels to maximize her expected profit. We find that integrating the offline
and online channels yields more profit for the retailer if and only if the
offline channel’s product description limit and the consumers’ base product
valuation are small.
To explore how the retailer can profitably integrate her offline and on-
line channels, we further consider a review system where the consumers
who purchase the product in period 1 may post their reviews. The frac-
tion of positive reviews in period 1 will influence the purchase intention
of the upcoming consumers in period 2. In the presence of the consumer
reviews, even if the offline product description limit is large, it can still be
more profitable for the retailer to integrate the offline and online channels.
Furthermore, the consumer reviews may reduce the retailer’s profit if the
consumers’ base product valuation is sufficiently large.
In Chapter 4, we study a seller’s decisions in the process of entering the
online market through online marketplaces. While some pure-play market-
places only provides an online platform for sellers to sell their products,
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some marketplaces not only provide this service but also sell their own
products directly to consumers. If the seller sells her products through the
latter marketplaces, she may find herself in direct competition with these
marketplaces. This creates a new form of channel conflict, which is one of
the focus of this chapter. In addition, the seller may engage in the com-
petition between different marketplaces, since consumers have their own
preference over different marketplaces when they shop for products.
To analyze the optimal decisions of through which marketplace(s) to sell
products for the seller, we construct a game-theoretical model to capture
the main trade-off in this decision process. We consider a setting in which
a seller would like to sell a single product to consumers through market-
place(s). We consider one pure-play marketplace and one marketplace who
also sells its own product which is competing with the seller’s product. By
hosting the seller, each marketplace decides a revenue sharing commission.
We analyze the optimal decisions for both the retailer and the marketplaces
to characterize the system equilibrium.
In general, as the commission charged by one marketplace becomes higher,
the seller tends to sell its product through the other marketplace. If the
price of the competing product in the marketplace becomes higher, the
seller tends to charge a lower price to further attract more consumers. How-
ever, if the price of the competing product becomes lower, the seller should
charge a higher price to focus on a small group of consumers to maximize
its profit. In equilibrium, to alleviate the competition with the market-
place’s product, if the commission of the pure-play marketplace higher, the
seller will only sell on the other marketplace. On the other hand, if the
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Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. By solving φ̄i2(0; d̄i1, p̄2) ≤ φ̄i2(−1; d̄i1, p̄2) for vi2, we ob-
tain that
1. p̄2 ≤ m + cvi2 if d̄i1 = −1 or 1. Thus, d̄
∗




2. p̄2 ≤ m + c+fvi2 if d̄i1 = 0. Thus, d̄
∗
i2 = 0 if p̄2 ≤ m +
c+f
vi2
, and d̄∗i2 = −1
otherwise.








































































































(1−λ)(n−ne)vH , and b7 =
















To derive V2 and n2 in the UCC’s expected profit function in Equation (2.1), we
need to distinguish the following four types of carriers:
Type 1 (d̄i1 = −1 or 1, and vi2 = vL): Each carrier i of this type uses the
UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability in period 2 (d̄∗i2 = 0) if
p̄2 ≤ m + cvL . The expected number of carriers of this type is λ(n − ne), and if
those carriers use the UCC’s service in period 2, then the expected task volumes
served by the UCC are λ(n− ne)vL.
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Type 2 (d̄i1 = −1 or 1, and vi2 = vH): Each carrier i of this type uses the
UCC’s service and eliminates his logistics capability in period 2 (d̄∗i2 = 0) if
p̄2 ≤ m + cvH . The expected number of carriers of this type is (1 − λ)(n − ne),
and if those carriers use the UCC’s service in period 2, then the expected task
volumes served by the UCC in period 2 are (1− λ)(n− ne)vH .
Type 3 (d̄i1 = 0, and vi2 = vL): Each carrier i of this type uses the UCC’s
service in period 2 (d̄∗i2 = 0) if p̄2 ≤ m +
c+f
vL
. The expected number of carriers
of this type is λne, and if those carriers use the UCC’s service in period 2, then
the expected task volumes served by the UCC in period 2 are λnevL.
Type 4 (d̄i1 = 0, and vi2 = vH): Each carrier i of this type uses the UCC’s
service in period 2 (d̄∗i2 = 0) if p̄2 ≤ m +
c+f
vH
. The expected number of carriers
of this type is (1− λ)ne, and if those carriers use the UCC’s service in period 2,
then the expected task volumes served by the UCC in period 2 are (1−λ)nevH .
Note that the expected number of Type 3 and Type 4 carriers will be 0 if ne = 0.
We first analyze the UCC’s optimal decision in the case that ne > 0, before we




can derive m+ c+fvL > m+
c+f
vH
> m+ cvL > m+
c
vH
, so the optimal choice of the
UCC is among the following four:






to attract type 3 carriers only, then
n2 and V2 equal to the expected number and expected task volumes of type 3
carriers, that is n2 = λne and V2 = λnevL. Substituting them into Equation
(2.1), the UCC’s expected profit is
π̄2(p̄2) = (p̄2 + S −M)λnevL −
√
λneC, (A.1)
which increases in p̄2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗




maximize profit. Substituting p̄∗2 = m+
c+f
vL


















to attract type 3 and type 4 carriers,
then n2 and V2 equal to the total expected number and expected task volumes
of those carriers, that is n2 = λne + (1 − λ)ne and V2 = λnevL + (1 − λ)nevH .
Substituting them into Equation (2.1), the UCC’s expected profit is
π̄2(p̄2) = (p̄2 + S −M)(λnevL + (1− λ)nevH)−
√
λne + (1− λ)neC, (A.2)
which increases in p̄2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗




maximize profit. Substituting p̄∗2 = m+
c+f
vH







m+ c+fvH + S −M
)










to attract type 3, type 4, and type
1 carriers, then n2 and V2 equal to the total expected number and expected
task volumes of those carriers, that is n2 = λne + (1 − λ)ne + λ(n − ne) and
V2 = λnevL+(1−λ)nevH +λ(n−ne)vL. Substituting them into Equation (2.1),
the UCC’s expected profit is
π̄2(p̄2) = (p̄2+S−M)(λnevL+(1−λ)nevH+λ(n−ne)vL)−
√
λne + (1− λ)ne + λ(n− ne)C,
(A.3)
which increases in p̄2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗




maximize profit. Substituting p̄∗2 = m+
c
vL







m+ cvL + S −M
)
(λnvL + (1− λ)nevH)−
√
λ(n− ne) + neC.




to attract all types of carriers, then n2 = n
and V2 equals to the total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that is
V2 = λnevL+(1−λ)nevH +λ(n−ne)vL+(1−λ)(n−ne)vH = λnvL+(1−λ)nvH .
Substituting them into Equation (2.1), the UCC’s expected profit is
π̄2(p̄2) = (p̄2 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC, (A.4)
which increases in p̄2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗




maximize profit. Substituting p̄∗2 = m+
c
vH







m+ cvH + S −M
)
(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC.













is the maximum if




is the maximum if m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}.
Therefore, the corresponding prices p̄∗2 under those choices are optimal for the
UCC, and the results in Lemma 2.2 follow.
Similarly, we analyze the case that ne = 0. Since there is only type 1 and type
2 carriers, the optimal decision of the UCC is among the following two:






to attract type 1 carriers only, then
n2 and V2 equal to the expected number and expected task volumes of type 1
carriers, that is n2 = λ(n−ne) = λn and V2 = λ(n−ne)vL = λnvL. Substituting
them into Equation (2.1), the UCC’s expected profit is
π̄2(p̄2) = (p̄2 + S −M)λnvL −
√
λnC, (A.5)
which increases in p̄2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗




maximize profit. Substituting p̄∗2 = m+
c
vL

















to attract both types of carriers, then
n2 = n and V2 equals to the total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that
is V2 = λ(n − ne)vL + (1 − λ)(n − ne)vH = λnvL + (1 − λ)nvH . Substituting
them into Equation (2.1), the UCC’s expected profit is
π̄2(p̄2) = (p̄2 + S −M)(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC, (A.6)
which increases in p̄2, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗




maximize profit. Substituting p̄∗2 = m+
c
vH







m+ cvH + S −M
)
(λnvL + (1− λ)nvH)−
√
nC.









if m < b7. Therefore, it is optimal for the UCC
to choose p̄∗2 = m +
c
vL
if m < b7, and p̄
∗
2 = m +
c
vH
otherwise. The results in
Lemma 2.2 thus follow.












































































































We first determine a carrier’s optimal decision when ñe > 0. Note that ñe is
rational and hence is equal, in equilibrium, to the corresponding actual value





p̄∗2 = m +
c+f
vL
. Given p̄∗2, each carrier i minimizes his total discounted cost
Φ̄i(d̄i1; p̄1) by comparing the following 3 options:
1. d̄i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, carrier i will deliver
on his own in period 2. This incurs an expected cost Φ̄i(−1; p̄1) = c + mvi1 +
δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
2. d̄i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, carrier i will use the
UCC’s service in period 2 if vi2 = vL and deliver on his own otherwise. This
incurs an expected cost Φ̄i(0; p̄1) = p̄1vi1 + δ(λp̄
∗
2vL + (1 − λ)(c + mvH + f)) =
p̄1vi1 + δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH) + f).
3. d̄i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, carrier i will deliver
on his own in period 2. This incurs an expected cost Φ̄i(1; p̄1) = p̄1vi1 + h +
δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
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By comparing the above three options, we obtain that d̄∗i1 = 1 if p̄1 ≤ m+ c−hvi1 ,
and d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. This proves case 1(a) of Lemma 2.3. Next we determine
the carrier’s optimal decision in case 1(b) of Lemma 2.3. Similarly, according to








each carrier i minimizes his total discounted cost Φ̄i(d̄i1; p̄1) by comparing the
following three options:
1. d̄i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, carrier i will deliver
on his own in period 2. This incurs an expected cost Φ̄i(−1; p̄1) = c + mvi1 +
δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
2. d̄i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, carrier i will use
the UCC’s service in period 2. This incurs an expected cost Φ̄i(0; p̄1) = p̄1vi1 +




(λvL + (1− λ)vH).
3. d̄i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, carrier i will deliver
on his own in period 2. This incurs an expected cost Φ̄i(1; p̄1) = p̄1vi1 + h +
δ(λ(c+mvL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that d̄∗i1 = 1 if p̄1 ≤ m + c−hvi1
and h ≤ δ(c+f)
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)












and h > δ(c+ f)
(
λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
− δc, and d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. This proves case
1(b) of Lemma 2.3. The proofs of cases 1(c) and 2(a) are similar to the proof of
case 1(b), and the proofs of cases 1(d) and 2(b) are similar to the proof of case
1(a), and thus omitted.





































































The UCC’s expected profit Π̄(p̄1) in Equation (2.2) depends on V1 and n1. The
different cases in Lemma 2.3 corresponding to different decisions of each carrier
will lead to different values of V1 and n1. In the following, we analyze each case of
Lemma 2.3 to derive V1 and n1 and obtain the UCC’s expected total discounted
profit and then determine the equilibrium price. To derive V1 and n1, we need
to distinguish the following two typs of carriers:
Type A (vi1 = vL): The expected number of carriers of this type is λn.
Type B (vi1 = vH): The expected number of carriers of this type is (1− λ)n.
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We first analyze the cases that ñe > 0 of Lemma 2.3, that is cases 1(a), 1(b),
1(c), and 1(d). Note that ñe is rational and hence equal to to the corresponding




2) > 0, b̃1 = b1, b̃2 = b2,
b̃3 = b3, b̃4 = b4, b̃5 = b5, and b̃6 = b6.




), d̄∗i1 = 1 if p̄1 ≤ m + c−hvi1 , or
d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Thus, type A carriers use the UCC’s service and keep their
logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m + c−hvL , and type B carriers use the UCC’s service
and keep their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m + c−hvH . In this case, no carrier will
use the UCC’s service and eliminate logistics capability, which means ne = 0,
and thus cannot happen in equilibrium.






















, thus d̄∗i1 = 1 if p̄1 ≤ m+ c−hvi1 ,
or d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Similar to the above case 1(a), these cases will never
happen in equilibrium.




), d̄∗i1 = 0 if p̄1 ≤ m + cvi1 , or
d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Thus, type A carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate
their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m + cvL , and type B carriers use the UCC’s
service and eliminate their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m + cvH . In case 1(d), we
have obtained that p̄∗2 = m +
c
vH
according to Lemma 2.2. The optimal choice
of the retailer in period 1 is among the following two:






to attract type A carriers only, then
n1 and V1 equal to the expected number and task volumes of type A carriers,
that is n1 = λn and V1 = λnvL. Since type A carriers use the UCC’s service and
eliminate their logistics capability, thus ne = n1 = λn. Substituting them into
Equation (2.2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is










m+ cvH + S −M
)












imize profit. This could be in equilirbium only if ne = λn satisfies the conditions
that ne > 0 (which is satisfied) and m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}. Substituting ne = λn
into b3, b5, and b6, we can rewrite the latter conition as m ≥ max{m2,m3,m4}.
This leads to the results in case 3 of Theorem 2.4.




to attract both types of carriers, then
n1 = n and V1 equals to the total expected task volumes of all the carriers, that
is V1 = λnvL + (1 − λ)nvH . Since all the carriers use the UCC’s service and
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eliminate their logistics capability, thus ne = n1 = n. Substituting them into
Equation (2.2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is











m+ cvH + S −M
)






which increases in p̄1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗
1 = m +
c
vH
to maximize profit. This could be in equilirbium only if ne = n satisfies the
conditions that ne > 0 (which is satisfied) and m ≥ max{b3, b5, b6}. Substituting
ne = n into b3, b5, and b6, we find that the latter condition can never be satisfied
as b5 and b6 go to infinity.
Next we analyze the cases that ñe = 0 of Lemma 2.3, that is cases 2(a) and 2(b).
Similarly, since ñe is rational and hence equal to the corresponding actual value




2) = ñe = 0.













, thus d̄∗i1 = 1 if p̄1 ≤ m+ c−hvi1 ,
or d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Thus, type A carriers use the UCC’s service and keep
their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m + c−hvL , and type B carriers use the UCC’s
service and eliminate their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m+ c−hvH . In case 2(a), we
have obtained that p̄∗2 = m+
c
vL
according to Lemma 2.2. The optimal choice of
the retailer in period 1 is among the following two:






to attract type A carriers only, then
n1 and V1 equal to the expected number and task volumes of type A carriers,
that is n1 = λn and V1 = λnvL. Since no carrier will use the UCC’s service and
keeplogistics capability, thus ne = 0. Substituting them into Equation (2.2), the
UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is


















which increases in p̄1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗
1 = m +
c−h
vL
to maximize profit. This could be in equilirbium only if ne = 0 satisfies the
conditions that ne = 0 (which is satisfied) and m− (M −S) < m1. Substituting
p̄∗1 = m +
c−h
vL





δ)(m+ S −M)λnvL + ((1 + δ)c− h)λn− (1 + δ)
√
λnC.




to attract both types of carriers, then
n1 = n and V1 equals to the total expected task volumes of all the carriers,
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that is V1 = λnvL + (1 − λ)nvH . Since no carrier will use the UCC’s service
and eliminate logistics capability, thus ne = 0. Substituting them into Equation
(2.2), the UCC’s expeted total discounted profit is


















which increases in p̄1, so it is optimal for the UCC to choose p̄
∗
1 = m +
c−h
vH
to maximize profit. This could be in equilirbium only if ne = 0 satisfies the









= (m + S −M)((1 +
δ)λnvL + (1− λ)nvH) + δλcn+ (c− h)n
(


























if m < m1. Therefore, we have p̄
∗




m < min{b7,m1}, and p̄∗1 = m+ c−hvH if min{b7,m1} ≤ m < b7. This leads to the
results in cases 1 and 2 of Theorem 2.4.
In case 2(b) (ñe = 0 and m − (M − S) ≥ b7), d̄∗i1 = 0 if p̄1 ≤ m + cvi1 , or
d̄∗i1 = −1 otherwise. Thus, type A carriers use the UCC’s service and eliminate
their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m+ cvL , and type B carriers use the UCC’s service
and eliminate their logistics capability if p̄1 ≤ m+ cvH . In this case, ne = 0 will
never happen which indicates that it will never be in equilibrium.
Lemma A.1. (Optimal decision of carrier i ∈ NL,2 in period 2)
1. If d̂i1 = −1 or 1, then in period 2 carrier i purchases capacity from the
platform and eliminates his logistics capability (d̂∗i2 = 0) if p̂2 <
c+(1+θ2)mvL
[1+θ2(1−α)]vL , or
delivers on his own (d̂∗i2 = −1) if p̂2 >
c+(1+θ2)mvL
[1+θ2(1−α)]vL .
2. If d̂i1 = 0, then in period 2, carrier i purchases capacity from the platform
(d̂∗i2 = 0) if p̂2 <
c+f+(1+θ2)mvL
[1+θ2(1−α)]vL , or delivers on his own (d̂
∗
i2 = −1) if p̂2 >
c+f+(1+θ2)mvL
[1+θ2(1−α)]vL .
Proof of Lemma A.1. By solving φ̂i2(0; d̂i1, p̂2) ≤ φ̂i2(−1; d̂|i1, p̂2) for vi2, we ob-
tain that
1. p̂2 < (c + 2mvL)/((2 − α)vL) if d̂i1 = −1 or 1. Thus, d̂∗i2 = 0 if p̂2 <
(c+ 2mvL)/((2− α)vL), and d̂∗i2 = −1 if p̂2 > (c+ 2mvL)/((2− α)vL).
2. p̂2 < (c+ 2mvL + f)/((2−α)vL) if d̂i1 = 0. Thus, d̂∗i2 = 0 if p̂2 < (c+ 2mvL +
f)/((2− α)vL), and d̂∗i2 = −1 if p̂2 > (c+ 2mvL + f)/((2− α)vL).
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Lemma A.2. (Optimal decision of the platform in period 2) Define ne as
the number of carriers who purchase capacity on the platform and elimate their
logistics capability in period 1.
1. If ne > n/2, the optimal price of the platform in period 2 is as follows. If
(c + f)[2(n − ne)(2n − αne) − (2 − α)(2n − ne)ne] ≤ 2mvL[(2 − α)nne − 2(n −
ne)(2n−αne)], then p̂∗2 =
(2n−ne)(c+f)+2nmvL
(2n−αne)vL ; if (c+f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)−(2−
α)(2n−ne)ne] > 2mvL[(2−α)nne−2(n−ne)(2n−αne)], then p̂∗2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL −ε.
2. If ne ≤ n/2, the optimal price of the UCC’s service in period 2 is as follows. If
(c+f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)−(n−αne)(2n−ne)] ≤ 2mvL[n(n−αne)−n(2n−αne)]
and (c + f)(2 − α)(2n − ne)ne − (2n − αne)(n − ne)c > 2mvL[(2n − αne)(n −
ne)− (2−α)nne], then p̂∗2 =
(2n−ne)(c+f)+2nmvL
(2n−αne)vL ; if (c+ f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)−
(n−αne)(2n− ne)] > 2mvL[n(n−αne)− n(2n−αne)] and 2(c+ f)(2−α)(n−
ne)ne − (n − αne)(n − ne)c > 2mvL[(n − αne)(n − ne) − (2 − α)nne], then
p̂∗2 =
(c+f)(n−ne)+nmvL
(n−αne)vL − ε; if 2(c+ f)(2− α)(n− ne)ne − (n− αne)(n− ne)c ≤
2mvL[(n − αne)(n − ne) − (2 − α)nne] and (c + f)(2 − α)(2n − ne)ne − (2n −
αne)(n− ne)c ≤ 2mvL[(2n− αne)(n− ne)− (2− α)nne], then p̂∗2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL .
Proof of Lemma A.2. To derive ns,2 and np,2 in the platform’s expected profit
function in Equation (2.3), we need to distinguish the following two types of
carriers:
Type 1 (d̂i1 = −1 or 1): Each carrier i of this type purchases capacity from
the platform and eliminates his logistics capability in period 2 (d̂∗i2 = 0) if p̂2 <
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL , or delivers on his own and sell capacity on the platform (d̂
∗
i2 = 1) if
p̂2 >
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL , or chooses either option with same probability if p̂2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL .
The expected number of carriers of this type is λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n.
Type 2 (d̂i1 = 0): Each carrier i of this type purchases capacity from the
platform and eliminates his logistics capability in period 2 (d̂∗i2 = 0) if p̂2 <
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL , or delivers on his own and sell capacity on the platform (d̂
∗
i2 = 1) if
p̂2 >
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL , or chooses either option with same probability if p̂2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL .
The expected number of carriers of this type is λne.
To maximize her profit, the optimal choice of the platform is among the following
three:
1. Choose a price p̂2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL to incentivize type 1 carriers to sell capacity,
and type 2 carriers to purchase or sell capacity with same probability. Then
we can obtain that ns,2 = λ(λn − ne) + λ(1 − λ)n + λne/2 , and np,2 = λne/2.






= α c+2mvL+f(2−α)vL min{[λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n+ λne/2]vL, λnevL/2}
= λα(c+2mvL+f)2−α min{n− ne/2, ne/2}
= λα(c+2mvL+f)ne2(2−α) .
2. Choose a price p̂2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL −ε to incentivize type 1 carriers to sell capacity,
and type 2 carriers to purchase capacity from the platform. Then we can obtain
that ns,2 = λ(λn − ne) + λ(1 − λ)n , and np,2 = λne. Substituting them into





= α( c+2mvL+f(2−α)vL − ε) min{[λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n]vL, λnevL}




2−α − ε, if ne < n/2;
λα(c+2mvL+f)(n−ne)
2−α − ε, if ne ≥ n/2.
3. Choose a price p̂2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL to incentivize type 1 carriers to sell or purchase
capacity with same probability, and type 2 carriers to purchase capacity from
the platform. Then we can obtain that ns,2 = [λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n]/2 , and
np,2 = [λ(λn−ne) + λ(1− λ)n]/2 + λne. Substituting them into Equation (2.3),






= α c+2mvL(2−α)vL min{[λ(λn− ne) + λ(1− λ)n]vL/2, λnevL}
= λα(c+2mvL)2−α min{(n− ne)/2, (n+ ne)/2}
= λα(c+2mvL)(n−ne)2(2−α) .










if (c+2mvL)n2(c+2mvL)+f ≤ ne <
2n









Therefore, the results in Lemma A.2 follow.
Lemma A.3. (Optimal decision of carrier i in period 1) Assume all car-
riers and the capacity sharing platform have a common rational belief ñe about
ne.
1. If ñe > n/2; or ñe ≤ n/2, (c+ f)[2(n−ne)(2n−αne)− (2−α)(2n−ne)ne] ≤
2mvL[(2−α)nne − 2(n− ne)(2n−αne)], and (c+ f)(2−α)(2n− ne)ne − (2n−
αne)(n−ne)c > 2mvL[(2n−αne)(n−ne)−(2−α)nne]; or ñe ≤ n/2, (c+f)[2(n−
ne)(2n−αne)−(2−α)(2n−ne)ne] > 2mvL[(2−α)nne−2(n−ne)(2n−αne)], and
2(c+f)(2−α)(n−ne)ne−(n−αne)(n−ne)c > 2mvL[(n−αne)(n−ne)−(2−α)nne],
the optimal decisions of carrier i are as follows. If p̂1 <
c+2mvL−h





(2−α)vL , then d̂
∗
i1 = −1; if p̂1 =
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , then d̂
∗
i1 = 1 or −1 with an
equal probability.
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2. If ñe ≤ n/2, 2(c + f)(2 − α)(n − ne)ne − (n − αne)(n − ne)c ≤ 2mvL[(n −
αne)(n−ne)−(2−α)nne], and (c+f)(2−α)(2n−ne)ne−(2n−αne)(n−ne)c ≤
2mvL[(2n−αne)(n− ne)− (2−α)nne], the optimal decisions of carrier i are as
follows.
(a) If h ≤ δ(1−λ)f , then if p̂1 < c+2mvL−h(2−α)vL , d̂
∗









i1 = 1 or −1 with an equal probability.
(b) If h > δ(1−λ)f , then if p̂1 < c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f(2−α)vL , d̂
∗
i1 = 0; if p̂1 >
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL ,




i1 = 0 or −1 with an equal probability.
Proof of Lemma A.3. We first determine a carrier’s optimal decision when ñe ≥
2n
3 . Note that ñe is rational and hence is equal, in equilibrium, to the corre-
sponding actual value ne. Thus, according to Lemma A.2, if ñe = ne ≥ 2n3 , then
p̂∗2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL . Each carrier i minimizes his total discounted cost Φ̂i1(d̂i1; p̂1, p̂2)
by comparing the following three options:
1. d̂i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will deliver on
his own and sell capacity in period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2,
i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(−1; p̂1, p̂2) =
c+mvL−[(1−α)p̂1−m]vL+δ(λ(c+mvL−[(1−α)p̂∗2−m]vL)+(1−λ)(c+mvH)).
2. d̂i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will purchase capacity
from the platform or deliver on his own and sell capacity in period 2 with same
probability (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an
expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(0; p̂1, p̂2) = p̂1vL + δ(λ(p̂
∗
2vL/2 + (c+mvL −
[(1− α)p̂∗2 −m]vL + f)/2) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
3. d̂i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will deliver on
his own and sell capacity in period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2,
i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(−1; p̂1, p̂2) =
p̂1vL + h+ δ(λ(c+mvL − [(1− α)p̂∗2 −m]vL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that, if h ≤ δλf , then d̂∗i1 = 1
if p̂1 < (c+2mvL−h)/((2−α)vL), or d̂∗i1 = −1 if p̂1 > (c+2mvL−h)/((2−α)vL).
If h > δλf , then d̂∗i1 = 0 if p̂1 < (c + 2mvL − δλf)/((2 − α)vL), or d̂∗i1 = −1 if
p̂1 > (c+ 2mvL − δλf)/((2− α)vL).
Next we determine the carrier’s optimal decision when (c+2mvL)n2(c+2mvL)+f ≤ ñe <
2n
3 .
Similarly, according to Lemma A.2, p̂∗2 =
c+2mvL+f
(2−α)vL − ε. Each carrier i minimizes
his expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(d̂i1; p̂1, p̂2) by comparing the following
three options:
1. d̂i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will deliver on
his own and sell capacity in period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2,
i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(−1; p̂1, p̂2) =
c+mvL−[(1−α)p̂1−m]vL+δ(λ(c+mvL−[(1−α)p̂∗2−m]vL)+(1−λ)(c+mvH)).
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2. d̂i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will purchase ca-
pacity from the platform in period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2,
i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(0; p̂1, p̂2) =
p̂1vL + δ(λp̂
∗
2vL + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
3. d̂i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will deliver on
his own and sell capacity in period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2,
i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(−1; p̂1, p̂2) =
p̂1vL + h+ δ(λ(c+mvL − [(1− α)p̂∗2 −m]vL) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain the same results as in the case
that ñe ≥ 2n3 . Thus, the carrier’s optimal decision is same as in that case.




According to Lemma A.2, p̂∗2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL . Each carrier i minimizes his expected
total discounted cost Φ̂i1(d̂i1; p̂1, p̂2) by comparing the following three options:
1. d̂i1 = −1: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will purchase
capacity from the platform or deliver on his own and sell capacity in period 2
with same probability (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This
incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(−1; p̂1, p̂2) = c+mvL− [(1−α)p̂1−
m]vL + δ(λ(p̂
∗
2vL/2 + (c+mvL − [(1− α)p̂∗2 −m]vL)/2) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
2. d̂i1 = 0: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will purchase ca-
pacity from the platform in period 2 (if he has low task volume in period 2,
i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(0; p̂1, p̂2) =
p̂1vL + δ(λp̂
∗
2vL + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
3. d̂i1 = 1: In this case, according to Lemma A.2, carrier i will purchase capacity
from the platform or deliver on his own and sell capacity in period 2 with same
probability (if he has low task volume in period 2, i.e., vi2 = vL). This incurs
an expected total discounted cost Φ̂i1(−1; p̂1, p̂2) = p̂1vL +h+ δ(λ(p̂∗2vL/2 + (c+
mvL − [(1− α)p̂∗2 −m]vL)/2) + (1− λ)(c+mvH)).
By comparing the above three options, we obtain that, d̂∗i1 = 0 if p̂1 < (c +
2mvL)/((2− α)vL), or d̂∗i1 = −1 if p̂1 > (c+ 2mvL)/((2− α)vL). Combining the
results in the above three cases together, Lemma A.3 follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.4, we analyze each
case of Lemma A.3 to derive the platform’s expected total discounted profit and
determine the equilibrium price.
We can obtain that case 1 of Lemma A.3 is not in equilibrium, because the
conditions of this case cannot be satisfied under any p̂1. For case 2 of Lemma
A.3, according to Lemma A.2, we have p̂∗2 =
c+2mvL
(2−α)vL . If h ≤ δ(1 − λ)f , that is
f ≥ hδ(1−λ) , then according to Lemma A.3, each carrier purchases capacity from
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the platform and keeps his logistics capability if p̂1 <
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , or delivers on
his own and sell remaining capacity if p̂1 >
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL , or with same probability
to choose either option if p̂1 =
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL . It’s optimal for the platform to choose
p̂∗1 =
c+2mvL−h
(2−α)vL to maximize her profit. This leads to ne = 0 = ñe, with which
the conditions of case 2 are always satisified. This completes the proof of case 1
of Theorem 2.5.
If h > δ(1 − λ)f , that is f < hδ(1−λ) , according to Lemma A.3, each car-
rier purchases capacity from the platform and eliminates his logistics capabil-
ity if p̂1 <
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL or delivers on his own and sell remaining capacity if
p̂1 >
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL , or with same probability to choose either option if p̂1 =
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL . It is optimal for the platform to choose p̂1 =
c+2mvL−δ(1−λ)f
(2−α)vL
to maximize her profit. This leads to ne =
λ
2n = ñe. Substituting them into

























(2−λ) . Combining them with the condition
f < hδ(1−λ) , the result in case 2 of Theorem 2.5 follows.




















































































































































In Region (i), the equilibrium expected total discounted profits of the UCC and

















= (1 + δ)(m + S −M)λnvL + δ(1 − λ)(m + S −M)nvH + λnc +
δnc
(























































λ vLvH + 1− λ
) ≡ c1,
where c1 decreases in n.
In Region (ii), the equilibrium expected total discounted profits of the UCC

















= (m + S −M)((1 + δ)λnvL + (1 − λ)nvH) + δλnc + (c −
h)n
(












































λ vLvH + 1− λ
)
+ αλ[(1+δ)2mvL−h]2(2−α) − (m+ S −M)[(1 + δ)λvL + (1− λ)vH ]

















) ≡ δ1; or c < c2 and δ < δ1.
In Region (iii), the equilibrium expected total discounted profits of the UCC and










= (1 + δ)(m+ S −
M)λnvL + λn((1 + δ)c − h) − (1 + δ)
√























































) ≡ h1, where h1 increases
in n.
Proof of Theorem 2.7. In Region (i), according to Theorems 2.4 and 2.5, we
can obtain that n1 = λn, n2 = n, np,1 =
λn
2 , and np,2 =
λn
2 . Thus, we have
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∆̄ψ = (λn −
√
λn + n −
√
n)ψ and ∆̂ψ =
5
4λnψ. By comparing ∆̄ψ and ∆̂ψ in








results for Regions (ii) and (iii) can be determined.



































(1−λ)nvH . One can see that max{m8,m9}






, where ñp and ñs are the rational be-
liefs about the number of carriers who purchase capacity from the platform and
who sell capacity on the platform, respectively.
Similar to the proofs of Lemma 2.1, we can derive the optimal decision of each
carrier i as follows.
1. Each carrier i with vi = vH uses the UCC’s service if p̄ ≤ m+ cvH , or delivers
on his own if p̄ > m+ cvH .
2. Each carrier i with vi = vL uses the UCC’s service if p̄ ≤ m+ cvL−θ[(1−α)p̂−m]
and p̂ ≥ p̄, or purchases capacity from the platform if p̄ > p̂ and p̂ < c+(1+θ)mvL[1+θ(1−α)]vL ,
or delivers on his own if p̄ > m+ cvL − θ[(1−α)p̂−m] and p̂ >
c+(1+θ)mvL
[1+θ(1−α)]vL . Note
that carrier i is indifferent between purchasing capacity from the platform and
delivering on his own if p̂ = c+(1+θ)mvL[1+θ(1−α)]vL .
According to the assumption (1 − α)p̂ − m < ( 1vL −
1
vH
)c, we can obtain that
m+ cvL − θ[(1− α)p̂−m] > m+
c
vH
. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1, we can
obtain that the optimal choice of the consolidator is among the following:
1. Choose p̄∗ > c+2mvL(2−α)vL and p̂
∗ = c+2mvL(2−α)vL . Under these prices, each carrier i with
vi = vH delivers on his own, and each carrier i with vi = vL is indifferent between
delivering on his own (and selling his remaining capacity to the platform) and
purchasing capacity on the platform. The consolidator’s profit is αλn(c+2mvL)2(2−α) .
2. Choose p̄∗ = m + cvL and p̂
∗ ≥ m + cvL . Under these prices, each carrier i
with vi = vH delivers on his own, and each carrier i with vi = vL uses the UCC’s
service. The consolidator’s profit is (m+ S −M)λnvL + λnc−
√
λnC.
3. Choose p̄∗ = m + cvH and p̂
∗ ≥ m + cvL . Under these prices, each carrier i







It is optimal for the consolidator to choose the choice that leads to a largest
profit. Comparing the consolidator’s profit under the above three choices, we
can obtain the results in Theorem 2.8.
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λ(1−λ)nvL . The proof
is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.4 and thus omitted.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter 3
Recall that we make the following assumptions in this chapter:








i,t, then the retailer always
chooses d′i,t.
Assumption 2. p+ uo ≤ V < p+ ub + (1− θ)c.
Assumption 3. (1− θ)c/2 < uo − ub < min{θc, (1− θ)c}.
Assumption 4. θ + (1−θ)ca < λ < 1−
(1−θ)c
a and a > 2c/θ
2.
Given the probabilities P{m} and P{s|m}, we can derive the probability distri-
bution of s as P{s = 0} = 1− (1− θ)di,t and P{s = 1} = (1− θ)di,t, according
to Bayes’ Theorem.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. In the model without consumer reviews, the retailer de-
cides a product description level db,t for the offline channel. The consumers
with perceived signal s = 1 will never purchase the product according to Equa-
tion (3.1) and Assumption 6. The consumers with perceived signal s = 0 pur-
chase the product if E[U |s = 0] ≥ ub, i.e., V −
c(1−θ)(1−db,t)
1−(1−θ)db,t − p ≥ ub, ac-
cording to Equation (3.1). By solving this inequality for db,t, we obtain that
db,t ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , under which these consumers with perceived sig-
nal s = 0 will purchase the product. Note that the retailer can only choose a
db,t ≤ d̄ < 1, thus,
1. if 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) ≤ d̄, then the retailer can attract the consumers
with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a db,t ∈
[ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , d̄], or not attract these consumers to purchase the




(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) which will reuslt in
zero profit and always be dominated by the former choice. Thus the latter
is omitted in the following discussions.
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2. if 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) > d̄, then the retailer can never attract the con-
sumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product.
By solving the above inequalities for V , under Assumption 6, we obtain the
following cases:
1. if V ≥ p+ ub + (1−θ)(1−d̄)c1−(1−θ)d̄ = V̂ and d̄ ≤
(1−θ)c−(uo−ub)
(1−θ)[c−(uo−ub)] = d̂, or d̄ > d̂, the
retailer can attract the consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase
the product by choosing a db,t ∈ [ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , d̄], and generate a
profit πb,t(db,t) = p×n×(1−(1−θ)db,t). One can see that πb,t(db,t) decreases

















2. if V < V̂ and d̄ ≤ d̂, the retailer can never attract the consumers with
perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product, which means πb,t(db,t) = 0.
Thus, according to Assumption 1, the retailer is optimal to choose d∗b,t = 0
with π∗b,t = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. In the model without consumer reviews, the retailer de-
cides a product description level do,t for the online channel. Similar to the proof
of Lemma 3.1, we can obtain that the consumers with perceived signal s = 1
will never purchase the product, and the consumers with s = 0 will purchase
the product if do,t ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . The retailer can attract these con-




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) and generate a profit πo,t(do,t) = p× n× (1− (1− θ)do,t).















Proof of Lemma 3.3. In the model without consumer reviews, the retailer de-
cides a product description level domni,t for both channels. The offline consumers
will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ ub and online consumers will purchase the
product if E[U |s] ≥ uo, where E[U |s] is derived in Equation (3.1). Similar to the
proofs of Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, we can obtain that the consumers with perceived
signal s = 1 will never purchase the product, the offline consumers with per-
ceived signal s = 0 will purchase the product if domni,t ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) ,
and the online consumers with perceived signal s = 0 will purchase the product
if domni,t ≥ 11−θ +
θc








(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) . The optimal choice of the retailer
is among the following two:
115
1. attract both the offline and online consumers with perceived signal s = 0
to purchase the product by choosing a domni,t ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) ,
and generate a profit
πomni,t(domni,t) = p× (n× φb,t(domni,t) + n× φo,t(domni,t))
= p× (n× P{s = 0}+ n× P{s = 0})
= 2pn(1− (1− θ)domni,t).
(B.1)
One can see that πomni,t(domni,t) decreases in domni,t, so it is optimal for the




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) to maximize her profit.




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) into Equation (B.1), we
obtain that π∗omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c .
2. attract the offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the







and generate a profit
πomni,t(domni,t) = p× (n× φb,t(domni,t) + n× φo,t(domni,t))
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)domni,t).
(B.2)
One can see that πomni,t(domni,t) decreases in domni,t, so it is optimal for the




(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) to maximize her profit.




(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) into Equation (B.2), we
obtain that π∗omni,t =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c .
By comparing the optimal profits of the retailer under choices 1 and 2, we can
obtain that 2θnpcp−V+uo+c >
θnpc
p−V+ub+c according to assumptions 6 and 3. Thus








Proof of Theorem 3.4. According to Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, we determine the opti-














According to Lemma 3.3, the optimal profit of the retailer who integrates the
offline and online channels is π∗omni,t =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c . One can see that π
∗
omni,t >
π∗dual,t if d̄ ≤ d̂ and V ≥ V̂ . Otherwise, according to Assumption 3, we can prove
that π∗omni,t < π
∗
dual,t.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides
a product description level do,2 in period 2 for the online channel. According
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to Equation (3.2), period 2 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 purchase the
product if E[U |s = 0] ≥ uo, i.e., V − c(1−θ)(1−do,2)1−(1−θ)do,2 +ψ(λ)− p ≥ uo, and period 2
consumers with perceived signal s = 1 purchase the product if E[U |s = 1] ≥ uo,
i.e., V − c + ψ(λ) − p ≥ uo. Solving these two inequalities for V and do,2, we
obtain the following cases:
1. if V ≥ p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ψ(λ), the retailer can attract all the period
2 consumers to purchase the product by choosing any do,2. In this case,
πo,2(do,2) = p × n, so it’s optimal for the retailer to choose d†o,2 = 0 with
π†o,2 = pn.
2. if p+uo−ψ(λ) ≤ V < p+uo+ (1−θ)c−ψ(λ), the retailer can attract the
period 2 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product
by choosing a do,2 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) , and generate a profit
πo,2(do,2) = pn(1−(1−θ)do,2). One can see that πo,2(do,2) decreases in do,2,















3. if V < p+uo−ψ(λ), the retailer can never attract any period 2 consumer
to purchase the product which means πo,2(do,2) = 0. Thus it’s optimal for
the retailer to choose d†o,2 = 0 with π
†
o,2 = 0.
Combining Assumption 6 and the conditions of V in the above 3 cases, we can
obtain the results in Lemma 3.5 accordingly.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides
a product description level do,1 in period 1 for the online channel. The period 1
consumers with perceived signal s = 1 will never purchase the product according
to Assumption 6. The period 1 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 purchase
the product if E[U |s = 0] ≥ uo, i.e., V − c(1−θ)(1−do,1)1−(1−θ)do,1 − p ≥ uo. By solving
this inequality for do,1, we obtain that do,1 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . Thus the
retailer has two choices in period 1: not attract period 1 consumers to purchase




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) ; or attract period 1
consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a
do,1 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) .




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , in which the profit
is πo,1(do,1) = 0 in period 1. In this case, no consumer review is generated so the
expected impact of consumer reviews on period 2 consumers is ψ(λ) = 0. Thus,
in period 2, the consumers have the same expected utilities as that in the model
without consumer reviews, and the retailer will make the same optimal decisions
as that in the model without consumer reviews. According to Lemma 3.2, it is




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) in period 2 with
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a profit π†o,2 =
θnpc





is independent of do,1. Thus it’s optimal for the retailer to choose d
†




We then analyze the case that do,1 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . In this case, period
1 consumers with perceived signal s = 0 will purchase the product, and the
retailer generate a profit in period 1 as follows:
πo,1(do,1) = p× n× φo,1(do,1)
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)do,1).
The actual misfit degree m of these period 1 consumers who purchase the product
has the following distributions:
P{m = 0|s = 0} = P{s=0|m=0}P{m=0}P{s=0} =
θ
1−(1−θ)do,1 ,
P{m = 1|s = 0} = P{s=0|m=1}P{m=1}P{s=0} =
(1−θ)(1−do,1)
1−(1−θ)do,1 .
With probability η, the period 1 consumers with U = V − p − cm ≥ uo will
write positive reviews, and the period 1 consumers with U = V − p − cm < uo
will write negative reviews. According to Assumption 6, these two inequalities
indicate that with probability η, the period 1 consumers with m = 0 will write
positive reviews, while the consumers with m = 1 will write negative reviews.
Thus, the expected number of positive consumer reviews is η × n × P{s =
0} × P{m = 0|s = 0} = ηθn and the expected number of negative consumer
reviews is η×n×P{s = 0}×P{m = 1|s = 0} = η(1−θ)(1−do,1)n, so the expected




1−(1−θ)do,1 , and the expected impact of consumer reviews






Lemma 3.5, we have the following three cases.
1. π†o,2 = 0 if ψ(λ) ≤ uo − ub − (1 − θ)c, or uo − ub − (1 − θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0
and V < p+uo−ψ(λ). Substituting ψ(λ) into these inequalities and solve




(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) . In this case,
Πo = πo,1(do,1) + π
†
o,2 = pn(1− (1− θ)do,1).
2. π†o,2 =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) if uo−ub−(1−θ)c < ψ(λ) < 0 and V ≥ p+uo−ψ(λ),
or 0 ≤ ψ(λ) ≤ uo−ub, or uo−ub < ψ(λ) < (1−θ)c and V < p+uo+(1−θ)c−
ψ(λ). Substituting ψ(λ) into these inequalities and solve them for do,1, we
can obtain 11−θ +
θa





In this case, Πo = πo,1(do,1)+π
†
o,2 = pn(1− (1−θ)do,1)+
θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) =
pn(1− (1− θ)do,1) + (1−(1−θ)do,1)θnpc(1−(1−θ)do,1)(aλ+p−V+uo+c)−θa .
3. π†o,2 = pn if uo−ub < ψ(λ) < (1− θ)c and V ≥ p+uo + (1− θ)c−ψ(λ), or
ψ(λ) ≥ (1− θ)c. Substituting ψ(λ) into these inequalities and solve them
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for do,1, we can obtain do,1 ≥ 11−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) . In this case,
Πo = πo,1(do,1) + π
†
o,2 = pn(1− (1− θ)do,1) + pn.
Since do,1 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , the above three cases may or may not happen
depending on their corresponding conditions of do,1. Specifically,






(1−θ)(V−p−uo−aλ) , which can be rewritten
as V ≥ p+uo+(1−θ)c− c(a(λ−θ)−(1−θ)c)a−c , the optimal choice of the retailer
is among the following three:







satisfies the condition in the above case 1, with a profit Πo = pn(1−
(1 − θ)do,1). One can see that Πo decreases in do,1, so it is optimal





her profit. In this case, Π†o =
θnpc
p−V+uo+c .







which satisfies the condition in the above case 2, with a profit Πo =
pn(1− (1− θ)do,1) + (1−(1−θ)do,1)θnpc(1−(1−θ)do,1)(aλ+p−V+uo+c)−θa . According to As-
sumption 4, we can prove that Πo increases in do,1, so it is optimal





maximize her profit. In this case, Π†o =
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
(iii) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , 1] which satisfies the
condition in the above case 3, with a profit Πo = pn(1−(1−θ)do,1)+
pn. One can see that Πo decreases in do,1, so it is optimal for the





her profit. In this case, Π†o =
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
Comparing the above optimal profits Π†o of the retailer under the above 3
choices, we can prove that θnpap−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + np >
θnpc
p−V+uo+c according
















p−V+uo+c . According to Assumption 4, we can prove that
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ+

















which can be rewritten as p+uo+(1−θ)c− ca(λ−θ)a−c ≤ V < p+uo+(1−θ)c−
c(a(λ−θ)−(1−θ)c)
a−c , the optimal choice of the retailer is among the following
two:
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which satisfies the condition in the above case 2, with a profit Πo =
pn(1− (1− θ)do,1) + (1−(1−θ)do,1)θnpc(1−(1−θ)do,1)(aλ+p−V+uo+c)−θa . According to As-
sumption 4, we can prove that Πo increases in do,1, so it is optimal





maximize her profit. In this case, Π†o =
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
(ii) choose a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ +
θa
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , 1] which satisfies the
condition in the above case 3, with a profit Πo = pn(1−(1−θ)do,1)+
pn. One can see that Πo decreases in do,1, so it is optimal for the





her profit. In this case, Π†o =
θnpa
p−V+uo+(1−θ)c+aλ + pn.
Note that the optimal description level d†o,1 and profit Π
†
o are the same














(1−θ)(V−p−uo−(1−θ)c−aλ) , which can be
rewritten as V < p + uo + (1 − θ)c − ca(λ−θ)a−c , the optimal choice of the
retailer is choosing a do,1 ∈ [ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) , 1] which satisfies the
condition in the above case 3, with a profit Πo = pn(1− (1− θ)do,1) + pn.









In summary, the retailer’s optimal decision d†o,1 and profit Π
†
o are as follows:





















Combining Assumption 6 and the conditions of V in that case, we can obtain
the results in Lemma 3.6 accordingly.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. According to Lemma 3.2, we can determine the optimal
online total profit of the retailer who operates the offline and online channels







p−V+uo+c . Comparing it with Π
†
o in Lemma 3.6, we find that

















2. if λ ≥ λ̄ and V < V̄1, or λ < λ̄, Π†o = θnpcp−V+uo+c + pn. According to





Note that V̄2 > V̄1, so Theorem 3.7 follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides
a product description level domni,2 for both channels in period 2. The period 2
offline consumers will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ ub and period 2 online
consumers will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ uo, where E[U |s] is derived in
Equation (3.2). Similar to the proofs of Lemma 3.5, by solving these inequalities
for V , we can determine the conditions under which different types of consumers
will purchase the product, and obtain the following cases:
1. if V ≥ p+uo + (1− θ)c−ψ(λ), the retailer can attract the period 2 offline
consumers with perceived signal s = 0 and period 2 online consumers with
perceived signal s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing any domni,2.
In this case, the retailer’s profit is
πomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× (n× P{s = 0}+ n× P{s = 0})
= 2pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that πomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal for
the retailer to choose d†omni,2 = 0 to maximize her profit. In this case,
π†omni,2 = 2pn.
2. if p+ uo − ψ(λ) ≤ V < p+ uo + (1− θ)c− ψ(λ), the optimal choice of the
retailer is among the following two:
(a) attract both the period 2 offline consumers with perceived signal
s = 0 and the period 2 online consumers with perceived signal
s = 0 to purchase the product by choosing a domni,2 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c) , and generate a profit
πomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× (n× P{s = 0}+ n× P{s = 0})
= 2pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that πomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal





maximize her profit. In this case, π†omni,2 =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) .
(b) attract the period 2 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to






(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c)), and generate a profit
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πomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that πomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal





maximize her profit. In this case, π†omni,2 =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) .
Comparing the optimal profits of the retailer under choices (a) and (b), we
can prove that 2θnpcp−V+uo+c−ψ(λ) >
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) according to assumptions










3. if p+ ub − ψ(λ) ≤ V < p+ uo − ψ(λ), the optimal choice of the retailer is
attracting the period 2 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to pur-






(1−θ)(V+ψ(λ)−p−uo−c)), and generate a profit
πomni,2(domni,2) = p× (n× φb,2(domni,2) + n× φo,2(domni,2))
= p× n× P{s = 0}
= pn(1− (1− θ)domni,2).
One can see that πomni,2(domni,2) decreases in domni,2, so it is optimal for





her profit. In this case, π†omni,2 =
θnpc
p−V+ub+c−ψ(λ) .
4. if V < p+ ub−ψ(λ), the retailer can never attract any period 2 consumer
to purchase the product which means πomni,2(domni,2) = 0. Thus, it’s
optimal for the retailer to choose d†omni,2 = 0 with π
†
omni,2 = 0.
Combining Assumption 6 and the conditions of V in the above 4 cases, we can
obtain the results in Lemma 3.8 accordingly.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. In the model with consumer reviews, the retailer decides
a product description level domni,1 for both channels in period 1. The period
1 offline consumers will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ ub and the period 1
online consumers will purchase the product if E[U |s] ≥ uo. Similar to the proofs
of Lemma 3.6, by solving these inequalities for domni,1, we can determine the
conditions under which different types of consumers will purchase the product,
and obtain that the optimal choice of the retailer is among the following three:
1. attract both the period 1 online consumers with perceived signal s = 0
and the period 1 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to purchase
the product by choosing a domni,1 ≥ 11−θ +
θc
(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c) . Similar to
the proof of Lemma 3.6, by considering the expected impact of consumer
reviews on period 2 consumers and the optimal profit π†omni,2 the retailer
can generate in period 2, we can determine the retailer’s optimal decision
and profit in period 1 under this choice as follows:
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2. attract the period 1 offline consumers with perceived signal s = 0 to pur-






(1−θ)(V−p−uo−c)). Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.6, by considering the
expected impact of consumer reviews on period 2 consumers and the opti-
mal profit π†omni,2 the retailer can generate in period 2, we can determine
the retailer’s optimal decision and profit in period 1 under this choice. It
turns out that the optimal profits under this choice are no larger than
the profits under the above choice 1, which means that this choice 2 is
dominated by the above choice 1, and thus not optimal.





(1−θ)(V−p−ub−c) , with a profit πomni,1(domni,1) = 0 in
period 1. Under this choice, no consumer review is generated so the ex-
pected impact of consumer reviews on period 2 consumers is ψ(λ) = 0.
Thus, in period 2, the consumers have the same expected utilities as that
in the model without consumer reviews, and the retailer will make the
same optimal decisions as that in the model without consumer reviews.













p−V+uo+c , which is independent
of do,1. Thus, it’s optimal for the retailer to choose d
†
omni,1 = 0 with
Π†omni =
2θnpc
p−V+uo+c . It is easy to see that this profit is less than the opti-
mal profits of the retailer under choice 1, which means that this choice 3
is dominated by the above choice 1 and thus not optimal.
In conclusion, the results under the above choice 1 are optimal. Combining
Assumption 6 and the conditions of V in that choice, we can obtain the results
in Lemma 3.9 accordingly.
Proof of Corollary 3.10. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.7 and
thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 3.11. According to Lemmas 3.1 and 3.6, we can determine the
optimal total profit of the retailer who operates the offline and online channels









p−V+uo+c + np if d̄ ≤ d̂, λ > λ̂, and V < V̄1; or d̄ ≤ d̂, λ ≤ λ̂, and









aλ+p−V+uo+(1−θ)c + np if d̄ ≤ d̂, λ > λ̂, and V ≥ V̂ ;





p−V+uo+c + np if d̄ ≤ d̂, λ̄ ≤ λ ≤ λ̂, and V̂ ≤ V < V̄1;
or d̄ ≤ d̂, λ ≤ λ̄, and V ≥ V̂ ; or d̄ > d̂, λ > λ̄, and V < V̄1; or d̄ > d̂ and
λ ≤ λ̄.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4, by comparing Π†dual with Π
†
omni in Lemma
3.9 in each cases, we can obtain the results in Theorem 3.11.
Proof of Corollary 3.12. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemmas 3.1 and
3.2, and thus omitted.




Proofs of Chapter 4
We make the following assumptions in the chapter:
Assumption 5. t ≤ min{V − pc, V − ps,m, V − ps,c}.
Assumption 6. VH − V ∈ [t, 2t].
Assumption 7. pc > p̄ ≡ max{(1 + 2θ )t, 2(VH − V )− t, 3t− θ(VH − V ), VH − V +
3t
2θ−1 , VH − V +
[(1−αm)+(1−θ)(1−αc)]t
θ(1−αm) }.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. If the seller only sells her product through the marketplace
c, according to Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we can obtain a high-type consumer’s
utility of purchasing a product from the seller and the marketplace c are as
follows.
us,c = V − tx− ps,c
uc = VH − tx− pc
A low-type consumer’s utility of purchasing a product from the seller and the
marketplace c are as follows.
us,c = V − tx− ps,c
uc = V − tx− pc
According to the above equations, we can determine the conditions under which
a high-type consumer at location x will purchase a product: If ps,c ≥ pc+V −VH ,
then the consumer purchases the product of the marketplace c; If ps,c < pc +
V − VH , then the consumer purchases the product of the seller. The conditions
under which a low-type consumer at location x will purchase a product are: If
ps,c ≥ pc, then the consumer purchases the product of the marketplace c; If
ps,c < pc, then the consumer purchases the product of the seller. The seller has
the following options to decide the price of her product.
1. The seller chooses a price ps,c ≥ pc, under which all the consumers will
purchase the product of the marketplace c. The seller’s expected profit is
πs,c = 0.
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2. The seller chooses a price ps,c ∈ [pc + V − VH , pc), under which the high-
type consumers will purchase the product of the marketplace c, and the
low-type consumers will purchase the product of the seller. The seller’s
expected profit is πs,c = (1 − θ)(1 − α)nps,c, which is linearly increasing
in ps,c. To maximize her profit, the seller will choose ps,c = pc, with an
expected profit πs,c = (1− θ)(1− α)npc.
3. The seller chooses a price ps,c < pc+V −VH , under which all the consumers
will purchase the product of the seller. The seller’s expected profit is
πs,c = (1 − α)nps,c, which is linearly increasing in ps,c. To maximize her
profit, the seller will choose ps,c = pc + V − VH , with an expected profit
πs,c = (1− α)n(pc + V − VH).
The seller will set the price to maximize her profit by comparing the profits in
the above options, and Lemma 4.1 follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. If the seller only sells her product through the marketplace
m, according to Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we can obtain a high-type consumer’s
utility of purchasing a product from the seller and the marketplace c are as
follows.
us,m = V − t(1− x)− ps,m
uc = VH − tx− pc
A low-type consumer’s utility of purchasing a product from the seller and the
marketplace c are as follows.
us,m = V − t(1− x)− ps,m
uc = V − tx− pc
According to the above equations, we can determine the conditions under which a
high-type consumer at location x will purchase a product: If x ≤ 12−
pc−ps,m+V−VH
2t ,
then the consumer purchases the product of the marketplace c; If x > 12 −
pc−ps,m+V−VH
2t , then the consumer purchases the product of the seller. The con-
ditions under which a low-type consumer at location x will purchase a product
are: If x ≤ 12 −
pc−ps,m
2t , then the consumer purchases the product of the mar-
ketplace c; If x > 12 −
pc−ps,m
2t , then the consumer purchases the product of
the seller. The seller has the following options to decide the price of her prod-
uct. In summary, the seller’s demand is Ds,m = θn[1 − F(max{0,min{1, 12 −
pc−ps,m+V−VH




2t }})], where F(·) is
the cumulative distribution function of the distribution of x. The seller has the
following options to decide the price of her product.
1. The seller chooses a price ps,m > pc+t, under whichDs,m = 0 and πs,m = 0.
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2. The seller chooses a price ps,m ∈ (pc + t + V − VH , pc + t], under which
Ds,m =
(1−θ)n
2t (pc − ps,m + t) and πs,m =
(1−θ)(1−αm)n
2t ps,m(pc − ps,m + t),
which is concave in ps,m. According to Assumption 7, to maximize her
profit, the seller will choose p∗s,m = pc + t + V − VH , with an expected
profit πs,m =
(1−θ)(1−αm)n
2t (VH − V )(pc + t+ V − VH).
3. The seller chooses a price ps,m ∈ (pc − t, pc + t + V − VH ], under which
Ds,m =
θn
2t (pc + V − VH + t − ps,m) +
(1−θ)n
2t (pc − ps,m + t) and πs,m =
θ(1−αm)n
2t (pc + V − VH + t − ps,m)ps,m +
(1−θ)(1−αm)n
2t ps,m(pc − ps,m + t),
which is concave in ps,m. According to Assumption 7, to maximize her
profit, the seller will choose p∗s,m = pc − t, with an expected profit πs,m =
(1− αm)n(pc − t)(1− θ(VH−V )2t ).
4. The seller chooses a price ps,m ∈ (pc − t + V − VH , pc − t], under which
Ds,m =
θn
2t (pc + V − VH + t − ps,m) + (1 − θ)n and πs,m =
θ(1−αm)n
2t (pc +
V − VH + t− ps,m)ps,m + (1− θ)(1− αm)nps,m, which is concave in ps,m.
According to Assumption 7, to maximize her profit, the seller will choose
p∗s,m = pc − t + V − VH , with an expected profit πs,m = (1 − αm)n(pc +
V − VH − t) if θ > 0.5, or choose p∗s,m = pc − t, with an expected profit
πs,m = (1− αm)n(pc − t)[1− θ2t(VH − V )] if θ ≤ 0.5.
5. The seller chooses a price ps,m ≤ pc−t+V −VH , under which Ds,m = n and
πs,m = (1 − αm)nps,m, which is linearly increasing in ps,m. To maximize
her profit, the seller will choose p∗s,m = pc − t+ V − VH with an expected
profit πs,m = (1− αm)n(pc − t+ V − VH).
The seller will set the price to maximize her profit by comparing the profits in
the above options, and Lemma 4.2 follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. If the seller sells her product through both marketplaces
c and m, according to Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we can obtain a high-type
consumer’s utility of purchasing a product from the seller and the marketplace
c are as follows.
us,c = V − tx− ps
us,m = V − t(1− x)− ps
uc = VH − tx− pc
A low-type consumer’s utility of purchasing a product from the seller and the
marketplace c are as follows.
us,c = V − tx− ps
us,m = V − t(1− x)− ps
uc = V − tx− pc
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According to the above equations, we can determine the conditions under which
a high-type consumer at location x will purchase a product: If ps ≥ pc +V −VH
and ps ≥ pc+V −VH−t(1−2x), then the consumer purchases the product of the
marketplace c; If ps < pc+V −VH and t(1−2x) ≥ 0, then the consumer purchases
the product of the seller from the marketplace c; If ps < pc +V −VH − t(1− 2x)
and t(1−2x) < 0, then the consumer purchases the product of the seller from the
marketplace m. The conditions under which a low-type consumer at location x
will purchase a product are: If ps ≥ pc and ps ≥ pc−t(1−2x), then the consumer
purchases the product of the marketplace c; If ps < pc and t(1 − 2x) ≥ 0, then
the consumer purchases the product of the seller from the marketplace c; If
ps < pc − t(1− 2x) and t(1− 2x) < 0, then the consumer purchases the product
of the seller from the marketplace m. The seller has the following options to
decide the price of her product.
1. The seller chooses a price ps ≥ pc, under which the high-type consumers








2t , and the low-type consumers will purchase the product of the
seller from the marketplace m if x > 12 −
pc−ps
2t or purchase the product of
the marketplace c if x ≤ 12−
pc−ps
2t . Thus, the seller’s demand isDs = θn[1−
F(max{0,min{1, 12 −
pc−ps+V−VH





2. The seller chooses a price ps ∈ [pc+V −VH , pc), under which the high-type
consumers will purchase the product of the seller from the marketplace m
if x > 12 −
pc−ps+V−VH
2t or purchase the product of the marketplace c if
x ≤ 12−
pc−ps+V−VH
2t , and the low-type consumers will purchase the product
of the seller from the marketplace m if x > 12 or purchase the product of
the seller from the marketplace c if x ≤ 12 . Thus, the seller’s demand is







3. The seller chooses a price ps < pc + V − VH , under which the high-type
consumers will purchase the product of the seller from the marketplace m
if x > 12 or purchase the product of the seller from the marketplace c if
x ≤ 12 , and the low-type consumers will purchase the product of the seller
from the marketplace m if x > 12 or purchase the product of the seller from





More specifically, the seller can choose from the following options to decide her
price to maximize the profit.
1. The seller chooses a price ps ≥ pc + t, under which the seller’s demand is
Ds = 0 and πs = 0.
2. The seller chooses a price ps ∈ [pc, pc+ t), under which the seller’s demand
is Ds =
(1−θ)n
2t (pc − ps + t) and πs =
(1−θ)(1−αm)n
2t ps(pc − ps + t), which
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is concave in ps. According to Assumption 7, to maximize her profit, the
seller will choose ps = pc, with an expected profit πs =
(1−θ)(1−αm)npc
2 .
3. The seller chooses a price ps ∈ [pc+t+V −VH , pc), under which the seller’s









which is linearly increasing in ps. To maximize her profit, the seller will





4. The seller chooses a price ps ∈ [pc+V −VH , pc+ t+V −VH), under which
the seller’s demand is Ds =
θn












which is concave in ps. According to Assumption 7, to maximize her













2 , which is linearly increasing
in ps. To maximize her profit, the seller will choose ps = pc + V − VH ,





The seller will set the price to maximize her profit by comparing the profits in
the above five options, and Lemma 4.3 follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. The seller will decide to sell her product through the
marketplace(s) that can maximize her profit, by comparing the profits in Lemmas
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. According to Theorem 4.4 and Assumption 7, the mar-
ketplace c can choose from the following options to decide its product price pc
to maximize its profit.
1. If αc ≤ αm, the marketplace c can set any price pc > (1+ 2θ )t. In this case,
the seller only sells through the marketplace c and p∗s,c = pc + V − VH .
The marketplace c has Dc =
θn
2 and πc = αcn(pc + V − VH) +
θnpc
2 , which
is linearly increasing in pc. To maximize its profit, the marketplace c will
choose the highest p∗c .
2. If αc > αm, the marketplace c can set any price pc ≤ VH−V + 2(1−αm)tαc−αm . In
this case, the seller sells through both marketplaces and p∗s = pc+V −VH .
The marketplace c has Dc =
θn




2 , which is
linearly increasing in pc. To maximize its profit, the marketplace c will




Proof of Corollary 4.6. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of The-
orem 4.5, and thus omitted here.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Define ᾱ1 =
[2t−θ(VH−V )]2





(1−θ)(3t−θ(VH−V )) . The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of
Theorem 4.5, and thus omitted here.
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